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IN THE SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petlt iunri

:

v.

t

DONALD L. JAEGER,

'

I ' Priority Mo. ^4

Defendant/Respondent«
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF p R Q C EEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a grant of writ of
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
j u r i s d i e t , In ii!! il Illi -"ill I In

case

1

under utah Code -

:

8 - 2(3) (a)

(1992).
STATEMENI or Tttis xSSUES PRESENTED ON CERTIORARI
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
i *

The

]

Did the c o m «

ppeals erroneously conclude that

the State has no right to seek appellate review
heai j •
based
there

::: Il: Dr der ::1 il sm :I s si i lg a :!:::i r s t: d e g r e e ic ,. ..

, u rmation

the preliminary hearing magistrate's conclusion that
- H not probable cause to bind over defend?

T h i s ni s a q JI o s L11111 "i I il • \ < ; in i

appeals' legal conclusion.

,!e t erencc

matters of

*• . ^x

-f

State v, James,

(Utah 1991); AsaS- "-1 > Watkins. 753
(qUesL

given

)

egislative intent and statutory interpretation are

2.

Did the preliminary hearing magistrate apply an

incorrect legal standard for determining probable cause to bind
defendant over for trial?

This is a question of law; the

magistrate's conclusion is accorded no deference on appeal and is
reviewed for correctness.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,

1070 (Utah 1985).
3.

Did the preliminary hearing magistrate erroneously

conclude that there was insufficient evidence to bind defendant
over for trial on a charge of criminal homicide?

In reviewing a

dismissal of an information for insufficient evidence, the
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the information and, when so viewed, determine if
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the
charge.

If so, the dismissal must be reversed.

See Highland

Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah
1984); Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728-29 (Utah 1983).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The full text of all cited provisions is set forth in
the addenda to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(1990) (R. 1-2) (Addendum 1). A preliminary hearing was held in
circuit court; at its conclusion, the magistrate took the case
under advisement (R. 17-19).

The magistrate subsequently issued

a memorandum decision in which he concluded that there was no
2

defendant 1< i I i n't I \ nl i/dt H J I

probable cause
di schaxyeil IT

xidendum 1!)

On February 6

1,991 thu

court issued a n order dismissing the felony information (R. JU)
(Addendum
The State appealed directly to the court of appeals (R.
4 4 r 48-49)

month before the scheduled oral argument, this

Court issued

i i i. S ta te w. Humphrey, hi \ i . .'ii "i i (Utah

-

(reversing State v . Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah A p p .
1990)

Defendant requested that supplemental briefing I .

jurisdictiona

:&«.;• -aised

the request

,-

^

. ^

.I&S^RS

oncurred in

appeals deniec

£

and summari

appeal for lack

* ^isdiction

lismissed

State v. Jaeger

State's
910132-CA

(Utah
t

. i ,, ,

1992

,

*>*

ertiorari.

On June

,

- petition was granted.
,^x>TEMENT ui iH£ FACTS
Shortly aftei midnight: on August 22, 1990, Mary Barndt

lay dying on her kitchen floe >
Office: s? i mi paramt
nineteen year
37;

anea . .

breathing but

--e found the

moving (T. 20-21 f 28-

j

unshot wound surrounded
5 apple

two feet from
pistol

v

J. . j

9

or

right foot wa* = .22 caliber semi-automatic
AX

vr

3

"just ahead of the gun a little bit . . • kind of in between her
—

her ankles off to the side of the gunM (T. 10). Mary had on a

skirt but was naked from the waist up; a bra was lying on the
floor to her left (T. 14-15).

Defendant, Mary's live-in

boyfriend, was kneeling next to her head; he was not touching her
but speaking to the 911 operator on the telephone (T. 10, 23-24,
123).
Officer Sundquist told the paramedics not to disturb
Mary's hands.

He immediately taped two brown bags over her hands

to preserve any evidence (T. 16-17, 28). The paramedics placed
Mary on a backboard to bring her to the ambulance (R. 114-15).
While the officer did not see any motion (T. 28), a paramedic
"noticed in particular that her feet were moving," she was
••squirming around," "kicking her legs and moving her arm" (T.
115).
At the hospital, Officer Sundquist removed the taped
bag from Mary's left hand and performed a paraffin (GSR) test for
gunshot powder residue.

Officer Peterson did the same to her

right hand (T. 17, 19, 31-32, 70). Officer Sundquist had not
performed a GSR test previously but carefully followed the
directions which came with the test kit and properly secured the
testing daubers (T. 18-19).

Officer Peterson was experienced in

performing the test and followed the kit directions completely
(T. 70-71).

The samples were taken while medical personnel were

attempting to save Mary, but neither officer felt that this
affected their ability to properly conduct the tests (T. 18, 31,

4

70-71, 80). GSR tests were also done on defendant (T. 71-72).
Ballistic tests established that the recovered gun was
relatively "clean" but when fired with a bullet, it left gunshot
residue on the hand of the shooter (T. 11-12, 26-27, 67, 98,
100).

The GSR tests established that Mary's hands did not

contain any substances indicative of gunpowder residue (T. 8990).

Both of defendant's hands contained substances

"characteristic" of gunpowder residue (T. 89-90).l
Defendant told the police that the gun belonged to his
boss.

Defendant stated that "he'd been having problems with an

individual that was a previous person living at his residence and
so he had gone to the business and picked up the gun for his own
safety" (T. 68). Defendant claimed that he had not touched the
gun on the day of the shooting (T. 68). But when informed of his
positive GSR test, defendant stated that it was "possible" that
he had touched the gun.

He stated that every night before he

went to bed, he would dry fire the gun by pointing it at the
floor and squeezing the trigger to make sure it was unloaded (T.
84-85).

Expert testimony established that dry firing of the gun

would not have left powder residue on defendant's hands (T. 100-

1

A particle is "consistent" with or "characteristic" of
gunshot powder residue when it contains one or two requisite trace
elements (T. 91). A particle is "unique" to gunshot residue when
all three elements, lead, antimony and barium, are found within the
same spherical particle (T. 91).

5

01).2
Defendant said that on the night Mary died, he came
home from work around 7:30 p.m.
but she was not.

He had expected Mary to be home

He opened the mail and found a telephone bill

with a number of calls to Clearfield.

He was not familiar with

the number and "decided that he'd make some calls to find out
where the calls was [sic] going to." Around 12:00 or 12:15 a.m.,
he was awakened by Mary "laying [sic] next to him" (T. 69). He
told Mary that he wanted her to leave, to move out the next day
since "he was disappointed in the way that she had been acting,
that she hadn't returned home that evening, that she had left her
child alone that evening, that she had called earlier that
evening at approximately 10:30 and there was music and noises in
the background that he thought, he didn't know, but he assumed
that she was possibly at a bar or at a party" (T. 69-70).
Defendant claimed that he did not yell or get angry but simply
spoke to her in a stern voice (T. 70). Defendant said he then
went to sleep but awoke when he heard a shot.

He went to the

kitchen and found Mary lying on the floor (T. 67).
After performing an autopsy, a state medical examiner
testified that in his opinion Mary died as a result of a homicide
(T. 49-50).

Examining the entry wound located in her left collar

2

Defendant later reiterated to the police that he did not
touch Mary or the gun (T. 68, 82-84). Asked how he got a blood
stain on one of his hands, he stated that he had "wiped across
[Mary's] chest" (T. 78). The State's expert testified that it was
"possible" that touching a wound with stippling could leave
gunpowder residue on the hand (T. 107).

6

bone area and the trajectory of the bullet disclosed that the
bullet entered Mary's body "at an angle from down to up and from
her right to her left."

There was no exit wound; the bullet was

found in the back area of her neck, about 8 1/2 inches from the
top of her head (T. 37). The bullet never struck her clavicle
but went underneath it.

The medical examiner concluded that when

the victim was shot, her left arm and elbow were elevated above
shoulder height; he could not determine how the right arm was
positioned (T. 38-39).
The state crime lab and medical examiner's office
conducted test firings with the recovered gun to compare
stippling patterns produced at different ranges with those found
during the autopsy (T. 43-44).

From this, it was determined that

the gun was fired in the intermediate range, with the end of the
barrel nine to ten inches away from Mary's body (T. 46, 51).
Mary's arm length was 26 1/2 inches (T. 51). Based on
the path of the bullet and the length of her arms, the medical
examiner concluded that Mthe range from which the weapon was
fired would be of a distance that would be very difficult for an
individual to achieve to have a self-inflicted wound" (T. 47).
If self-inflicted, the gun would have been held in the right hand
(T. 47). Since the gun was fired at the 9-10 inch range and the
gun barrel length added another 5 inches, Mary would have had to
fully extend her arm, holding the gun lower than her clavicle
area, to the right of midline and below her right breast (T. 51,
55-56).

To test her ability to do this, an experiment was set

7

up with a gun which had a 4 inch barrel length and a woman who
had a 28 inch arm length.

Despite her slightly longer arm length

and the slightly shorter barrel, the woman was "unable to reach,
put her hand around the trigger and reproduce the angle" at which
Mary was shot (T. 51). In this positionf the woman could not
pull the trigger with her index finger.

If the thumb was used on

the trigger, the weapon could be placed "farther away" from the
body (T. 55). Based on the attempted reproduction, the medical
examiner stated that if the index finger was used, Mary would
"not have been able to produce that angle and that range of fire.
If she had used her thumb, it is possible that she could have
been the one that fired the weapon" (64-65).
In rejecting the idea that Mary had shot herself, the
medical examiner additionally considered the location of the
entrance wound:
Typically in suicides the gunshot wounds have
entrances that are located either in the
head, in the chest, over the heart region, or
in the abdomen. The location for the
entrance wound occurring over the clavicle is
an atypical location for an entrance wound.
Also in suicides the wounds are typically
contact wounds or close contact, meaning the
end of the barrel is close to the surface of
the body when the weapon is discharged.
A possibility in this case is that the
deceased, if she was indeed the one firing
the weapon, could have flinched and accounted
for the misplacement of the entrance wound.
However, typically if individuals flinch, the
weapon has been placed in a close contact or
contact position and then rotated and
produces tangential wounds on the skin
surface. Usually someone does not flinch
outwords [sic] before firing a weapon.
Also the angle of fire, most of the
suicide entrance wounds are usually straight

8

on, maybe a slight angle. But the fact that
there is an intermediate range with stippling
makes it very unusual for this to be a selfinflicted wound. Based on the investigation,
we had no information that she had any
previous suicidal thoughts, although that in
several of our suicide cases that we have at
our office we may not have information that
specifically says that this person was
suicidal•
The other thing is the elevation of the
clavicle. If someone is to shoot themselves,
I would find it very unusual that they would
elevate their arm as they're doing this
procedure, unless an individual is lying down
and possibly placing the hand behind the head
in a resting position. And also the
information that I obtained as far as the
results of the gunshot residue testing that
we had of the samples that we had obtained on
the deceased, as well as other gunshot
residue tests that were done.
(T. 49-50).

Even when considering the fact that the weapon

recovered had close to a "hair trigger" (T. 99), the medical
examiner still concluded based on the range and positioning of
the wound that it was "unlikely that the deceased [was] the one
who actually pulled the trigger" (T. 63, 65).
Defendant waived his right to testify at the
preliminary hearing (T. 123-24).

Through cross-examination of

the State's witnesses, defendant established that he worked for
Western Battery, overhauling alternators and generators (T. 87).
Samples taken from his work tools were chemically tested.
Officer Peterson "believe[d]," but was "not sure," that "one
particle" from defendant's work area was found to be "consistent
with gunshot residue" (T. 87).3 No other evidence was

3

See n.l, supra at 5.
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introduced concerning the results of these tests.
Defendant subpoenaed the victim's mother, Judy Clark
(R. 14; T. 117). She testified that defendant had telephoned her
twice looking for Mary (T. 118). Defendant told her that he had
found Mary's daughter in the house alone and that Mary was "heavy
into drugs" (T. 119, 121). Later that evening, defendant called
a third time but immediately handed the phone to Mary, who was
then home and crying (T. 119-20).

Mary repeatedly told her

mother that defendant hated her (T. 121). Mary said that "things
[were not] working out with" defendant and "mentioned" that she
had "problems with getting a job and and [sic] she felt upset"
(T. 121).

She said, "I feel like I just need to get away from

things and work things out" (T. 122).
Several hours later, Mrs. Clark was told that Mary had
"passed away" (T. 120). She asked if Mary had taken something to
kill herself (T. 121).

Mrs. Clark testified that she asked this

only because defendant had previously said that Mary was "heavy
into drugs," but that nothing in the conversation with her
daughter indicated that she was contemplating suicide (T. 12122).

Mary's blood alcohol level at the time of her death was .10

percent, "slightly above" the legal limit (T. 59). She had also
ingested diazepam (valium) before her death, revealing a level of
.33 percent.

A person who does not normally take valium and then

ingests a single 10 milligram tablet would have a blood level
after one hour of approximately .14 percent; while a person who
daily ingests valium would have a level of approximately 1.03
10

percent (T. 61-62).

Mary's level of Valium was "closer to the

single oral dosage level" than the daily level (T. 62).
Defendant introduced a tape recording of his telephone
call to 911 for assistance for Mary (T. 123; R. 51). The
operator could hear Mary groaning in the background and
defendant's statements that he loved her.

Several times, the

operator told defendant to help Mary by holding her hand or
turning her on her side.

Each time, defendant responded that he

did not want to touch her.

The operator told defendant to move

the gun from Mary's reach but defendant responded again that he
did not want to touch it.

When the operator insisted that the

gun be moved away from Mary, defendant told her that it was about
four feet away and did not need to be moved.
In refusing to bind over defendant for trial, the
preliminary hearing magistrate concluded that "no reasonable jury
given the facts of this case before the court could find the
defendant guilty of second degree murder" (R. 36). In the
opinion of the magistrate, the facts supported only a conclusion
of suicide (R. 29-35) (Addendum 2).

For this reason, the felony

information was dismissed (R. 39-40) (Addendum 3).
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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT
Jurisdictional Issue
In State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991) f this
Court determined the appropriate procedural course for a
defendant who seeks review of a preliminary hearing bindover
order.

The converse question is presented here: What is the

State's right of review of a preliminary hearing court order
dismissing a felony information based on a magistrate's
conclusion that there is not probable cause to bind over the
defendant for trial?
In considering a defendant's right of review of a
magistrate's bindover order, this Court stated:
Magistrates are not courts or tribunals.
They exercise magisterial, not adjudicatory,
functions. Review of their orders cannot
properly be subjected to appellate review
under our statutory scheme.
Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. The court of appeals relied on this
reasoning in summarily dismissing the State's appeal in this
case.

But the Humphrey statement, while correct if considering

the traditional magisterial role of holding a defendant for
trial, is inapplicable to the preliminary hearing court's
adjudicatory role in dismissing a felony information.
Beginning in territorial days, only trial courts had
the authority to dismiss a felony information and the State was
granted the right to directly appeal such dismissals.

A

magistrate had no authority to dismiss a felony information.
In 1980 the legislature substantially departed from
12

this precedent.

Where previously a magistrate's authority was

wholly non-adjudicatory, preliminary hearing magistratesf who in
felony cases must be judges of courts of record, were granted the
authority to dismiss a criminal information.
the State's right to appeal was extended.

Contemporaneously,

Where previously the

State only had the right to appeal from dismissals issued by the
trial court, the State's right to appeal from a dismissal was
broadened to include a final judgment of dismissal irrespective
of the issuing court.
Dicta in Humphrey characterized these newly authorized
preliminary hearing court orders of dismissal as lacking finality
and, hence, unappealable because refiling of the information is
not precluded.

But, Utah law has consistently recognized the

appealability of orders of dismissal without regard to the losing
party's ability to refile the case.
Additionally, the Humphrey reasoning did not consider
constitutional limitations on the State's right to refile.

Rule

7(8)(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits the State
"review" of a refusal to bind over by simply refiling the
dismissed information before a different magistrate.

This

provision has been effectively nullified by State v. Brickev, 714
P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), which prohibits the refiling of a dismissed
information unless authorized by the original magistrate on the
basis that "new evidence" or "good cause" justifies the refiling.
Other jurisdictions have concluded that a due process limitation
on the State's ability to refile gives finality to a dismissal
13

and allows for superior court review; for, it would be
inequitable to impose a Brickev-tvpe standard while denying the
State any avenue of review of the magistrate's actions.

This

view should be adopted in Utah.
Alternatively, if the court of appeals' ruling is
correct and no right of appeal exists, this Court should convert
this action to an extraordinary writ, as no other just remedy at
law is available.

The district court lacks jurisdiction since no

bindover order was issued and refiling is precluded by Briekev.
Without review by this Court, the magistrate's erroneous legal
conclusions will remain insulated from challenge and the State
will be denied a fair adjudication of the merits.
Because the court of appeals summarily dismissed this
appeal, no determination of its merits was made.

This Court

should now consider the substantive issues; the record contains
all relevant evidence, which evidence was essentially
unchallenged below, and the issues are matters of law.

The two

substantive issues raised are: (1) Did the magistrate apply an
erroneous probable cause standard? and (2) Based on the
preliminary hearing evidence, is there probable cause to bind
over as a matter of law?
Standard of Proof Issue
Traditionally in Utah, probable cause for a bindover
was defined as reason to believe that the defendant was "guilty
of the offense."

Under this definition, probable cause required

proof of a prima facie case.

In 1980, the legislature
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substantially changed the preliminary hearing probable cause
standard by defining probable cause for a bindover as reason to
believe that the defendant "had committed the offense."

This

latter language has been interpreted by this Court as not
requiring proof of a prima facie case.

Insteadf probable cause

for bindover is now identical to the lesser standard of probable
cause applied in authorizing arrest or search warrants under the
fourth amendment.
The preliminary hearing magistrate erred, therefore, as
a matter of law in evaluating the evidence under a prima facie
probable cause standard.
Substantive Issue
The magistrate incorrectly applied a prima facie
standard in assessing the State's evidence and erroneously
concluded that there was not probable cause to bind over
defendant for trial.

But even under a prima facie standard, the

magistrate's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to
support the information is erroneous as a matter of law.
Under either a fourth amendment or prima facie standard
of probable cause, the magistrate improperly considered the
credibility of otherwise plausible evidence, failed to consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the information, and
entered factual findings which were unsupported by and contrary
to the evidence presented.

Taking the preliminary hearing

evidence as a whole, the only issues were factual issues properly
left to a jury determination.

For these reasons, probable cause
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for a bindover was established as a matter of law.
This Court should reverse the court of appeals'
dismissal of the State's appeal and review the substantive merits
of this case.

If probable cause is found, defendant should be

ordered bound over for trial on the homicide information.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN ORDER DISMISSING AN INFORMATION BASED ON
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO BIND OVER IS A
FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER
A.

The Nature Of An Appealable Final Order
Of Dismissal

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1992) allows the
State to appeal from a final judgment of dismissal.

Until State

v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), it was settled law that
[w]hile a judgment of dismissal does not
always determine the rights of the parties
litigant, and may not preclude the bringing
of a new action, still it is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties in that particular
suit; and where the rights of the parties in
an action, or a distinct and independent
branch thereof, are determined by the court,
and nothing is reserved for future
determination, except what may be necessary
to enforce the judgment or decision, the
judgment is final.
State v. Booth, 59 P. 553, 554 (Utah 1899) (determining that the
State must directly appeal a dismissal of an indictment as
opposed to seeking mandamus).

Accord State v. Gomez. 722 P.2d

747 (Utah 1986) (permitting the State to appeal from the grant of
the State's motion to dismiss an information at a time when the
State was statutorily permitted to refile the information); State
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v. Ward, 571 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 1005
(1978) (allowing the State to directly appeal from an order
granting a motion to quash at a time when statutorily the quashal
did not bar refiling of the information); State v. Archuletta,
526 P.2d 911, 911 (Utah 1974) (recognizing the State's right to
appeal the grant of a motion to quash entered "without prejudice
for a new filing" of an amended information); State ex rel.
Neilson v. Third Judicial District Court, 102 P. 868, 869 (Utah
1909) (holding that for purposes of appeal, finality of a
dismissal is not affected by the losing party's ability to reinstigate litigation).

Cf.. State v. Thompson, 254 P. 147 (Utah

1927) (an order which quashes an information but orders the
defendant to remain in custody and the information to be refiled
is not a final appealable order).
The Humphrey decision was limited to a determination of
a defendant's right of review of a bindover order which holds the
defendant for further trial proceedings.

Yet, dicta in Humphrey

substantially calls into question the above Utah precedent by
suggesting that a preliminary hearing court order of dismissal of
a felony information predicated on a refusal to bind over is not
a final order of dismissal appealable by the State pursuant to §
77-18a-l(2)(a):
The fact that a magistrate's dismissal of a
charge does not preclude subsequent
prosecution of the same offense, see Utah R.
Crim. P. 7(8)(c), substantiates the
determination that magistrates do not
adjudicate. . . . [A] judicial officer
functioning as a magistrate is not
functioning as a circuit court or other court
17

of record. Because magistrates are not
courts of record when they conduct
preliminary hearings and issue bindover
orders, under current jurisdictional statutes
their orders are not immediately appealable.
. . .

Magistrates are not courts or tribunals.
They exercise magisterial, not adjudicatory,
functions. Review of their orders cannot
properly be subjected to appellate review
under our statutory scheme.
Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. Before specifics of the Humphrey
opinion are discussed, the State's traditional right to appeal an
order of dismissal must be understood.
Historically, the State always enjoyed the right to
appeal from a pretrial order which effectively dismissed a felony
charging document.

In territorial days, the State was permitted

to directly appeal from a "judgment for the defendant on a
demurrer to the indictment."

1888, Compiled Laws of Utah

(Territory) § 5137(1) (Addendum 5 ) / Accord State v. Eldredqe,
5 Utah 161, 13 P. 673 (Terr, of Utah), cert, denied, 145 U.S. 636
(1887).

After statehood, the State's right was expanded to

include the right to appeal from a demurred information.

1917,

Compiled Laws of Utah § 9208 (Addendum 6).
In 1953, with the abolition of demurrers and the
creation of motions to quash, the State retained the right to
directly appeal "from a judgment of dismissal in favor of the
4

The complete text of all cited constitutional, statutory or
rule provisions is contained in the addenda. A separate addendum
is provided for each year cited which contains all the relevant
provisions for that year, i.e, Addendum 5 contains all relevant
territorial provisions; Addendum 6, the relevant 1917 provisions;
Addendum 7, the 1953 provisions; Addendum 8, the 1980 changes; and
Addendum 9, the current provisions.
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defendant upon a motion to quash."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4(1)

(1953) (Addendum 7).
In 1980, the State's right to appeal was expanded to
include the right to appeal from Ma final judgment of dismissal"
without restriction of the basis for the dismissal.

Utah Code

Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(l) (1980) (referred to as Utah R. Crim. P. 26)
(Addendum 8).
and rule.

This same language remains in the current statute

Utah Code Ann. S 77-18a-l(2)(a); Utah R. Crim. P.

26(3)(a) (Addendum 9).
The current statute, section 77-18a-l(2)(a), is a
significant expansion of the State's original right to appeal
from the granting of a demurrer.
1235 (Utah App. 1990).

State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233,

A demurrer to an indictment or

information was limited to specified grounds, including lack of
jurisdiction and failure to substantially conform to the
statutory charging requirements.

1888, Compiled Laws § 4972;

1917f Compiled Laws § 8889 (Addenda 5 & 6). With the change to a
quashal system, the grounds were expanded to include (a) failure
to provide a defendant with a preliminary hearing, (b) failure to
comply with the preliminary hearing statutory requirements, and
(c) failure of the prosecutor to authorize the filing of the
information.

Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-3(2) (1953) (Addendum 7).

These new grounds had formerly been the basis for an order
setting aside an information, which was non-appealable.
Compiled Laws §§ 8878 and 9208 (Addendum 6).

1917,

Thus, by expanding

the grounds for granting a quashal of an information, the
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legislature necessarily also expanded the nature of the State's
right to appeal from a judgment of dismissal based on a motion to
quash.
In 1980 with the adoption of the language of the
present statute and rule, the legislature chose to deviate from
its 100-year practice of restricting the State's right to appeal
dismissals to those predicated on a quashal or demurrer.

Now,

the State is authorized to appeal from any "final judgment of
dismissal."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Addendum 9).

also Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(1) (1980) (Addendum 8).

See
This

expansion of the State's right to appeal is consistent with the
history of the appellate statutes; the appellate rights of both
the State and defendants have been expanded, not restricted,
since territorial days.

Compare 1888, Compiled Laws §§ 5136 and

5137 (Addendum 5), with Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(b) and (c)
(1980) (Addendum 8), with Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l) and (2)
(Addendum 9).

See State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1983)

("the Legislature has the power to confer appellate jurisdiction
in connection with the decisions of any inferior court where such
jurisdiction is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution").
B.

The Nature Of An Order Of Dismissal
Predicated On A Refusal To Bind Over A
Defendant

Is the State's right to appeal from an order dismissing
an information limited to dismissals issued by the trial court as
opposed to the preliminary hearing court?

The court of appeals

assumed that this question had been answered in Humphrey, 823
20

P.2d at 467-68, when this Court characterized preliminary hearing
magistrates as non-adjudicatory and not of record.

But while the

Humphrey holding is sound, its dicta did not properly appreciate
the adjudicatory nature of a dismissal of a felony information,
did not discern the restrictions placed on which magistrates may
conduct felony preliminary hearings, and failed to consider the
impact of State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), on the
right to refile granted in rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
(1) The Adjudicatory Nature Of A
Preliminary Hearing Court's Order
Dismissing A Felony Information
Prior to 1980, if a preliminary hearing magistrate
determined that probable cause did not exist to hold a defendant
for trial, the magistrate's role was limited to "discharging" the
defendant.

1888, Compiled Laws § 4885 (Addendum 5); 1917,

Compiled Laws § 8753 (Addendum 6); Utah Code Ann. S 77-15-17
(1953) (Addendum 7); Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1326-27
(Utah 1977) (the power of a committing magistrate is limited to
discharging the defendant or binding him over for trial).
However, this traditional non-adjudicatory role was
expanded in 1980 to confer on preliminary hearing courts the
adjudicatory power to "dismiss the information."

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-35-7(d)(l) (1980) (Addendum 8). Accord Van Dam, 571 P.2d at
1327 (under pre-1980 statutes, the power to dismiss a felony
information was not conferred on magistrates but restricted to
"courts").

Under the current procedural rule, the preliminary
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hearing court has retained this adjudicatory authority.

Utah R.

Crim. P. 7(8)(c) (Addendum 9).
The failure of the Humphrey decision to recognize the
adjudicatory nature of a preliminary hearing court order of
dismissal arises from the decision's uncritical reliance on the
language of Van Dam.

Van Dam's holding that magistrates have no

adjudicatory function was dictated by the pre-1980 statutes
restricting preliminary hearing magistrates to discharging a
defendant and allowing only trial courts to terminate prosecution
by dismissing the information.

Read in light of the 1980

statutory change and the current rule, Van Dam supports the
proposition that when a preliminary hearing magistrate dismisses
a felony information, the magistrate adjudicates as a "court."
Cf. State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528, 531-32 (Utah 1983) ("In the
absence of language expressly limiting 'the court' to a
particular court, it is reasonable to construe discovery powers
as having been conferred upon . . • the circuit courts" inherent
in their magisterial power to conduct preliminary hearings).
(2) The Statutory Requirement That
Preliminary Hearing Magistrates In
Felony Cases Must Be Courts Of
Record
Humphrey also concluded that preliminary hearing
magistrates are not "circuit courts.

Furthermore, because the

statutory definition of magistrate includes judges of courts not
of record, . . . the respective functions of courts of record and
magistrates are not extensive."

Id., 823 P.2d at 467. Again,

while technically correct, this statement fails to consider the
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restrictions placed on which magistrates and courts may conduct
felony preliminary hearings.
At the time of this preliminary hearing in January
1991, magistrates were defined to include judges of the appellate
courts, the district courts, the juvenile courts, the circuit
courts and the justice courts. Utah Code Ann. S 77-1-3(4) (1990)
(Addendum 9).

Except for the justice courts, the remainder were

designated as courts of record. JId. But statutorily, not all
magistrates were permitted to conduct preliminary hearings.
Judges of courts not of record have never had authority to
conduct a felony preliminary hearing or dismiss a felony
information.

Instead, only a court of record, i.e., circuit

court or above, could conduct this first degree felony
preliminary hearing.
1989) (Addendum 8).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104(3)(c) (Supp.
Even for second and third degree felonies,

the justice court could only conduct a preliminary hearing if (1)
no circuit court existed in the jurisdiction, and (2) the justice
court proceedings were "made a matter of record."

Id.

In January 1992, additional restrictions were placed on
which magistrates could conduct felony preliminary hearings.
Utah Code Ann. S 78-5-104 (1992) (Addendum 9) prohibits the
justice courts from conducting any felony preliminary hearings
unless authorized by the Judicial Council Rules.

Utah Code Ann.

S 78-7-17.5(2) (1992) limits felony preliminary hearings to
courts of record (Addendum 9).

Rule 4-610, Code of Judicial

Administration, permits the appointment of a justice court judge
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to preside at a preliminary hearing only if no court of record
judge is reasonably available and then only if trained to conduct
the preliminary hearing and the parties stipulate (Addendum 9).
Further, the hearing must be "conducted on the record."

Id.

(3) The Impact Of State v. Brickev On
The Finality Of A Preliminary
Hearing Court Order Of Dismissal
When the legislature by statute and this Court by rule
granted the preliminary hearing court adjudicatory power and
restricted felony preliminary hearings to courts of record,
significant expansion of the State's right to appeal also
occurred.

Where prior to 1980 the State could only appeal a

dismissal issued by the trial court in quashing an information,
the State may now appeal from any final grant of a dismissal
irrespective of the issuing court (see discussion, supra at 1920).
Despite this, dicta in Humphrey would negate the
appealability of a preliminary hearing court order of dismissal
on the grounds that such an order is not "final" since the State
may refile the information. Id., 823 P.2d at 467.

But as

discussed, supra at 16-17, the finality of a judgment has never
been limited by the fact that a party may re-instigate
litigation.

Indeed, it is clear that the State would have the

right to appeal a trial

court's

dismissal of the information on

insufficiency grounds under § 77-18a-l(2)(a), even though the
procedural rules contemplate that the State may refile the
information.

See Rule 25(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
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(only dismissals based on speedy trial or statute of limitations
violations bar subsequent prosecution) (Addendum 9).
Significantly, in weighing the impact of refiling on
"finality," the Humphrey decision failed to consider the effect
of State v, Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), which prohibits
the refiling of a dismissed information unless authorized by the
original magistrate on the basis that "new evidence" or "good
cause" justifies the refiling.

The adoption of this due process

limitation effectively nullifies the State's right to refile an
information dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage pursuant
to rule 7(8)(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Addendum 9).
Now, despite the procedural rule permitting unfettered refiling,
the State's right to refile is controlled by due process
determinations of the magistrate.

Further, if the court of

appeals' application of Humphrey were followed, the State would
have no right of appeal from the original order of dismissal and
no right of review of any subsequent action by the magistrate in
barring refiling.

As noted by at least one commentator, to

refuse to provide appellate review because of lack of "finality"
of a judgment, which judgment fully precludes the State from
proceeding, amounts to the "awkward and unjustified setoff of two
irrational rules."

Graham and Letwin, "The Preliminary Hearing

in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy
Observations," 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 635, 731 (1971).

No other

judicial officer or court is so isolated from challenge.
Every jurisdiction addressing the prosecution's right
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to seek review of a refusal to bind over and dismissal of an
information has considered the presence or absence of a Brickeytype restriction.

State v. Frv. 385 N.W.2d 196, 198-99 (Wis.

App. 1985), cert, denied, 388 N.W.2d 185 (Wis. 1986) (where
refiling is subject to a Brickev-tvpe standard, the State retains
the right to appeal erroneous legal conclusion); State v. Antes,
246 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Wis. 1976) (when prosecution is restricted
from refiling under Briekev-type standard, any dismissal of the
charges is a final order and appealable); Commonwealth v. Finn,
496 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Pa. Sup. 1985) (while a dismissal of an
information for lack of probable cause is not ordinarily
considered a final order since the prosecution may freely refile,
it will be considered as final and appealable where refiling is
precluded due to a statute of limitations); Commonwealth v.
Prado, 393 A.2d 8, 10 (Penn. 1978) (a dismissal of an information
for lack of probable cause will be considered final where lower
court refused to allow refiling); Walker v. Schneider, 477 N.W.2d
167, 171-75 (N.D. 1991) (under its writ and rulemaking powers,
the court adopts a Brickev standard and then construes the
dismissal of information as a final order which may be appealed);
State Ex Rel. Fallis v. Caldwell, 498 P.2d 426, 428 (Okl. App.
1972) (using its writ powers, the court adopts a prospective rule
that the prosecution is entitled to a right of review of a
dismissed information co-equal with that of defendant's right to
review of bindover order); State v. Zimmerman, 660 P.2d 960, 96364 (Kan. 1983) (where refiling is restricted, dismissal of a
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criminal complaint is equivalent to a final order; statute
permits appeals from such orders and is not affected by the
possibility that the State may refile); Morgan v. State, 675 P.2d
473 (Okl. App. 1984) (State's right to refile or appeal from
dismissal are alternative modes of procedure); People v. Nevitt,
256 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. App. 1977) (where charges are dismissed,
better practice is to allow appeal rather than permit de novo
refiling); State v. Ruiz, 678 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Idaho 1984) (where
no Brickev-type restriction on refiling, the State's remedy for a
dismissed information is to refile de novo before a different
magistrate); State v. Fahev, 275 N.W.2d 870, 871 (S.D. 1979)
(magistrate's order of dismissal is not final order where State
has unrestricted right to refile de novo before different
magistrate); State v. Maki, 192 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1971) (State's
right to review of dismissed charges is limited to its
unrestricted right to refile the charges de novo before a
different magistrate). See also People v. Mimms, 251 Cal.Rptr.
672 (Cal. App. 1988) (recognizing appellate court's attempts to
provide prosecution with review of a magistrate's order and
subsequent legislative reform allowing the prosecution to first
seek reconsideration from the magistrate who dismisses an
information and then permitting direct appellate review of the
magistrate's refusal to reconsider).
C.

The State's Right To Review Of The
Merits

As discussed, the State asserts that it is entitled to
direct appellate review of the order of dismissal issued by the
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preliminary hearing court•

This is based on the present

statutory and rule provisions and is consistent with the State's
right to appeal similar orders of dismissal since territorial
days.
Alternatively, if the court of appeals is correct that
no right of appeal exists, this Court should convert this action
to an extraordinary writ, as no other just remedy at law is
available.

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a).

The district court lacks

jurisdiction since no bindover order was issued and refiling is
precluded by Brickev.

Without review by this Court, the

magistrate's erroneous legal conclusions will remain insulated
from challenge and the State will be denied a fair adjudication
of the merits.
POINT II
THE PRIMA FACIE STANDARD FOR PROBABLE CAUSE
TO BIND OVER FOR TRIAL IS NO LONGER
APPLICABLE IN UTAH; INSTEAD, THE STANDARD HAS
BEEN REDUCED TO A LEVEL OF PROBABLE CAUSE
EQUIVALENT TO THAT REQUIRED UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Under the Utah Constitution, a defendant charged by an
information has the right to a preliminary examination before a
magistrate to determine if he should be held for trial.
Const, art. I, S 13 (Addendum 9).

Utah

The probable cause standard of

proof applicable to such a hearing is not constitutionally
defined but arises from legislative enactment and, today, by
procedural rule.

Utah R. Crim. P. 7(8)(b).

Here, the magistrate relied on the prima facie probable
cause standard enunciated in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778
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(Utah 1980), which had been accepted in Utah since State v.
Eldredoe, 13 P. 673 (R. 27-29).

The prima facie standard derived

from the difference in statutory definition of probable cause for
purposes of a preliminary hearing as opposed to a warrant of
arrest.
From territorial days until 1980, Utah law established
that a magistrate had probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest
when the magistrate was satisfied that an offense had been
committed and there was a reasonable basis to believe that "the
defendant

had committed

it."

1888, Compiled Laws § 4839

(Addendum 5); 1917, Compiled Laws S 8688 (Addendum 6); Utah Code
Ann. § 77-12-1 (1953) (Addendum 7). 5 During the same period, a
magistrate had probable cause to bind over a defendant for trial
when the magistrate was satisfied that an offense had been
committed and a reasonable basis to believe that "the
was guilty

of it."

defendant

1888, Compiled Laws § 4885 (Addendum 5);

1917, Compiled Laws § 8753 (Addendum 6); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1517 (1953) (Addendum 7). Comparing these two distinct standards,
this Court stated:
The probable cause showing necessary in
the preliminary examination differs from that
required for an arrest warrant. In the
latter, the facts presented must be
sufficient to establish that an offense has
been committed and a reasonable belief the
defendant committed it. The facts presented,
however, do not have to establish a prima
5

The term "probable cause" was not used statutorily until
1980 but "reasonable cause" and "sufficient cause" were interpreted
to mean "probable cause." Eldredge, 13 P. at 675-76; Anderson. 612
P.2d at 783.
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facie case against defendant.
Conversely the probable cause showing at
the preliminary examination must establish a
prima facie case against the defendant from
which the trier of fact could conclude the
defendant was guilty of the offense as
charged.
Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783 (citing Eldredore, 13 P. at 675-76)
(footnotes omitted).
In 1980, the Utah legislature abandoned these
distinctions and lowered the standard of probable cause for a
preliminary hearing.

Whereas before the statutory definitions

differed for probable cause to arrest and probable cause to bind
over, the legislature now chose to equate the two.

Utah Code

Ann. § 77-35-7(d)(1) (1980) (Addendum 8) was enacted to read:
If from the evidence a magistrate finds
probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the

defendant

has committed it,

the magistrate

shall forthwith order . . . that the
defendant be bound over to answer in the
district court.
(Emphasis Added).

The new language is identical to that

traditionally used to define probable cause for purposes of
arrest.

See Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-6(a) (1980) (Addendum 8).

The legislature must be presumed to have understood the
consequences of so substantial a change. Madsen v. Borthick, 769
P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 1988) (any statutory amendment not
expressly designated as a clarification must be presumed to be a
change in existing legal rights and liabilities).
Ten years after the 1980 legislative change, this Court
reaffirmed the adoption of the fourth amendment standard for
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probable cause to bindover by utilizing the "committed" language
in current rule 7(8)(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Addendum 9).
Consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions,
the new Utah test for probable cause to bind over is one of
probability.

LaFave and Isreal, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 2, §

14.3 at 256.

It is more than "mere suspicion" but less than

"condemnation or conviction;" it exists when the facts and
circumstances surrounding the crime are sufficient to "warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the defendant
committed the crime.

Brineaar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,

175-76 (1949).
Despite the clear legislative and rule change,
subsequent cases have cited the Anderson prima facie standard as
applicable to preliminary hearings. In State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d
at 646 and State v. Easthooe, 668 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1983), this
Court correctly noted that the State must establish probable
cause that a defendant "committed" an offense to hold him for
trial but then, without analysis, stated that Anderson had
interpreted this language to impose a prima facie standard.

This

is directly contrary to Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783, which
recognized that use of "committed" language does not create a
prima facie requirement.
But whether a fourth amendment or prima facie standard
is applied to probable cause, the magistrate's refusal to bind
over defendant is still erroneous as a matter of law.
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No Utah case has enunciated how a magistrate should
evaluate evidence to determine if probable cause has been
established, that is: When should the magistrate evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses and in whose favor should
conflicting evidence and inferences be resolved?

Two Utah cases

have generally commented on the right of a preliminary hearing
magistrate to consider the credibility of witnesses.

State v.

Anderson. 612 P.2d at 786 ("the credibility of the witnesses is
an important element in the determination of probable cause");
State v. Giles, 576 P.2d 876# 879 (Utah 1978) (a magistrate has
the "prerogative to believe whom he chose and to decide which
witness was telling the truth and which one was falsifying").
But since neither case was decided on this ground, the decisions
are not controlling.

State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah

1991) (appellate court is not bound by earlier dicta).

Accord

Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468.
More determinative are decisions addressing the
propriety of dismissals based on insufficient evidence and
directed verdicts.6

In the civil context, the law is clear:

In directing a verdict the trial court may
not weigh the evidence. Rather, the court
must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the
motion is directed and resolve controverted
facts in his favor. If the evidence and its
6

A prima facie standard is considered synonymous, in this
context, with a directed verdict standard. See LaFave and Israel,
Crimina1 Procedure, § 14.3(a).
For purposes of evaluating
evidence, a fourth amendment standard entails the same type of
inquiries as a prima facie standard but with a lesser degree of
proof.
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inferences would cause reasonable men to
arrive at different conclusions as to whether
the essential facts were or were not proved,
then the question is one of fact for the
jury. Unless the evidence is wholly lacking
and incapable of reasonable inference to
prove some issue which supports the
plaintiff's claim, a court should not direct
a verdict for the defendant.
Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728-29 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted).

On appeal, the same standard is imposed; the appellate

court must view the evidence is the light most favorable to the
losing party and if there is any reasonable basis to support "a
judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict
cannot be sustained."

Management Committee v. Graystone Pines.

652 P.2d 896, 897-898 (Utah 1982); Highland Const, Co. v. Union
Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984).
Applying this standard to a determination of probable
cause, a magistrate must not resolve the ultimate issue of guilt.
Anderson, 612 P.2d at 683 (even under a prima facie standard, the
State need not establish guilt, only enough evidence to warrant
the submission of the case to the trier of fact).

Rather, the

magistrate should view the evidence, and all potential
inferences, in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Under a fourth amendment standard, the magistrate must then
determine if the facts provide "some rational ground for assuming
the possibility" that the crime was committed and the defendant
committed it.

CjE. People v. Superior Court (Bolden), 257

Cal.Rptr. 678, 680 (Calif. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1989).

Accord

People v. Garner. 781 P.2d 87, 90 (Colo. 1989) (evidence is
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sufficient for a bind over when it would "induce a person of
ordinary prudence to entertain a reasonable belief that the
defendant committed the crime charged . . . evidence sufficient
to support a conviction is not necessary").
Under a prima facie standard, the magistrate must
determine if some evidence exists in support of all requisite
elements of the crime.

If credible evidence exists both

supporting and negating an element, this presents a question of
fact to be resolved by the jury and a bind over is required. See
People v. Superior Court fKneip), 268 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct.
App. 6 Dist. 1990) ("the evidence need not be unambiguous for
purposes of a bindover; raising a reasonable possibility of guilt
suffices").

See also People v. District Court, 803 P.2d 193, 196

(Colo. 1990) ("it is not for the trial judge at a preliminary
hearing to accept the defendant's version of the facts over the
legitimate inferences which can be drawn from the People's
evidence. . . . weighing the merits of the case is for the trier
of fact at trial"); People v. Pedrie, 727 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo.
1986) ("when testimony conflicts, a question of fact exists for
the jury, and the judge must draw the inference favorable to the
prosecution"); State v. Patterson, 570 A.2d 174, 179 (Conn. 1990)
("when reviewing a motion to dismiss an information, the
proffered proof is to be viewed most favorably to the state");
People v. Moore, 446 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989),
appeal denied

Mich.

(1990) ("if the preliminary examination

evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt regarding a
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defendant's guilt# this question is properly left for judge or
jury at trial, and the binding over of the defendant is still
required"); Matter of Buckner. 284 N.W.2d 507# 509 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1979) (if credible evidence exists to support and negate an
element, a question of fact exists which should be left to the
jury); State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 317 N.W.2d 458, 461 (Wis.
1982) ("the purpose of the preliminary [hearing] is not to make a
final judgment on the credibility of a witness; the court's role
is simply to ascertain the plausibility of her story and whether,
if believed, it would support a bind over").
This does not mean that the magistrate is totally
precluded from considering credibility.
The judicial role in pretrial screening
involves weighing and judgment rather than a
wooden comparison of the testimony with the
elements of the crime. Although credibility
ordinarily is a matter for the jury, and it
is not expected that judges will normally
resolve testimonial conflicts at the
preliminary hearing, cases do occasionally
arise in which a witness's testimony is so
weak or contradicted by sufficiently clear
facts that the judge should have the power to
dismiss the case.
Mvers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819, 826 n.12 (Mass. 1973)
(quoting Model Penal Code, § 330.5(3) and cited with approval in
Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783).
Read with the requirement that a preliminary hearing
court is not to decide the ultimate issue of culpability,

a

committing magistrate is restricted in his "inquiry of
credibility to the 'plausibility of the story and not general
trustworthiness.'"

Hunter v. District Court, 543 P.2d 1265, 1268
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(Colo. 1975).
[A] judge in a preliminary hearing has
jurisdiction to consider the credibility of
witnesses only when, as a matter of law, the
testimony is implausible or incredible. When
there is a mere conflict in the testimony, a
question of fact exists for the jury, and the
judge must draw the inference favorable to
the prosecution.
Id.

Accord People in Interest of M.V., 742 P.2d 326, 329 (Colo.

1987) ("the trial court may not disregard the testimony of a
witness favorable to the prosecution unless the testimony is
implausible or incredible as a matter of law"); Matter of
Buckner, 284 N.W.2d at 509; State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 317
N.W.2d at 461.
The magistrate's failure to apply the correct legal
standard in evaluating the preliminary hearing evidence
constitutes error as a matter of law.
POINT III
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE, THERE IS PROBABLE
CAUSE TO BIND OVER; ACCORDINGLY, DEFENDANT
SHOULD BE ORDERED HELD FOR TRIAL ON THE
CHARGE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER
If this Court determines that the merits of the State's
claim should be reviewed, it is unnecessary to remand for further
proceedings in any other court.

The record contains a complete

statement of the evidence, which was essentially unchallenged in
the preliminary hearing court.
one of law:

The issue raised then and now was

Does the preliminary hearing evidence establish

probable cause to bind defendant over for trial on a charge of
second degree murder?
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When considering the propriety of a dismissal based on
insufficient evidence, the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the losing party, and if there is any
reasonable basis in the evidence to support a judgment in favor
of the losing party, the order of dismissal must be reversed.
Management Committee v. Gravstone Pines, 652 P.2d at 897;
Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d at 1045.
Here, the magistrate erroneously found facts
unsupported by the evidence, failed to draw reasonable inferences
in support of the information, and invaded the province of the
jury by resolving factual and credibility issues involving
conflicting evidence. As discussed in Point II, supra, this was
incorrect under either a fourth amendment or prima facie standard
of probable cause.

Since under either standard a proper

evaluation of the evidence supports a conclusion of probable
cause as a matter of law, the errors will be discussed under only
the higher standard.

If erroneous under the prima facie

standard, the magistrate's conclusion is necessarily erroneous
under the lesser fourth amendment standard.
A.

Factual Findings Without Evidentiary
Support

Throughout his memorandum decision, the magistrate made
factual findings that lacked support or were contrary to the
evidence.

The specific errors will be discussed below, including

the magistrate's compounding of these errors by further
impermissible and speculative extrapolations.
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(1) The Finding That The Victim Made
Unauthorized Telephone Calls
The magistrate initially found that when defendant came
home, he opened the telephone bill and discovered that Mary had
been making "unauthorized phone calls" (R. 21, 35). (See Addendum
2 for complete memorandum decision).

But, the only evidence

presented concerning the bill or calls was defendant's statement
to the police that he
went to the mailbox, got the mail, opened up
a telephone bill that he had received and saw
a lot of calls, long distance phone calls,
some going to Clearfield. And so he decided
that he'd make some calls to find out where
the calls was [sic] going to, he wasn't
familiar with the numbers.
(T. 69). There was no evidence that defendant thought Mary made
the calls or that the calls contributed to the disagreement
between Mary and defendant (T. 69-70).
Yet, from the erroneous finding that Mary made
unauthorized calls (R. 35), the magistrate extrapolated that one
reason for Mary to have been so "distraught" as to commit suicide
was that
[s]he had been confronted with making long
distance phone calls to places and to people
unknown and not approved by Donald Jaeger.
(R. 34). This finding is wholly fictional.
(2) The Findings That The Victim Was
Suicidal
The magistrate found that when Mary talked to her
mother shortly before she was shot, she was "crying and
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despondent" (R. 22). From this the magistrate concluded:
There is ample motive for Mary to have
taken her own life. She was distraught. She
was crying and upset. She had just been
informed that she would have to leave the
residence of Donald Jaeger the next day and
not continue to reside with him. Where would
she live? Under what circumstances would she
live and with whom? She was under the
influence of alcohol and Valium. Earlier in
the evening she had temporarily abandoned her
daughter at the home unsupervised. She had
been confronted with making long distance
phone calls to places and to people unknown
and not approved by Donald Jaeger. She spoke
to her mother on the telephone about her many
problems and her troubled life and expressed
a desire to get away from things. The
combination of these emotions and chemicals
could very well have prompted Mary to take
her own life. Of significance, is the first
comment made by Mary's mother, Judy Clark,
when informed that Mary had died. She asked
if Mary had taken her own life.
(R. 34-35).
There is no basis in the record to support the
magistrate's finding that Mary Barndt was suicidal.

The only

testimony concerning Mary's state of mind came from her mother.
Mrs. Clark stated that when Mary called she was crying and kept
repeating that defendant hated her (T. 120). Mary said that
"things" were not working out between them.

Mary "mentioned that

she'd just had problems with getting a job and she felt upset. .
. . She said I feel like I just need to get away from things and
work things out" (T. 121-22).

Neither defendant nor Mrs. Clark

portrayed Mary as "despondent" or suicidal.

Neither represented

that Mary had "many problems" or a "troubled life."
Despite defendant's claim that he had ordered Mary out
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of the home (T. 69-70), neither defendant nor Mary told that to
Mrs. Clark.

Instead, Mary represented to her mother that it was

her wish to "get away" and "work things out" (T. 122). Assuming
that Mary had been out partying, it would be reasonable to
conclude that Mary was involved with other persons besides
defendant.

If so, it was Mary who was separating herself from

defendant and not the other way around.

Even accepting

defendant's description of the events leading up to the shooting,
it was defendant who was sitting at home, babysitting his
girlfriend's child, and repeatedly attempting to locate her.
Apparently from a bar where music was playing, she called
defendant at 10:30 p.m., yet did not come home until 12:00 or
12:15 a.m. (T. 69-70).
that she was crying.

Mary was sufficiently upset once home
But when faced with what she perceived to

be defendant's "hate," her solution was not to apologize or ask
for forgiveness.

Mary's solution was to leave defendant so she

could "work things" out for herself (T. 122).
The significance the magistrate attributed to Mrs.
Clark's question regarding suicide is unwarranted. (See R. 35,
Addendum 2.)

Mrs. Clark testified that the only reason she asked

if her daughter had "taken something" to kill herself was because
defendant had earlier said that Mary was "heavy into drugs."
did not believe that her daughter was suicidal and

She

had no

indications from their conversation that she was contemplating
suicide (T. 121-22).
The magistrate also found that when defendant heard the
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shot, "he immediately rushed into the kitchen whereupon he saw
Mary lying on her back.

The firearm was on the floor between her

legs near her ankles" (R. 22). This is incorrect.

Defendant

told the police that he "was asleep in the bedroom and heard a
shot, went into the kitchen and found Mary . . . on the floor"
(T. 67). When asked by the 911 operator where the gun was,
defendant responded that it was to Mary's side about four feet
away.

Officer Sundquist, the first person on the scene,

testified that he observed the gun about "one to two feet from
the victim's right foot" (T. 9). It was not the gun but a spent
shell casing that the officer found "kind of in between her
ankles" (T. 10).
The significance of the magistrate's error concerning
the location of the gun can be seen in the magistrates's further
speculation that a suicide occurred because the gun was "exactly
where one would expect it to be found if the gunshot was selfinflicted" (R. 34). Aside from the fact that the gun was not
between the victim's legs, no testimony was presented that this
would have been indicative of a self-inflicted wound.
(3) The Findings That The GSR Tests
Were Unreliable And Failed To
"Link" Defendant With The Crime
The magistrate determined that the critical proof of
defendant's "linkage" with the victim's death was the gunshot
residue tests of his and the victim's hands.

Since the

magistrate found the tests unreliable, he refused to find any
"linkage" of defendant with any crime (R. 29). This ignores the
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fact that if the probability of a homicide was established,
defendant was the only possible perpetrator.

The critical issue

was not whether the gunshot residue tests connected defendant
with the crime but whether there was medical or other physical
evidence that a homicide had occurred.
The magistrate found the GSR tests to be unreliable on
the following grounds:
1. At defendant's work place, one "unique"
particle had been found as well as many
particles "characteristic" of gunshot
residue;
2. It was "very conceivable" that
defendant's hands tested characteristic
several hours after work because his work
place contained similar particles and "no
evidence was presented to indicate that the
work place particles would not be found on
the defendant's hands a few hours after
work;" and,
3. On both of defendant's hands were found
particles characteristic of gunpowder
residue.
(R. 29-30).

The magistrate found that if defendant had fired the

gun, it was more reasonable to assume that gunpowder residue
would have been on only one of defendant's hands and that the
particles should have tested as "unique" to gunpowder and not
just "characteristic" (R. 29-30).

These findings are simply

speculative and do not support the magistrate's finding that the
tests were unreliable.
The magistrate's finding concerning the result of the
tests at defendant's work place is erroneous.

GSR samples from

defendant's work place were taken but the results were not
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admitted into evidence.

On cross-examination, Officer Peterson

stated that he thought, but was not sure, that one particle found
at defendant's work place was "consistent" with gunpowder residue
(T. 87). The magistrate confused this testimony with the
testimony of James Gaskill that firings of the recovered gun
produced residue on the shooter's hand consisting of one unique
particle and several characteristic particles (T. 93, 100-01).
In considering the possible effect of the chemicals at
defendant's work place, the magistrate originally noted that
there was no evidence presented to establish that the particles
obtained from defendant's work would have stayed on his hands
over five hours later (T. 140). Evidence was presented that such
things as washing the hands would remove or lessen the presence
of residue (T. 95).
What the testimony did establish was that the GSR tests
of defendant's hands were properly done and correctly analyzed
(T. 71-72, 89-90).

The tests established that particles

characteristic of gunpowder were on defendant's hands (T. 90).
The issue was not the admissibility or reliability of the tests
but what weight should be accorded them.

The GSR tests provided

some evidence that defendant shot Mary; therefore, the ultimate
resolution of the issue should have been left for the jury.
Accord Matter of Buckner, 284 N.W.2d at 509.
Additionally, the magistrate found that despite the
negative GSR tests on Mary's hands, it was "possible" that Mary
had fired the gun (R. 30). This was derived from the testimony
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of the state criminologist that it was normal protocol in GSR
tests to scan the first four rows of the discs and not every
particle (R. 93-94)•

The expert testified that the lack of a

positive GSR test was never conclusive that a person had not
fired a weapon.

Negative results could occur based on the type

of weapon used, the passage of time between firing and testing,
and whether the shooter washed his or her hands (T. 95).
In Mary's case, none of these factors were present.
The gun recovered did leave detectable powder residue, there was
only a short period between the firing of the gun and the
testing, and her hands were not washed after she was shot.
Despite this, the magistrate found that it was "very conceivable
that any gunshot residue from a relatively 'clean gun' found on
her hands would rub off or be obliterated" (R. 31). The
magistrate found that residue could have been rubbed off when
[t]he defendant was told by the 911
dispatcher to hold her hand and to turn her
over. Mary's upper clothing was removed —
presumably rubbing against her hands and
removing residue. . . . Mary's hands were
moving about as she was taken on the
stretcher from the home while her hands were
still in the bags.
(R. 31). Again, this is contrary to the evidence.
A paramedic testified that Mary had kicked her leg and
moved one arm when moved to the ambulance (T. 115-16).
Initially, the magistrate recognized that no evidence was
presented that this type of motion would have had any affect on
dispersal of the residue (T. 137). Subsequently, the magistrate
speculated that it did (R. 31). This latter finding is without
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evidentiary support and in contradiction of the requirement to
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the information.
For, while the magistrate found that the alleged residue on the
victim's bagged hands would have totally disappeared from
"squirming around" for a few minutes, the magistrate readily
inferred that any chemical residue defendant picked up from work
would easily stay on his hands through many hours of normal
activities.

This acceptance of defendant's theory of the case

over the legitimate inferences drawn from the state's evidence is
impermissible at the preliminary hearing stage.

People v.

District Court, 803 P.2d at 196.
Contrary to the magistrate's finding (R. 31), there was
no evidence that after Mary had been shot, defendant either held
Mary's hands or removed her clothing.

Defendant only claimed to

have touched Mary when he "wip[ed]" her chest (T. 78). When the
911 operator told him to touch Mary, he said he did not want to
and repeated this several times. Despite the fact that the 911
operator told defendant to turn Mary on her side so she would not
choke, Mary was still on her back when the officers arrived (T.
14).

No one saw defendant holding Mary's hand and he never

asserted that he did (T. 23-24, 78).
When the officers arrived, Mary was naked from the
waist up.

Her bra was next to her; her blouse was not in the

room (T. 14-15).

No evidence was presented that Mary's upper

clothing was removed after she was shot.

No facts support the

finding that Mary's blouse "presumably rubb[ed] against her hands
45

and remove[d] residue" (R. 31).
While the magistrate referred to the GSR tests as
unreliable and "discredited," there was no basis for this
finding.

The tests were conducted and analyzed properly; the

magistrate did not find otherwise.
corroborative evidence.

The GSR tests were simply

Even if defendant had tested negatively

for residue, the medical evidence established probable cause to
believe that a homicide had occurred.

Under the facts, defendant

was the only possible perpetrator.
(4) The Findings That The Medical
Evidence Was Unreliable And Failed
To Establish That A Homicide Had
Occurred
Clearly, the main evidence against defendant was the
autopsy and medical examiner's opinion.

Based on this physical

and scientific evidence, the medical examiner concluded the it
was highly unlikely that the victim's wound was self-inflicted.
Instead, the medical examiner testified that the physical
findings indicated that the gun had been fired by another
individual at intermediate range and, thus, that a homicide had
occurred.

(See Statement of Facts, supra at 6-9, for complete

discussion of the examiner's findings.)
The magistrate discounted and ultimately rejected the
medical examiner's opinion for two reasons: (1) the examiner's
opinion was "grounded on the discredited gunshot residue tests";
and (2) the examiner failed to "consider any factors of a
possible suicide" (R. 35). Neither contention is supported by
the record.

The medical examiner's opinion was based primarily
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on the physical difficulties the victim would have encountered in
shooting herself, particularly in light of the path and range of
fire (T. 47, 49-51, 63, 65). Only secondarily did he consider
the GSR tests (T. 50). The finding that the examiner failed to
consider the possibility of suicide is directly contrary to the
examiner's extensive testimony that he thoroughly considered and
rejected that hypothesis (T. 49-51).
A magistrate is not permitted to disregard Mthe
testimony of a witness favorable to the prosecution unless the
testimony is implausible or incredible as a matter of law."
People In Interest of M.V., 742 P.2d at 329. Here, the medical
examiner, as a qualified expert, testified to matters within his
expertise.

His scientific conclusions were not challenged.

But

even if conflicting expert evidence had been presented, it would
simply have raised a factual issue which should have been left
for the jury to resolve.

People v. General Dynamics Lands

Systems, 438 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich. App. 1989).
(5) The Finding that Defendant Lacked A
Motive
Finally, the magistrate's consideration of motive is
unwarranted and improper.

Motive is not an element of murder.

Yet, the magistrate's ruling is clearly predicated on the fact
that he found a motive for the victim to commit suicide but no
motive for defendant to have killed her. Aside from the factual
incorrectness of the finding that the victim was suicidal,
discussed supra at 38-41, the magistrate failed to draw the
requisite inferences from Mary's actions.
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If Mary was out

partying as defendant believed, it was she and not defendant who
was actively terminating the relationship.

This inference is

supported by Mary's statement to her mother that it was her wish
to leave.

Her desire to leave defendant gave him a motive.
B.

The Magistrate's Erroneous Conclusion
That There Was Not Probable Cause To
Bind Over

When the evidence is evaluated under the proper
standard, it is clear that there is probable cause to bind over
defendant.

The medical evidence established that it would have

been essentially impossible for the victim to self-inflict the
wound she suffered.

Gunshot residue tests corroborated that it

was unlikely that the victim had fired the gun and supported the
probability that defendant had.

Even if the GSR tests were

totally disregarded, the medical examiner's testimony alone
established probable cause that a homicide had occurred.

Since

it is uncontroverted that at the time of the homicide only
defendant and the victim were present, sufficient proof that a
homicide occurred necessarily creates probable cause to believe
defendant committed the crime.
853, 855 (Mich. App. 1988).

People v. Porterfield, 420 N.W.2d

Accord People v. District Court, 779

P.2d 385 (Colo. 1989); People in the Interest of M.V., 742 P.2d
326.
The refusal to bind over and subsequent order of
dismissal are erroneous as a matter of law.

People v. Lewis, 791

P.2d 1152, 1154 (Colo. Ct. App 1989), cert, denied

Colo.

(1990) (failure to draw all permissible inferences and view the
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evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
constitutes error as a matter of law).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of
appeals dismissing the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction
should be reversed.

This Court should review the substantive

issues and conclude, as a matter of law, that the State has
established probable cause to bind over defendant.

Accordingly,

defendant should be ordered bound over for trial on the charge of
second degree murder, a first degree felony.
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day of October, 1992.
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Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by:
Assigned to:

E. Jones
E. Jones

Plaintiff,
BAIL

$50,000.00

v.
INFORMATION
DONALD 6* JAEGER

11/20/58,

Defendant(s).

The undersigned Sgt. Vern Peterson - West Jordan P.D. under
oath states on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed
the crimes of:
COUNT I
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a First Degree
Felony, at 6495 South Scranton Drive, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about August 22, 1990, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
DONALD L. JAEGER, a party to the offense, intentionally
or knowingly caused the death of Mary L. Barndt, or
intending to cause serious bodily injury to another,
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that
caused the death of Mary L. Barndt, or acting under
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human
life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of
death to another, and thereby caused the death of Mary
L. Barndt;

(Continued on page 2)
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Officers:
Others:

B. Sundquistf K. Kallas, V. Person, C. Loving and C.
Hodgkinson.
Kevin Lee Smith, R.L. Wright, Rudy Riet, Dr. Edward A.
Leis, Bradley Wardle, Chris Evans, Claude Stoker, Jed
Harris, Paul Miller, Jim Gaskill, Judy Clark and Mary
Crawford.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant based this Information on police report, Case
No. 90-5745 and his personal investigation which disclosed the
following:
Officers were called to 6495 South Scranton Drive to
investigate a shooting. The victim of the shooting was 19 year old
Mary Barndt. The victim had been shot in the chest with a single
shot from a .22 caliber pistol. The Defendant was alone in the house
with the victim at the time of the shooting. The Defendant said the
victim shot herself. A GSR test on the victim for evidence of powder
was negative. A GSR on the Defendant at the scene, however was
positive for powder residue. The Defendant and victim had been in an
argument the evening of the shooting.

y/ ^L-^feb>
Affiant
Subscribed ., aricL ; sworn . to before
this
/ -dayofxliovemfier. 1990.

Authorized for presentment and
filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM./County Attorney
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]|

VS.

DONALD L. JAEGER,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

}

Case No. 901012471 FS

|

JUDGE MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS

]

On January 9, 1991 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. the court, Judge
Michael L. Hutchings presiding, heard evidence presented by the
State and also by the defense in the above entitled case.

The

defendant, Donald L. Jaeger, is charged with criminal homicide,
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony which allegedly
occurred at 6495 South Scranton Drive in Salt Lake County.

On the

date of August 22, 1990. The State was represented by Ernie Jones
and Kim Hornack.
Richard Mauro.

The defense was represented by Lisa Remal and
The court commends counsel for the defense and

the prosecution for the manner in which the evidence at the
preliminary hearing was presented.
The court has taken the case under advisement and now issues
its Memorandum Decision.
The court will state the question presented, a summary of the
facts presented at the preliminary hearing, cite the legal
standard to be applied at a preliminary hearing, analyze the facts
with the law and announce it's decision in this Memorandum Decision

QUESTION
Did the defendant, Donald Jaeger, inflict the fatal gunshot
wound that caused the death of Mary Barndt?
FACTS
Mary Barndt was a 19 year old female, living with the
defendant, Donald Jaeger, at 6495 South Scranton Drive in West
Jordan, Utah.

On August 22, 1990, the defendant, Donald Jaeger,

arrived from work at the residence at 7:30 p.m.
home.

Mary was not

The defendant opened some mail that had been delivered in

the mail box and discovered a telephone bill with some long
distance phone calls.

He suspected that Mary had made some

unauthorized phone calls.

The defendant called the phone numbers

to find out the purpose of the phone calls and to verify who had
made them.
The defendant also found Mary's young daughter, Alicia, home
unsupervised.

The defendant attempted to determine where Mary

might be located.
Clark.

He called, at least twice, Mary's mother, Judy

During one of the conversations, Judy Clark was informed

that Mary "was heavy into drugs."

Judy Clark did not know Maryfs

whereabouts•
Later in the evening, Mary contacted the defendant by
telephone.

The defendant did not know where Mary was when she

called but he could hear some music in the background.

He assumed

that she had called from a bar or a party.
At approximately 12:00 midnight, Mary came home.
defendant was awakened when Mary came to bed.

The

At that time, the

defendant told her that his relationship with her was terminated
and that she should move out of the home the next day*
The defendant made another telephone call to Judy Clark. The
defendant first spoke with Judy Clark and indicated that Mary
would like to speak with her. Ms. Clark thereupon spoke with
Mary.

Mary was crying and despondent.

Mary stated that Don had

asked her to leave the home and that the relationship was over.
She stated "Don hates me*, .yes he does, he hates me.91
these statements approximately six times.
employment situation was not good.

She made

She also said, her

Finally she said, "I feel that

I need to get away from things and work things out.11
The defendant indicated in conversations with the police
officers that he went back to sleep and was awakened by the
discharge of a firearm.

He immediately rushed into the kitchen

whereupon he saw Mary lying on her back.

The firearm was on the

floor between her legs near her ankles. Mary had sustained a
gunshot wound in her lower left neck near the collarbone.
The defendant called 911 emergency and spoke with the 911
operator for the city of West Jordan.

Near the beginning of his

911 conversation he stated, "Oh,...1...I.. .my girlfriend just shot
herself.11

He also stated during this conversation, "Oh, God I

canft believe she done this.11 (sic.) "What can I do to help her?",
,f

I can*t calm down but my girlfriend just shot herself.", "I love

you, I love you Mary...breath...breath...Baby, come on." and also
in speaking directly to her, "How could you do this?"

During the

911 conversation, the operator told him, among other things, to
hold the hand of Mary Barndt and also told him to turn Mary Barndt
on her side.

Officer B. Sundguist, from the West Jordan Police Department,
was first to arrive on the scene. When he entered the residence,
he noticed Mary on her back on the kitchen floor with the gun at
her feet.

The barrel was pointed towards Mary Barndt.

had been shot from the .22 caliber automatic pistol.

One bullet

One expended

cartridge was lying on the ground between Mary Barndtfs legs near
her ankles.

Officer Sundguist noticed some of Mary's upper

clothing near her side on the floor.

Officer Sundguist noticed

no evidence of disruption in the house.

He immediately put two

small brown paper bags over Mary's two hands and taped them.

His

purpose in doing so was to preserve any gun shot residue which may
possibly of been on her hands.

Paramedics arrived and took Mary

out of the residence to be transported to the hospital.

Her arms

were moving about as she was taken down the stairs of the split
level home.
Officer Sundguist performed a gun shot residue test at the
hospital at approximately 1:45 p.m.

The scene was hectic.

medical personnel were working to preserve Mary's life.

Many

Maryfs

left breast was cut, chest tubes were placed within her, I.V.'s
were administered and she was given many medical treatments.

The

bags which were placed over Mary's hands were removed by the law
enforcement officers and were never preserved.

Therefore no tests

were performed on the inside of the bags to ascertain the presence
of gun shot residue.
Officer Sundguist performed a gunshot residue test on Mary's
left hand.

He had never performed a gunshot residue test before.

Officer Peterson performed a gunshot residue test on Mary's right

hand.

Officer Vernon Peterson had performed three or four prior

gunshot residue tests on various occasions before this particular
test.
Officer Vernon Peterson also conducted gunshot residue tests
on both hands of the defendant.

He performed the gunshot residue

test between 1:22 a.m. to 1:27 a.m.
of Donald Jaeger.

He noticed blood on the hands

Donald Jaeger also indicated that he had

touched Mary's gunshot wound.
Later, Judy Clark was informed that her daughter had died.
Her first comment was to ask if Mary had taken her own life.
Dr. Edward A. Leis, the Assistant State Medical Examiner,
testified that when the shot entered Mary's body, her left arm was
raised at least to shoulder height.

He formed this opinion

because of the passage way created by the bullet as it went
through the muscle and bone of Mary's left lower neck.

He

indicated the gunshot wound was clearly within the reach of Mary's
arms.

He determined that the barrel of the gun was approximately

nine inches away from Mary when the fatal shot was fired.

The

firearm was also positioned near Mary's right breast and was fired
into her upper left collarbone area of her lower left neck. A
mannequin was introduced into evidence to demonstrate the location
of the fatal wound, the distance of the gun from the wound (a nine
inch yellow tape was attached to the mannequin), the trajectory of
the fatal shot and Mary's left arm raised at the time the fatal
shot was fired.
Dr. Leis also indicated that blood was found on Mary's hands
when she was brought into the State Medical Examiner's office.

Blood alcohol and drug screen tests were also conducted at
the State Medical Examinerfs office.
had between .10 and .12 percent

At the time of death, Mary

alcohol in her system.

A drug

screen test also indicated the presence of Valium (diazapam) and
the metabolite of Valium.

Dr. Leis indicated this drug and its

combination with alcohol would cause someone to be tired and slow
and that Valium would heighten the effect of the alcohol.
Dr. Leis also indicated that the arm length of the victim was
26 1/2 inches and that it would be extremely unlikely that she
would have been able to shoot herself by holding the handgun by
the right hand with her right index finger on the trigger.

He

also indicated, however, that it would have been possible for Mary
to self inflict a gunshot by holding the gun facing her left
upper chest with her right hand and pulling the trigger with her
right thumb.
Dr. Leis expressed the opinion that Mary did not self-inflict
the gunshot.

He based the opinion on the facts of her left arm

being raised, gunshot residue test results on her hands, the
atypical entrance wound, the distance of the firearm from Maryfs
body and angle of fire.
Kevin Smith, a criminologist working for the State Crime Lab,
testified.

He stated he tested the gunshot residue tests

performed on both Mary Barndtfs hands and found no gunshot residue
on either test.

He stated that it was possible that Mary had

gunshot residue on her hands because he did not analyze all of the
particles submitted to him on the test discs. He also stated that
a lack of gunshot residue should not be conclusive that Mary did
not fire the gun.

He also tes_*fied that he analyzed gunshot residue test
samples taken from both hands of Donald Jaeger.

He indicated that

he found particles "characteristic91 of gunshot residue on both
samples.

He testified that there are three particles he is

looking for when performing a gunshot residue test.
particles are:

lead, barium, and antimony.

These three

He indicated that he

would look for spherical particles containing lead, plus the
substance of barium or the substance of antimony.

In the tests

conducted on the samples taken from Donald Jaeger's hands, he
found only two elements. His conclusion was that he found
elements "characteristic* of gunshot residue but not "unique."

A

finding of "unique" would require the discovery of all three
substances taken in the gunshot residue test.
The test samples were also taken from the defendant's
workplace.

The defendant works for a company called "Western

Battery" where he overhauls generators and alternators.
"Characteristic" samples of particles were taken from four
locations at Western Battery, including Mr. Jaegerfs wrenches, the
"vice," the defendant's toolbox and also the "book area."
Kevin Smith performed tests upon the samples taken at
"Western Battery" and found one spherical particle to be "unique"
(i.e. wherein all three elements were found) and a limited number
of spherical particles to be "characteristic" (i.e. where two of
three elements were found) of gunshot residue.

The defendant,

therefore, at the time of the shooting was working in an
environment where particles characteristic and unique of gunshot
residue were prevalent.

James Gaskill, an Assistant Professor at Weber State College
Crime Lab, testified.

He stated that it would take only two

pounds of pressure to pull the trigger on the firearm.
firearm was characterized as having a "hair trigger.11

The
Professor

Gaskill also tested the level of gunshot residue coming onto the
hands of the shooter of the firearm.

Gunshot residue tests were

performed on the hands of persons firing the «22 caliber pistol
with the same ammunition used in the fatal shot.

The tests were

performed with holding the gun in the right hand pulling the
trigger with the right index finger.

Particles "unique" to

gunshot residue were found on the hand of each person shooting the
pistol•
Professor Gaskill also indicated that the gun is a relatively
"clean gun" meaning that it did not exude very much gunshot
residue when compared with other handguns.

He indicated that

semi-automatic firearms have fewer openings than revolvers and
given the fact that the firearm in this case is a .22 caliber
firearm, that not much gunshot residue would exude from the
firearm when it was fired.
No evidence of fingerprint testing of the gun was presented
at the preliminary hearing to assist the court in determining who
fired the fatal shot.
LEGAL STANDARD TO APPLY AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING
Rule 7 (8) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs
preliminary hearings. That rule requires that a magistrate must
find "probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been

committed and that the defendant has committed it.,f

The Utah

Supreme Court has defined "probable cause91 for purposes of
preliminary hearings in the case of State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d
778 (Utah 1980).

In Anderson, the court stated

,f

...the probable

cause showing at the preliminary examination must establish a
prima facie case against the defendant from which the trier of
fact could conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as
charged."

The court cited with approval a Massachusetts case,

Mvers v. Commonwealth. 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E. 2d 819 (1973)
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted a
"directed verdict" rule in defining the minimum quantum of
evidence necessary to fulfill the probable cause requirement at
the preliminary examination.

The Supreme

Judicial Court of

Massachusetts stated "the magistrate should dismiss the complaint
when, on the evidence presented, the trial court would be bound to
acquit as a matter of law."
The Anderson case also contains the following language "the
prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to
establish the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must
present a quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of
the case to the trier of fact."

Footnote 13 of that opinion

states that probable cause at a preliminary hearing is a higher
standard of "probable cause" than the "probable cause" for
arrest.

The Supreme Court reasoned, "thus, the minimum quantum of

evidence is more than required to establish probable cause for
arrest but less than would prove the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt."

Id. at 783. The Anderson case has also been

cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in subsequent
opinions dealing with preliminary hearings, see State v. EasthopeP
668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983) and State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah
1986).
ANALYSIS
At final argument of this case, the prosecution and defense
argued that the prosecution's case really hinged on the results of
the gunshot residue tests. Without the gunshot residue test
results, the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to link
the defendant to the second degree murder charge.
The court is of the opinion that the gunshot residue tests in
this case are not reliable to provide that critical linkage.

Of

great significance, is the fact that the prosecution has tested
the defendant's workplace and found one particle "unique" as well
as many particle "characteristic" of gunshot residue.

The

defendant was regularly employed in an environment in which
particles "unique" and "characteristic" of gunshot residue are
prevalent.

It is very conceivable that the defendant's hands had

particles "characteristic" of gunshot residue when tested by law
enforcement officers a few hours after work.

He works day after

day in an environment where these particles are prevalent.

No

evidence was presented to indicate that the workplace particles
would not be found on the defendant's hands a few hours after work.
Another fact of significance is that both of the defendant's
hands were tested and had particles "characteristic" of gunshot

residue upon them*
with both hands?

Did the defendant shoot the gun by holding it
It seems highly unlikely that the particles

could be found on both the defendant's hands and could have come
from the .22 caliber pistol. The gun is not particularly large or
heavy and one which a person of the size and stature of the
defendant clearly would have no trouble holding, aiming and
shooting.

The .22 caliber gun was also a relatively "clean gun"

exuding comparatively little gunshot residue.

No one testified

about the possibility of the defendant shooting the gun with one
hand and particles "characteristic" of residue landing on the
other hand.

Furthermore, if the defendant really shot the gun,

why were only particles "characteristic" and not "unique" found on
his hands?

When Professor Gaskill tested the firing of the same

gun with the same ammunition, he found particles "unique" to
gunshot residue.

Finally, the most prevalent particles found at

the defendant's place of employment were also "characteristic"
particles.
For the above reasons, the court finds that a reasonable jury
could not link the defendant to the charge with the gunshot
residue test results.

They do not establish the probable cause

necessary to link the defendant to the commission of the offense.
The prosecution points out that Mary had no gunshot residue
on her hands when tested.

The argument is that if she

self-inflicted the gunshot, she would have had residue on her
hands.

In this case, she had none.

However, Kevin Smith

testified that he did not analyze all of the particles taken from
Mary's hands and therefore it was possible that Mary had gunshot
residue on her hands. He also stated that a lack of gunshot
residue should not be conclusive that Mary did not fire the gun.

The defense also persuasively argues that Mary's hand did not
have gunshot residue when tested because it may have been rubbed
off in the hustle of the care that she received after she was
discovered with a gunshot wound.

The defendant was told by the

911 dispatcher to hold her hand and to turn her over.

Mary's

upper clothing was removed—presumably rubbing against her hands
and removing residue. A bag was placed and taped over each hand
and later removed at the hospital (unfortunately

the bags were

not preserved by law enforcement to test for gunshot residue that
may have been displaced from the hands and still found within the
bags).

Mary's hands were moving about as she was taken on the

stretcher from the home while her hands were still in the bags.
Numerous persons were working upon and around Mary at the
hospital.

The scene was hectic as medical personnel attempted to

preserve her life. Mary's left chest was cut, tubes placed into
her chest and I.V.'s administered.

Blood also was on her hands.

Given these facts, it is very conceivable that any gunshot residue
from a relatively "clean gunw found on her hands would rub off or
be obliterated.
Nor is the court persuaded that the gun, if fired by Mary,
would exude a sufficient amount of gunshot residue on her hands to
be detectable.

The gun is a relatively "clean gun" exuding

comparatively little gunshot residue.

It is true that test

firings were performed under the direction of Professor Gaskill,
showing a discharge of gunshot residue.

But these tests were

presumably conducted with a person holding the .22 caliber gun

with the right hand holding the pistol in a normal manner—with
the heel of the gun held with the right hand and pulling the
trigger with the right index finger.

The shell would expend to

the right through the exit chamber and presumably most of the
gunshot residue would also be expelled through the exit chamber to
the right of the gun.

There was no testimony of gunshot residue

tests performed consistent with the defense theory that the gun
was held in Mary's right hand and pointed backwards and fired
using her right thumb.

In essence, the gun was held by her right

hand but on the left side of the gun—away from the exit chamber
which expels

the cartridge to the right and presumably also

expels most of the gunshot residue.
performed is obvious to the court.

The reason this test was not
However, appropriate testing

perhaps could have been performed in a safe manner.

Regardless,

the evidence is not before the court and yet for the above
reasoning, the court doubts that the gun, if fired by Mary, would
exude a sufficient amount of gunshot residue to be easily
detectable on her hands, especially after receiving all of the
care and treatment which she received as described in the
preceding paragraph.
One of the defendant's first comments made to the 911
operator is consistent with the prosecution's case.

The defendant

stated MOh...I...I...my girlfriend just shot herself."

It could

be considered, although not argued as such by the prosecution,
that this statement was the beginning of an admission changed in
mid-course by the defendant.

The statement, however, obviously

cannot provide the linkage of the defendant to the murder charge.
It was made in the confusion and excitement at the very beginning
of the 911 call.

It is not an admission and is consistent with

many other emotional, excited utterances made by the defendant
while on the telephone line with the 911 operator.

These

emotional, excited utterances are consistent with the defense
theory that Mary self-inflicted the gunshot wound.
stated,

"Oh God, I can't believe she done this.11

The defendant
(sic) and ,fI

can't calm down but my girlfriend just shot herself."

and, in

speaking directly to Mary, "How could you do this?"
The prosecution also points to the fact that when Mary was
shot, her left arm was raised at least to shoulder level in a
natural reaction to protect herself from the gunshot.

However,

the court has viewed the evidence demonstrated by the mannequin
and determines that there would be no reason for Mary to raise her
left arm to protect herself from the gunshot.

The gun would have

been held by the defendant in a position too low and too close to
Mary's chest for Mary to raise her left arm above shoulder height
in any meaningful self defense.
However, the left arm being raised by Mary is more consistent
with a person who is self-inflicting a gunshot and chooses to
cover her eyes with her left hand rather than literally look down
the barrel of the gun as it was pointed at her chest, neck or
facial area.
Furthermore, the closeness of the gun when it was shot is an
important factor.

Nine inches away from Mary is clearly within

Mary's 26 1/2 inch arms reach.

It would seem that if Mary were to

be shot by the defendant that she would be shot at a distance out
of her arms reach.
Another factor to consider is the trajectory of the shot
itself.

The trajectory is very consistent with Mary holding the

gun up at herself with her right hand and pulling the trigger with
her right thumb.

The trajectory compared with the closeness of

the shot and Mary's elevated left arm is not consistent with the
prosecution's theory that the defendant held the gun and fired the
fatal shot.
Another factor is the location of the gun itself when the
police arrived at the home.

It was found on the floor between

Mary's legs—exactly where one would expect it to be found if the
gunshot were self-inflicted.

Furthermore, the officers observed

no evidence of any struggle when they were inside the home.
There is ample motive for Mary to have taken her own life.
She was distraught.

She was crying and upset.

She had just been

informed that she would have to leave the residence of Donald
Jaeger the next day and not continue to reside with him.
would she live?
whom?

Where

Under what circumstances would she live and with

She was under the influence of alcohol and Valium.

Earlier

in the evening she had temporarily abandoned her daughter at the
home unsupervised.

She had been confronted with making long

distance phone calls to places and to people unknown and not
approved by Donald Jaeger.

She spoke to her mother on the

telephone about her many problems and her troubled life and
expressed a desire to get away from things.

The combination of

these emotions and chemicals could very well have prompted Mary to
take her own life.

Of significance, is the first comment made by

Mary's mother, Judy Clark, when informed that Mary had died.

She

asked if Mary had taken her own life.
On the other hand, is there a motive for the defendant to
kill Mary?

It is true that this case is in a domestic environment

where strong and sometimes unpredictable emotions may exist.

It

is true that Mary made unauthorized phone calls, abandoned her
daughter at the defendants home unsupervised and had been at a bar
or a party that evening.
Valium in her system.

She came home late with alcohol and

The relationship was over.

When

relationships end, people are often excited and do not restrain
their anger and frustration.
person?

But was the defendant this type of

Was he excited and did he fail to restrain his anger and

frustration?

It is significant to the court that, in spite of all

that had happened and after the defendant had informed Mary that
the relationship was over, Donald Jaeger telephoned Mary's mother,
Judy Clark.

He said that Mary needed to talk to her and then gave

Mary the phone.

This does not appear to be the conduct of a

person who would within minutes take Mary's life.
It is true that the opinion of the Assistant State Medical
Examiner was that Mary's death was a homicide.

However, his

opinion was grounded on the discredited gunshot residue tests and
he did not consider any factors of a possible suicide.

For these

important reasons and other, the court is not persuaded by the
opinion of the Assistant State Medical Examiner.

CONCLUSION
The court has taken this case under advisement for over a
three week period of time.

The court has reviewed the tapes of

the trial on many occasions as well as the 911 tape.

The court

has examined the physical evidence that was admitted at trial
including the mannequin, the firearm, the photographs, and the
gunshot residue test packets. This case is certainly one of the
most difficult cases that the court has been assigned to decide
during an eight year tenure on the bench.

The court has given

this case an extensive amount of careful thought and consideration.
The case is a circumstantial evidence case with major
weaknesses.

The facts just do not add up to the second degree

murder charge against the defendant.

The legal standard

articulated by our Supreme Court is a higher standard of probable
cause than the probable cause associated with arrest.

There is

not a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to submit
case to a judge or jury.

this

It is the finding of this court that if

a trial court were presented with this case that it would be bound
to acquit the defendant as a matter of law.

Could a reasonable

jury find the defendant guilty of the homicide charge?

This

court's honest evaluation of that question is negative—no
reasonable jury given the facts of this case before the court
could find the defendant guilty of second degree murder.

The

court concludes that the requisite probable cause necessary for a

bindover at a preliminary hearing is lacking.

The case is

dismissed against the defendant and he is discharged.
Dated this 1st day of February, 1991.

Michael L. Hutchings^
Third Circuit Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I certify that I hand delivered a copy of the foregoing
Memorandum Decision in the above entitled case to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 and the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Office, 430 East 500
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this 1st day of February,
1991.
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN.
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
V.

DONALD L. JAEGER,

Case No. 901012471FS
HONORABLE MICHAEL HUTCHINGS

Defendant.

Having heard and considered the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing in the above-entitled case, and the arguments of
counsel for the State and counsel for the Defendant, and good cause
appearing as was stated by this Court in its Memorandum decision,
dated February 1, 1991,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
above-entitled case be and the same hereby is dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
DATED this _fc2. day of February, 1991.
ft THE COURT:
HONORABLE Ml€HAEiy L'. HUTCH]?NGS

Third Circuit Court

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the
Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this vP -day of February, 1991.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

AMENDED*
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Case No, 910132-CA
Donald L. Jaeger,
Defendant and Appellee.

F I L E D
(January 7, 1992)

Third Circuit, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Michael L. Hutchings
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake
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PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion and
stipulation for supplemental briefing and to strike oral
argument*
Defendant was charged with second degree murder and a
preliminary hearing was held. The court dismissed the
information on the ground that the State failed to establish
probable cause to bind over defendant to district court for
trial. The State appeals.
In State v. Humphrey, No. 900434 (Utah December 18, 1991),
the Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review bindover
orders rests with the district court, not with the Utah Court of
Appeals. The court stated that when a bindover order is issued,
the circuit court judge, acting as a magistrate, determines
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind defendant over for
trial. If so, the information is then transferred to the
*This replaces the memorandum decision issued on January 3, 1992.

district court permitting that court to take original
jurisdiction of the matter. The district court then "has the
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its
original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." Id. Further,
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the
district courts authority to review defects in the indictment or
information.
In this case, the State appeals from the circuit court's
dismissal of an information, alleging defendant should have been
bound over to district court for trial. In accordance with
Humphrey, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
remand to the circuit court. Because we dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, oral argument is stricken and the motion
for supplemental briefing is deemed moot.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

Russel^-W. Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion and
stipulation for supplemental briefing and to strike oral
argument.
Defendant was charged with second degree murder and a
preliminary hearing was held. The court dismissed the
information on the ground that the State failed to establish
probable cause to bind over defendant to district court for
trial. The State appeals.
In State v. Humphrey. No. 900434 (Utah December 18, 1991),
the Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review bindover
orders rests with the district court, not with the Utah Court of
Appeals. The court stated that when a bindover order is issued,
the circuit court judge, acting as a magistrate, determines
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind defendant over for
trial. If so, the information is then transferred to the
district court permitting that court to take original
jurisdiction of the matter. The district court then "has the
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its
original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." I£. Further,

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the
district courts authority to review defects in the indictment or
information.
In this case, the State appeals from the circuit court's
dismissal of an information, alleging defendant should have been
bound over to district court for trial. In accordance with
Humphrey, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
remand to the district court. Because we dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, oral argument is stricken and the motion
for supplemental beefing is deemed moot.
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THE INFORMATION.

tion, mast be oommenced within two years after the commission of the offence.
§ 4835. e 55. An action on a complaint is commenced, ^gfXJgJ
when a verified complaint isfiledby the magistrate.
She?cS^*
plaint ie filed.

CHAPTER HI.
T B S IKFOEMATJOX.
SECTION.

4836 Who are magistrates.

§ 4836. s 56. The following persons are magistrates: J^JT*1**"
1. The district judge.
2. Justices of the peace.
3. Police magistrates in incorporated cities, such as
mayors and aldermen.

CHAPTER IV.
THE WARRAKT OP ARREST.

SECTION.

SECTION.

4887 Examination of the prosecutor
and his witnesses upon the information.
4838 The deposition, what to contain.
4839 When warrant may issne.
4840 Form of warrant.
4841 Name or description of the d e feiidant in the warrant, and
statement of time of issuing it.
4842 Warrant, to whom directed and
by whom executed.
4838 Defendant arrested for felony to
be taken before magistrate i s suing the warrant, etc.
4844 Defendant arrested for misdemean or in another county to be
admitted to ball.

4845 Proceedings on taking bail from
the defendant.
4846 When bail is not given. When
magistrate who issued the warrant cannot act.
4847 No delay in taking defendant before magistrate.
4848 Proceedings when defendant is
taken before another magistrate.
4849 Proceedings for offences triable
in other county.
4850 Duty of officer.
4851 Admission to bail. Proceedings
when magistrate has jnrlsdiction of the offence.

•

§ 4837. s 57. When an information is laid before a
magistrate of the commission of a public offence, triable
within the county, he must examine on oath the informant or
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J«mta«tton
^iufetse^p
•SOD. 6iDform
The dermalcontain.

prosecutor, and any witnesses he may produce, and take their
^P 08 *** 01 * 8 in writing, and cause them to be subscribed by
t ie
* Parties making them.
§ 4838. s 58. The deposition must set forth the facts
stated by the prosecutor and his witnesses, tending to establish the commission of the offence and the guilt of the defendant.
wStml""
§ 4 8 3 9 « s 5& - I f & e magistrate is satisfied therefrom
iBine.
t^f. t jj e 0 f f e n c e complained of has been committed, and that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has
committed it, he must issue a warrant of arrest.
Form of w»r§ 4840. s 60. A warrant of arrest is an order in writxant.

.

ing in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, commanding the arrest of the defendant, and may be substantially
in the following form:
County of
The people of the Territory of Utah to any sheriff, constable, marshal, or polieceman of naid Territory, or of the
county of
: Information on oath having been this day
laid before me, by A. B . , that the crime of
(designating i t ) , has been committed, and accusing C D . thereof, you
are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above
named C. D . and bring him before me at (naming the place),
or in case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest
or most accessible magistrate in this county. Dated at
this
day of
, eighteen
.
Justice of the Peace.
When necessary, the magistrate may insert therein a
• clause to the effect that if the accused has fled from justice,
that the peace officer pursue him into any other county of this
Territory and there arrest him.
•cnptionoV
5 4841. s 61. The warrant must specify the name of
e d e
&ntt e
m th e w«. ^ defendant, or, if it is unknown to the magistrate, the de•SSSemiBBt of fendant may be designated therein by any name. It must
5£ingu!o£i8" also state the time of issuing it, and the county, city or precinct where it is issued, and be signed by the magistrate, with
his name of office,
warrant to
§ 4842. s (*2. The warrant must be directed to and exlecwhonkdexe.eou'ed by a peace officer; and in an incorporated city may be
«nt€d.
served by any peace officer, either in the county where issued
or in any other county of the Territory.
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VII.

EXAMINATION OF THE CASE AND DISCHARGE OF THE DEFENDANT, OB
HOLDING HIM TO ANSWER.
SECTION.

SECTION.

4872 Magistrate to inform defendant
of the charge and of his right
to have counsel.
4873 Time to send and sending for
counsel.
4874 Examination, when to proceed.
4875 When to be completed. PoBtponement.
4876 On postponement defendant to
be committed or discharged on
bail.
4877 The commitment, form of.
4878 Depositions to be read on exainination and subpoenas issued.
4879 Examination of witnesses to be
in presence of defendant, etc.
4880 Examination of defendant's witnesses.
4881 Exclusion and separation of
witnesses.
4882 Who are entitled to be present
at the examination.
4883 Testimony, how taken and anthenticated.

4884 Depositions, by whom and how
kept.
4885 Defendant, when and how di6charged.
4886 When and how to be committed.
4887 When offence is not bailable,
order for commitment.
4888 When offence is bailable, certificate of bail being taken.
4889 Order for bail on commitment,
4890 Commitment, how made and to
whom delivered.
4891 Commitment, form of.
4892 Undertaking may be required of
witness to appear.
4893 For the appearance of witnesses,
when and how required.
4894 Witness refusing to give security for his appearance to be
committed.
4895 Witness unable to give security
may be conditionally examined.
4896 Magistrate to return depositions,
etc., without delay, to the
court.

§ 4872. 8 92. When the defendant is brought before Magistrate to
the magistrate upon an arrest, either with or without warrant, fendantof the
on a charge of having committed a public offence, the magis-iu» right to
trate must immediately inform him of the charge against him,
and" of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the
proceedings.
§ 4873. 8 93. He must also allow the defendant a reas- Time to Bend
onable time to send for counsel, and postpone the examination for counsel,
for that purpose, and must, upon the request of the defendant, require a peace officer to take a message to any counsel
in the precinct or the city the defendant may name. The
officer must, without delay and without fee, perform that duty.
§ 4874. s 94. If the defendant requires the aid of Examination
counsel, the magistrate must, immediately after the appear-ce/dD pro'
ance of counsel, or if, after waiting a reasonable time therefor, none appears, proceed to examine the case.
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competed6
Postpone

$ 4875. 8 95. The examination must be completed at
one session, unless the magistrate, for good cause shown bj
affidavit, postpone it. The postponement cannot be for more
than four days at each time, nor more than twelve days in
all, unless by consent or on motion of the defendant.
B
De
meDt° de?e nd$ 4876. 8 96. If a postponement is had, the magistrate
a
^1^{1b«r<gI™_ must commit the defendant for examination, admit him to
charged on ^ail, or discharge him from custody upon the deposit of money
as provided in this act, as security for his appearance at
the time to which the examination is postponed,
menftcfmof
$ 4877# 8 97'
^ e commitment for examination is
be reason ex made by an indorsement, signed by the magistrate on the
SobpSffff*warrant of arrest, to the following effect:
"The within
*
named A. B. having been brought before me under this warrant, is committed for examination to the sheriff of
."
If the sheriff is not present, the defendant may be committed
to the custody of any peace officer.
Examination
§ 4878. B 98. At the examination the magistrate must
tobeinprea- first read to the defendant the depositions of the witnesses
F

ence of de

fendant, etc examined on taking the information. He must also issue
subpoenas, subscribed by him, for witnesses within the Territory, required either by the prosecution or the defense.
Examination
§ 4879. 8 99. The witnesses must be examined in the
witaeMMHkBt>a presence of the defendant, and may be cross-examined in his
behalf.
§ 4880. s 100. When the~examination of witnesses on
the part of the people is closed, any witness the defendant
may produce may be sworn and examined.
Excision and
§ 4881. 8 101. While a witness is under examination,
witnesses? ° the magistrate may exclude all witnesses who have not been
'
examined. He may also cause the witnesses to be kept separate, and to be prevented from conversing with each other
until they are all examined,
who are en§ 4882. 8 102. The magistrate must also, upon the represent at the nuest of the defendant, exclude from the examination every
examination.

*

person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his counsel, the
attorney-general, the prosecuting attorney of the county, or
the district attorney of the United States, the defendant and
his counsel, and the officer having the defendant in custody.
Testimony,
§ 4883. 8 103. The testimony of each witness in cases
andanthen- 0 f homicide must be reduced to writing, as a deposition, by
the magistrate, or under his direction; and in other cases
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upon the demand of the prosecuting officer. The magistrate
before whom the examination is had, may, in his discretion,
order the testimony and proceedings to be taken down in
short hand, in all examinations herein mentioned, and for
that purpose he may appoint a short hand reporter. The
deposition or testimony of the witness must be authenticated
in the following form:
1. It must state the name of the witness, his place of March is, ISM.
residence, and his business or profession.
2. It must contain the questions put to the witness, and
his answers thereto, each answer being distinctly read to him
as it is taken down, and being corrected or added to until it
conforms to what he declares is the truth; except in cases
where the testimony is taken down in short hand, the answer
or answers of the witness need not be read to him.
3. If a question put be objected to on either side and
overruled, or the witness declines answering it, that fact with
the ground on which the question was overruled or the answer declined, must be stated.
4. The deposition must be signed by the witness, or if
he refuse to sign it, his reason for refusing must be stated
in writing as he gives it, except in cases where the deposition is taken down in short hand, it need not be signed by the
witness.
5. It must be signed and certified by the magistrate
when reduced to writing by him, or under his direction, and
when taken down in short hand, the transcript of the reporter
appointed as aforesaid, when written out in long hand writing, and certified as being a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings in the case shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings. The reporter shall, within ten days after the close of such examination, (if the defendant be held to answer the charge), transcribe into long hand writing his said short hand notes, and
certify and file the same with the clerk of the district court
of the district embracing the county in which the defendant
was examined, and shall in all cases file his original notes with
said clerk. The reporter's fees shall be paid out of the treasury of the county.
§ 4884. s 104. The magistrate or his clerk must keen PW>«KK»§.
.*

,

. ,

,

,

.

-r oy whom *nd

the depositions taken on the information or on the examina- bowkept
tion, until they are returned to the proper ^court; and must
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not permit them to be examined or copied by any ^enon except a judge of a court having jurisdiction of the offence, or
authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus, the attorney general, district attorney, or other prosecuting attorney, and the
defendant and his counsel.
Shenn«d\ow
§ 4885. e 105. If, after hearing the proofs, it appears
discharged. ^at either no public offence has been committed, or that
there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of
a public offence, the magistrate must order the defendant to
be discharged, by an indorsement on the depositions and
statement, signed by him, to the following effect: "There
being no sufficient cause to believe the within named A. B
guilty of the offence within mentioned, I order him to be
discharged.''
when »nd
§ 4886. s 106. If, however, it appears from the excommitted, animation that a public offence has been committed, and
there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate must indorse on the depositions an order,
signed by him to the following effect: " I t appearing to me
that the offence in the within depositions mentioned (or any
offence, according to the fact, stating generally the nature
thereof), has been committed, and that there is sufficient
cause to believe Nthe within named A . B . guilty thereof, I
order that he be held to answer to the same."
when offence
§ 4887. s 107. If the offence k not bailable, the fol{fafiabie,or lowing words must be added to the indorsement: "And he
mitment. m is hereby committed to the sheriff of the county of
."
when offence
§ 4888. s 108. If the offence is bailable, and bail is
is bailable,

*

#

.

• «

.

i

*

JJ J

certificate of taken by the magistrate, the following words must be added
t**en.
to the indorsement; "And I have admitted him to bail on
the undertaking hereto annexed."
order for
§ 4889. s 109. If the offence is bailable and the demitment.
fendant is admitted to bail, but bail has not been taken, the
following words must be added to the order indorsed on the
deposition: "And that he is admitted to bail in the sum
of
dollars, and is committed to the sheriff of the count)
of
, until he gives such bail, or is legally discharged.
commitment
§ 4890. s 110. If the magistrate ordered the defendant
SSd tTwho^to be committed, he must make out a commitment, signed by
delivered.
^ . ^ w l t h h i g n a m e 0 f o f f i c 6 f a n d deliver it, with the defendant, to the officer to whom he is committed, or, if that officer
is not present, to a peace officer, who must deliver the de
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fendant into the proper custody, together with the commitment.
§ 4891. s 111. The commitment must be to the f o l l o w - ^ S f " *
ing effect:
County of
: (as the case may be.)
The people of the Territory of Utah to the sheriff of the
county of
: An order having been this day made by
me that A. B. be held to answer upon a charge of (stating
brfefly the nature of the offence, and giving as near as may
be the time when, and the place where, the same was committed), you are commanded to receive him into your custody
and detain him until he is legally discharged. Dated this
day of
eighteen
.
§ 4892. s 112. On holding the defendant to answer, the UnderUking
magistrate may take from each of the material witnesses ex- JjS^ofW
amined before him on the part of the people a written under- ]J|]5e8t0*p
taking, to the effect that he will appear and testify at the
court to which the depositions and statements are to be sent,
or that he will forfeit the sum of two hundred dollars.
§ 4893. s 113. When the magistrate or a judge of the security for
court in which the action is pending is satisfied, by proof onlnce*o?witoath, that there is reason to believe that any such witness2nTbowre*n
will not appear and testify unless security is required, he may ^ r e '
order the witness to enter into a written undertaking, with
sureties, in such sum as be may deem proper, for his appearance as specified in the preceding section.
§ 4894. 8 114. If a witness, required to enter into an witness ret asundertaking to appear and testify, either with or without cnnt£?o75?§
sureties, refuses compliance with the order for that purpose, be committed,
the magistrate must commit him to prison until he complies
or is legally discharged.
§ 4895. s 115. When, however, it satisfactorily ap-witnes§nn
pears, by examination on oath of the witness, or any other *ecnrity may
i

,

,*

.

»

De

condition

person, that the witness is unable to procure sureties, he may *{g[ *§•
be forthwith conditionally examined on behalf of the people;
such examination must be by question and answer, and conducted in the same manner as the examination before a committing magistrate is required by this act to be conducted,
and the witness thereupon be discharged; but this section
does not apply to the prosecutor or to an accomplice in the
commission of the offence charged.
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Feb.«2,1878.
§ 4896. s 116. When a magistrate has discharged a
return depon defendant, or has held him to answer, he must return, withtions, etc,

without delay out delay, to the clerk of the court at which the defendant is
to tue court.

.

required to appear, the warrant, if any, the depositions, and
all undertakings of bail, or for the appearance of witnesses
taken by him.

TITLE III.
OF PROCEEDINGS AFTER COMMITMENT AND BEFORE INDICTMENT.
CHAPTER

I.

Preliminary provisions.

CHAPTER II. Powers and duties of a grand jury.

CHAPTER

I.

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS.

SECTION.

SRCTIOX.

4897 Public offences triable in the 4904
district courts to be prosecuted
by indictment.
4905
4898 Who may challenge the panel
or an individual juror.
4906
4899 Cause of challenge to a panel. 4907
4900 Cause of challenge to an indi- 4908
vidual grand juror.
4909
4901 Manner of taking and trying
challenges.
4910
4902 Decision upon challenges.
4908 Effect of allowing a challenge to
a panel.

Effect of allowing a challenge to
an individual juror.
Objection to jury can only be
taken by challenge.
Appointment of a foreman.
Oath of foreman.
Oath of other grand jurors.
Grand jury to be charged by the
court.
Retirement of the grand jury.
Discbarge of.

March is, 1884.
§ 4897. 8 117. All public offences triable in the district
^eDcei
courts, except cases appealed from justices' courts, must be
SuSnaoomta prosecuted by indictment.
cnted^inA grand jury must consist of fifteen eligible male citizens
dictmeDt
0 j t j i e United States, selected, summoned and impaneled, as
provided by law, twelve of whom may constitute a quorum to
do business.
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SETTING ASIDE THE INDICTMENT.

ment is not made, the defendant is precluded from after- ^IJJ^obW
wards taking the objections mentioned in the last section.
m°akesthe88he
§ 4967. s 187. The motion must be heard at the time Sofion,when
it is made, unless for cause the court postpones the hearingheardto another time. If the motion is denied, the defendant must
immediately answer the indictment, either by demurring or
pleading thereto. If the motion is granted, the court mustit denied or
*

i

i

i »

t

•*•

*

*

<». i

«iA»

granted, what

order that the defendant, if in custody, be discharged there- proceeding* to
from; or, if admitted to bail, that his bail be exonerated;
or, if he has deposited money instead of bail, that the same
be refunded to him, unless it directs that the case be re-submitted to the same or another grand jury.
§ 4968. s 188. If the court directs the case to be re-Effect of order
*

,

for re anemia

submitted, the defendant, if already m custody, must so re-*ionmain unless he is admitted to bail, or, if already admitted to
bail, or money has been deposited instead thereof, the bail or
money is answerable for the appearance of the defendant to
answer a new indictment; and unless a new indictment is
found before the next grand jury of the district is discharged,
the court must, on the discharge of such grand jury, make
the order prescribed by the preceding se'etion.
§ 4969. s 189. An order to set aside an indictment, as order to aet
provided in this Chapter., is no bar to a future prosecution ment notot©
»

**

~

another proae

for tne same offence,

cation.

CHAPTER

HI.

DEMUBRER.

SECTION.

SECTION.

4970
4971
4972
4978

4977 If re-gubmlssion not ordered,
defendant to be discharged, etc.
407$ Proceedings, if submission ordered.
4979 Proceedings if demurrer is disallowed.
4980 When
objections
forming
ground of demurrer must or
may be taken.

Pleading on part of defendant.
Demurrer or plea, when put in.
Grounds of demurrer.
Demurrer, how put in and its
form.
4974 When heard.
4975 Judgment on demurrer.
4976 If allowed, bar to another prosecution, when.
*

§ 4970. s 190. The only pleading on the part of the # £ £ * « »
defendant is either a demurrer or a plea.
part of defend.
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-jemarreron
plea, when pot

§ 4971. s 191.

Both the demurrer and plea must be
r

/

uc

«>•

put m, m open court, either at the time of the arraignment
or at such other time as may be allowed to the defendant for
that purpose.
SSSSSSr?1
§ 4 9 7 2 - 8 1 9 2 ' T h e d ^ n d a n t may demur to the indictment when it appears upon the face thereof either:
1. That the grand jury by which it was found had no
legal authority to inquire into the offence charged, by reason
of its not being within the legal jurisdiction of the court.
March is, i88i
2. That it does not substantially conform to the requirements of sections 150 and 151.
3. That more than one offence is charged in the indictment, except as provided m section 153.
4. That the facts stated do not constitute a public
offence.
5. That the indictment contains any matter which, if
true, would constitute a legal justification or excuse of the
offence charged, or other legal bar to the prosecution.
i^wp^unand
§ 4973. s 193. The demurrer must be in writing, signed
k§ form.
either by the defendant or his counsel, and filed. It must
distinctly specify the grounds of objection to the indictment,
or it must be disregarded,
when heard
§ 4974. s 194. Upon the demurrer being filed, the argument upon the objections presented thereby must be heard,
either immediately or at such time as the court may appoint,
judgment on
§ 4975. s 195. Upon considering the demurrer, the
rlblafim
court must give judgment, either allowing or disallowing it,
and an order to that effect must be entered upon the minutes,
if allowed,bar
§ 4976. s 196. If the demurrer is allowed, the judgto another

*.

.

'

. *

°

prosecution, ment is final, upon the indictment demurred to, and is a bar
March is, 1884 to another prosecution for the same offence, unless the pourt,
being of the opinion that the objection on which the demurrer
is allowed may be avoided in a new indictment, directs the
case to be re-submitted to the same or to another grand jury,
if re tobmis
§ 4977. s 197. If the court does not direct the case to be
VS^tiwuS re-submitted, the defendant, if in custody, must be discharged,
discharged, or .^ a ( j m j t t e ( j to ^ail, his bail is exonerated, or if he has deposited money instead of bail, the money must be refunded
to him.
Proceedings if
§ 4978. s 198. If the court directs that the case be reordered
submitted, the same proceedings must be had thereon as are
prescribed in sections 187 and 188.
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6 4979. a 199. If the demurrer is disallowed, the court Proceeding
must permit the defendant, at his election, to plead, which he disallowed,
must do forthwith, or at such time as the court may direct.
If he does not plead, judgment may be pronounced against
him.
§ 4980. s 200. When the objections mentioned in seo>B> SSffVomiSW
tion 192 appear upon the face of the indictment, they cang£j£j«**«•
only be taken by demurrer, except that the objection to thegjgjf*
jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the indictment,
or that the facts stated do not constitute a public offence,
may be taken at the trial, under the plea of not guilty, or
after the trial, in arrest of judgment.

CHAPTER

IV.

PLEA.
SECTION.

SECTION.

4981 The different kinds of pleas.
4982 Plea, bow put in and its form.
4983 Plea of £niltj, how put in and
when it may he withdrawn.
4984 Plea of not frailty, what It puts
in issue.
4985 What may be put in evidence
under a plea of not guilty.

4986 What is not a former acquittal.
4987 What is a former acquittal.
4988 Conviction or acquittal of an
indictment for a higher offence,
effect of.
4989 Defendant refusing to answer,
plea of not guilty to be entered.

§ 4981. s 201. * Tbere are three [four] kinds of pleas to Feb. «, inn.
an indictment. A plea of:
2£*^SaaL
1. Guilty.
2. Not guilty.
3. A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the March is, *sst
offence charged, which may be pleaded either with or without the plea of not guilty.
4. Once in jeopardy.
§ 4982. s 202. Every plea must be oral and entered piea, bow ^t
upon the minutes of the court substantially in the following &£!* iu
form:
1. If the defendant plead guilty, "The defendant
pleads that he is guilty of the offence charged in this indictment."
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attorney, and he shall, at the request of the defendant, permit such ministers of the gospel, not exceeding two, as the
defendant may name, and any persons, relatives or friends,
not to exceed five, to be present at the execution, together
with such peace officers as he may think expedient, to witness
the execution. But no other person than those mentioned in
this section can be present at the execution, nor can any person under age be permitted to witness the same.
5S^«x?ant
$ 5 1 3 ^ 8 3 5 7 * After the execution, the proper officer
must make a return upon the death warrant, showing the
time, mode and manner in which it was executed.

TITLE

VIII.

OF APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COUBT.
CHAFTEB

I. Appeals, when allowed and how takeD, and the effect
thereof.
CHAPTER II. Dismissing an appeal for irregularity.
CHAPTER III. Argument on the appeal.
CHAPTER IV. Judgment on appeal.

CHAPTER

I.

APPEALS, HOW ALLOWED AND HOW TAKEN AND THE EFFECT THEREOF.
SECTION

SECTION.

518* Either party may appeal, on 5)89 Appeal, how taken.
question of law.
5140 When notice may be 6er?ed by
5185 Parties, how designated on appublication.
peal
5141 Appeal by the people, effect of.
5186 Appeal by defendant; in what 5142 Appeal by defendant, effect of.
cases may be taken.
5148 Same. Duty of officer.
5187 Appeal by the people, in what 5144 Same.
cases may be taken.
5145 Duty of clerks upon appeal.
5188 Appeal, within what time to be
taken.

Either party
§ 5134. s 3 5 8 . Either party in a criminal action, may
rquStPon o?n appeal to the supreme court on questions of law alone, as
prescribed in this Chapter.
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§ 5135. s 359. The party appealing is known as the Parties, how
„

i

,

,

i

i t

designated on

appellant, and the adverse party as the respondent, but appeal,
the title of the action is not changed in consequence of
the appeal.
§ 5136. s 360. An appeal may be taken by the defend-Appeal by de
'
ant:

rr

j

j

fendant,in
cases
may be taken

what

1. From a final judgment of conviction.
2. From an order denying a motion for a new trial.
3. From an order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.
§ 5137. 8 361. An appeal may be taken by the people: Aw^J *£ the
1. From a judgment for the defendant on a demurrer mif^hiken.
to the indictment.
2. From an order granting a new trial.
3. From an order arresting judgment.
4. From an order made after judgment affecting the
substantial rights of the people.
§ 5138. s 362. An appeal from a judgment must be Appeau^thtaken within one year after its rendition, and from an order10 bc takenwithin sixty days after it is made.
§ 5139. s 363. An appeal is taken by filing with the Appeal, how
clerk of the court in which the judgment or order appealed
from is entered or filed, a notice stating the appeal from the
same, and serving a copy thereof upon the attorney of the
adverse party.
§ 5140. s 364. If personal service of the notice cannot when notice
be made the judge of the court in which the action was tried, by'pobiicaSxSL
upon proof thereof, may make an order for the publication
of the notice in some newspaper for a period not exceeding
thirty days; such publication is equivalent to personal
service.
§ 5141. s 365. An appeal taken by the people in no Appeal by the
case stays or effects the operation of a judgment in favor of o?.op e ' e cc
the defendant, until judgment is reversed.
§ 5142. s 366. An appeal to the supreme court from a Appeal by de.
judgment of conviction stays the execution of the judgment, of.
upon filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction was had, a certificate of the judge of such court, or of a
justice of the supreme court, that in his opinion there
is probably cause for the appeal, but not otherwise.
§ 5143. 8 367. If the certificate provided for in the same,
preceding section is filed, the sheriff must, if the defendant
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patyofofflccr.be in his custody, upon being served with a copy thereof,
keep the defendant in his custody without executing the judgment and detain him to abide the judgment on appeal.
***«•
§ 5144. s 368. If, before the granting of the eertifi- cate, the judgment has commenced, the further execution
thereof is suspended, and upon service of a copy of such certificate the defendant must be restored, by the officer in
whose custody he is, to his original custody.
^waT*
§ 51*5. s 369. Upon the appeal being taken the clerk
with whom the notice of appeal is filed must, within ten days
thereafter, without charge transmit to the clerk of the
appellate court a copy of the notice of appeal, and of the
record, and of all bills of exception, instructions and indorsements thereon; and upon the receipt thereof, the clerk of the
appellate court must file the same and perform the same service as in civil cases, without charge.

CHAPTER I I .

DI6MI8SING AN APPEAL FOR IRREGULARITY.

SECTION.

SECTION.

5146 For what irregularity and bow 5147 Dismissed for want of proper
dismissed.
return.

For what ir.
$ 5146. s 370. If the appeal is irregular in any subanffhowiii. e t a ntial particular, but not otherwise, the appellate court
missed.
may, on any day in the term, on motion of the respondent,
upon five days notice, accompanied with copies of the papers
upon which the motion is founded, order it to be dismissed.
wanTo/pwpS
§ 5 1 4 7 - 8 3 7 1 \ T h e o o u r t m a y a l s o » u P o n l i k e motion,
"etTfi ^^ dismiss the appeal, if the return is not made as provided in
section 369, unless for good cause they enlarge the time for
that purpose.
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may be commenced at any time after^the death of the person killed, and for
the embezzlement of public moneys .or the falsification of public records, at
.any time after the discovery of the crime.
Cal. Fen. C, f 799; Cal. Sup. (1893) p. 1064.
Limitations, civil procedure, II 6445-6492.

Limitations not affected by general repeal I
5835.

8666. (4598.) Felony other than murder, e t c Four years. For any
felony other than murder, the embezzlement of public moneys, or the falsification of public records, an indictment must be found or an information filed
within four years after its commission.
Gal .Pen. C, | 800; Cal. Sup. <1893) p. 1064.

8667. (4599.) Indictable misdemeanor. Three years. An indictment
for any misdemeanor must be foun4 or an information filed within three years
after its commission.
<3aL Pen. C 1 S01*,

State •. Jeneen, 14 U. 166; 96 P. 1085.

8668. (4600.) Tune of defendant's absence no part of limitation. If,
when the offense is committed, the defendant is out of the state, the indictment may be found or an information filed within the term herein limited
after his coming within the state, and no time during which the defendant
shall not be an inhabitant of, or usually resident within, the state, shall be
part of the limitation.
Cal. Pen. C. | 802.

8669. (4601.) When indictment deemed found. An indictment is found,
within the meaning of this chapter, when it is presented by the grand jury in
open court, and there received and filed.
Cal. Pen. C, I 808.

8670. (4602.) Misdemeanor within justice's jurisdiction. Two years.
A complaint for a misdemeanor, of which justices of the peace have jurisdiction, must be filed within two years after the commission of the offense.
8671. (4603.) Action begun when complaint filed. An action on a complaint is commenced when a verified complaint is filed with the magistrate.
Complaint defined, | 8674; form, If 8680, 8480.

CHAPTER 11.
DEFINITIONS.
8674. (4604.) Complaint defined. A complaint is a statement in writing, made to a court or magistrate, that a person has been guilty of some
designated offense.
Cal. Pen. C, f 806; Mont. Pen. C, { 1870.
Action begun when complaint filed, | 8S71.

What complaint must state, f{ 8680,-9480.

8675. (4605.) Indictment defined. An indictment is an accusation in
writing, presented by a grand jury to a competent court, charging a person
with a public offeftse.
Cat Pen. €., 8 817.

^ 8676. (4606.) Information defined. An information is an accusation in
writing in form and substance like an indictment for the same offense, charging a person with a public offense, presented and signed by the district attorney, or by the attorney pro tern, for the state, and filed in the office of At
clerk of the district court, - Am'd "01, p. 26.
Mont Pen. C. f 1872V
niing- of information, Ifi 8779-8782,

Proeecution by information or indictment
except, Con. art 1, tee. 18; | 8549.

8677. (4607.) Magistrate defined. A magistrate is an officer having
power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense.
Cal. Pen. C, I 807; Moat Pen. C, I 1878.

8678. (4608.) Magistrates enumerated. The following persons are
magistrates:
L The justices of the supreme court/
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2. The judges of the district courts;
3. Justices of the peace.
Cal Pen. C , I 808*.

8679. (4609.) Peace officers enumerated. A peace officer is a sheriff of
a county or his deputy, or a constable, or a marshal or policeman of any incorporated city or town.
Mont. Pen. C I 1375*.

CHAPTER 12.
COMPLAINT.
8680. (4610.) What m complaint most state The complaint must
state:
1. The name of the person accused, if known, or if not known and it is
so stated, he may be designated by any other name;
2. The county in which the offense was committed;
3. The general name of the crime or public offense;
4. • The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the crime or public offense named;
5. The person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, if known;
6. If the offense is against the property of any person, a general description of such property.
. The complaint must be subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.
N. Dak. (1895) i 7886; Mont Pen. C , | 1590*.
Complaint defined, ( 8674.
Complaint for offense within justice's jurisdiction, | 9420.
~
J £ £ p l f ! ? ™ * f t o m m i S 8 i o n ot c r i m e to " o t h e r
nS?ni!iS «« «,»«™ •« ~ . « ^ i - ^ M ^ ^ *~
k . X ^ K ? ^ L £ ?f ft°57t°anS0mpel • e c u r i t y t 0
keep the peace, 55 8567, 8569.
e t c ^ l f ^ . t m 1 1 8 1 c o r p o r a t i o n ' comPlaint»
Information or complaint must show that a
ta
crime fcas been committed.
%7*ex
In re Catherine Wiseman, 1 U. 89.
Criminal complaint may be sworn to upon
Information and belief.
U. S. v. Eldredge, 5 TJ. 161; 18 P. €73.
A complaint which states the name of the
crime charged, the time and place of its commission, the name of the accused, and which
sets out in general terms the acts constituting
the crime, is sufficient
State v. Anderson, 85 U. 496; 101 P . 885.

It need not state the offense In technical
language or in such specific term* as is required in the information.
State v. Pay, 45 tJ. 411; 146 P . 100.
Accused, failing to object to the complaint
wnen
arraigned before the committing magistrate, waived all objections that might hive
been urged against i t
State v. Anderson. 85 U. 496; 101 P , 885.
. A verified complaint is essential to a prelim« n a H o n i ^ „ *«* ^ * •» «A«
state v
- Sheffield, 45 U. 426; 146 P . 806.
Where It develops that a crime committed
was different from that charged in the complaint, a magistrate may direct the county attorney to prepare a new complaint, and direct
the rearrest of the accused, and give him an
opportunity to either waive or insist on examination on the new charge,
State v. Pay, 45 XJ. 411; 146 P . 100.

8681. (4611.) Any person having knowledge must make complaint.
Every person who has reason to believe that a crime or public offense has
been committed must make complaint against such person before some magistrate having authority to make inquiry of the sameN. Dak. (1895) I 7887; Mont Pen. C., I 1591*
When person concealing crime an accessory, I 7980.

8682. (4612.) Magistrate must examine complainant Witnesses.
When a complaint is made before a magistrate, charging a person with the
commission of a crime or public offense, such magistrate must examine the
complainant, under oath, as to his knowledge of the commission of the offense charged, and he may also examine any other persons, and may take their
depositions.

K. Dak. (1895) I 7888; Mont Pen. C , J 1592*.
complainant must name witnesses, f 8684.
Witnesses may be required to give bonds for
appearance at preliminary, fi 8766.
Depositions of witnesses unable to give
bonds, 55 8765, 8767.
Preliminary examination, f 5 8787-8768.
Under chap. 23, laws of 1896, a magistrate
hit authority to examine and commit a prisoner charged with commission on an offense
to answer the eharge in proper court
State v. Pierpont, 16 TJ. 476; 52 P . .892.

A writ of prohibition will not issue to restrain criminal proceedings on the ground that
I 8682, providing that when a complaint is
made before a magistrate, charging a crime,
the magistrate must examine the complainant
under oath and may also examine other persons
and take their depositions, and 5 8688, providing
that where a complaint is made by a person
r+her than the county attorney, the complaint
and other evidence taken by the magistrate
must be submitted to the county attorney before a warrant issues—were not complied with;
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the decision of the question being within the
Jurisdiction of the trial court, and the accused's

remedy for an erroneous ruling being by *opeal.
State, ex rel Brown •. Third District Court
27 U. 836; 76 P. 739.

8683. (4613.) When arrest made without warrant, complaint to be filed.
When any officer or other person shall bring any person he has arrested without a warrant before a magistrate, it is the duty of such officer or person f
specify the charge upon which he has made the arrest. It is then the duty ol
the magistrate or the county attorney to make a complaint of the offense
charged, and cause the officer or person, or some other person, to subscribe
and make oath to such complaint, and file it.
N. Dak. (1S95) I 7*89; Mont Pen. C, I 1593V

8684. (4614.) Complainant must name witnesses. Subpoena. Every
person making complaint charging the commission of a crime or public offense must inform the magistrate of all persons whom he believes to have any
knowledge of its commission, and the magistrate, at the time of issuing the
warrant, may issue subpoenas for such persons, requiring them to attend at»
specified time and place as witnesses.
tt. Dak. (1895) 5 7890; Mont Pen. C., | 1594.

CHAPTER 13..
WARRANT OF ARREST.
8688. (4615.) Issuance of warrant Consent of county attorney.
When a complaint, verified by oath or affirmation, is made before a magistrate, charging the commission of a crime or public offense, he must, if satisfied therefrom that the offense complained of has been committed, and that
. there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused committed it, issue a
warrant for his arrest; but when the magistrate before whom the complaint
is made is a justice of the peace, before issuing the warrant, the complaint, if
made by any person other than the county attorney of the county, and other
evidence taken by such magistrate relating to the offense charged, must be
submitted to such county attorney, and he must examine into the charge and
enter either his approval or disapproval of the issuance of a warrant upon such
complaint. If the county attorney disapproves, no warrant shall be issued,
but if he approves the issuance of a warrant, such magistrate shall proceed
accordingly; provided, that in cases when it appears from statements of the
complaint or other written evidence submitted to the magistrate that the
accused is likely to escape from the county before the approval of the county
attorney can be had, as hereinbefore prescribed, a wcrrant may issue without
the apprqval of the county attorney. No justice of the peace shall receive
any fees or allowances whatever for any act done or services rendered in a
criminal action or proceeding commenced or prosecuted in disregard of the
provisions of this section,
N. Dak. (1895) ( 7891*.
Form of complaint, I 8680.
Magistrate defined, I 8677; magistrates enumerated, | 8678.
Cited In : State v. Pay, 45 U. 411; 146 P.
100.
A writ of prohibition will not Issue to restrain

criminal proceedings upon the ground that the
provisions of this section and | 8682 were not
complied with, the accused's remedy being by
appeal.
State, ex rel. Brown v. Third District Court
27 U. 886; 75 P. 789.

8689. (4616.) Warrant defined. Form. A warrant of arrest is an order in writing in the name of the state, signed by a magistrate, commanding
the arrest of the defendant, and may be substantially in the following form:
State of Utah, county of
.
The state of Utah to any sheriflF, constable, marshal, or policeman of said
state, or of the county of
Complaint on oath having been this day made before me, by A B, that the
crime of (designating it) has been committed, and accusing C D thereof, you
are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above n a m ^ C n *nA v»rinir
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*7XL (4(54.) id. Arrest and det«tioo of prboner. The order may be
directed generally to any of such officers, and executed by the officer receiving
it. The officer executing any such order shall take into his custody the person
designated therein, and detain him upon such order for such length of time as
shall be necessary for the officer directing the arrest to reach the place of detention by the ordinary means and course of travel, or until sooner demanded
by an officer having a warrant for the arrest* of such person, but in no case
shall the officer arresting such person upon such order detain him longer than
the time hereinbefore mentioned.
K. Dak. <H95) f TWO.

Disposition of person arrested, tf 8695-8707.

CHAPTER tS.
RETAKING AFTER ESCAPE OR RESCUE.
8732. <4655.) Pursuit and rearrest If a person arrested escapes or is
rescued, the person from whose custody he shall have escaped or shall have
been rescued may immediately pursue and retake him at any time and in any
place within the state.
•Cal. Pen. C, 1 S54.
Escapes, | | 7967-7971.

Rescues, | | 7964, 7965.
Justifiable homicide In retaking felon, f 1031.

£733. (4656.) Id. May break door or window. To retake the person
escaping or rescued, the person pursuing may break open an outer or inner
door or window of a dwelling-house or other building, if, after notice of his
intention, he is refused admittance.
Cal. Fen. C I 656.
Door or window may be tooken In making arrest, when, | S72J.

CHAPTER 16.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.
4737. <4657.) Magistrate to inform prisoner of his rights. When the
defendant shall be brought before the magistrate upon an arrest, either with
or Without a warrant, on a charge of having committed a public offense, the
magistrate must immediately inform him of the charge against him, and of his
right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings.
Cal. Pen. C, 1 S58.
Rights of accused person, Con. art 1, sees,
7-12, and notes; I 6553, and note.
District attorney may attend, | 6762.
Preliminary examination may fee waived*
Con, art 1, sec. IS; | 6549, and note.
What complaint must state, I 8680.
Preliminary examination of corporation, J
9867.
Information to he filed, f ST7S, and note.
The right of the accused to a preliminary
examination on the charge stated In the complaint Is a substantial one.
State v. Pay, 46 0 . 411; 146 P. SO0.

Where the Information charged an offense
different from that stated in the complaint on
which accused had a preliminary examination,
the accused may, before pleading to the merits,
move to quash the information on that groundId.
A verified complaint Is essential to a prelimInary examination, and the preliminary examination, unless waived. Is a prerequisite to
prosecution by Information.
State v. Sheffield, 45 U. 486; 146 P. 806.

$738. (4658.) Time to procure coantd allowed Message to counsel
The magistrate must also allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for
counsel, and postpone the examination for that purpose, and must, upon the
request of the defendant, require a peace officer to take a message to any
counsel in the precinct or the city the defendant may name. The officer must,
without delay and without fee, perform that duty*
CaL Pen. C., 1 859.

Right to counsel, Con. art X, sec 18.

8739. (4659.) Examination to be proceeded with. At the time set for
the hearing, the magistrate before whom the accused is brought must, unless
a change of place of trial is had under the provisions of the next succeeding
section, immediately after the ann»QM«^ ** ,»A««~«~i ~- it
~~-~~* •(•
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ter waiting a reasonable time therefor, if the accused requires the aid of counsel, proceed to examine the case.
N Dak. (1895) | 7952.
Waiver of preliminary examination with Densest of state, Con. a r t 1, sec. 12; f 8549.

8740. (4660.) Change of place of trial Affidavit Transfer. When
ever a person accused of a public offense is brought before a justice of the
peace for examination and, at any time before such examination is commenced, he files with such justice his affidavit stating that by reason of tbt
bias or prejudice of said justice he believes he cannot have a fair and impartial
examination before him, such justice must transfer said action, and all die papers therein, including a certified copy of his docket entries, to another justice
of the same county; provided, that unless the parties agree upon the justice tc
whom said action shall be transferred, it shall be sent to the nearest justice oi
the county, but no more than one change of the place of examination tmdei
this section shall be had in an action.
N Dak. (1895) I 7963.
Chancre of place of trial In Justices' courts, f| 9427-9429.

8741. (4661.) Limitation on postponement, unless by consent The examination must be completed at one session, unless the magistrate, for good
cause shown, postpone it. The postponement shall be for not more than four
days at each time, nor more than twelve days in all, unless by consent or on
motion of the defendant.
Cal Pen C, I S81*.

8742. (4662.) Id Defendant to give bail or be committed. If a postponement is had, the magistrate must commit the defendant for examination,
admit him to bail, or discharge him from custody upon the deposit of money,
as provided in this code, as security for his appearance at the time to which
the examination is postponed.
Cal Pen C , I 862.

%

Bail, It 8704, 8705, 9248-9270.

8743. (4663.) Form of commitment for examination. The commitment
for examination shall be made by an indorsement, signed by the magistrate
on the warrant of arrest, to the following effect: 'The within named A B,
having been brought before me under this warrant, is committed for examination to the sheriff of
" If the sheriff be not present, the defendant
may be committed to the custody of any peace officer.
Cal Pen C , I 863.
County attorney to report to district attorney, I 8788.

8744. (4664.) Magistrate must issue subpoenas. The magistrate must
issue subpoenas, subscribed by him, for witnesses within the state, required
either by the prosecution or the defense.
Cal Pen. C , 8 864V
Accused entitled to compulsory process for -witnesses, Con. a r t 1, s e c 18.

8745. (4665.) Procedure on preliminary examination. At the examination, the magistrate must first read to the defendant the complaint and the
depositions of the witnesses examined or making the complaint, if depositions
were taken.
*
'-«R|
Cal Pen C , I 864*.
A criminal prosecution must be begun by a
complaint, and accused can only be held for
trial after preliminary examination for the

crime charged in the complaint, or one included
therein,
State T. Pay. 48 U. 411; 148 P . 800.
JT —

8746. (4666.) Id. Examination of witnesses in presence of defendant.
The witnesses must be examined in the presence of the defendant, and may be
cross-examined in his behalf.
Cal Pen C , f 865.
Accused entitled to be confronted by witnesses, Con. a r t 1, sec. 18; I 8558.

8747. (4667.) Id. Examination of. defendant's witnesses. When the
examination of witnesses on the part of the state shall have closed, any witnesses the defendant may produce may be sworn and examined.
Cal Pen. C . 8 888.

8748. (4668.) Id. Exclusion of witnesses. Keeping separate. While
a witness shall be tinder examination, the magistrate may exclude all witnesses who have not been examined. He may also cause the witnesses to be
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kept separate, and to be prevented from conversing with each other until
they shall have all been examined.
CaL Pen. C, I 867.

Exclusion of witnesses and others, | 1801.

8749. (4669.) I d Exclusion of spectator*, etc, on request The magistrate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude from the examination every person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his counsel, the attorney-general, the county attorney, the defendant and his counsel, and the
officer having the defendant in custody. .
Cal. Pen. C., f 868.
Exclusion of spectators, etc., In certain cases, 8 1101.

8750. (4670.) When testimony reduced to writing. Form of deposition.
The testimony of each witness in cases of homicide must be reduced to writing as a deposition, by the magistrate, or under his direction; and in other
cases upon the demand of the prosecuting attorney. The magistrate before
whom the examination shall be had may, with the consent of the county attorney, order the testimony and proceedings to be taken down in shorthand, in
all examinations herein mentioned, and for that purpose he may appoint a
stenographer. The deposition or testimony of the witness must be authenticated in the following form:
1. It must state the name of the witness, his place of residence, and his
business or profession;
2. It must contain the questions put to the witness, and his answers
thereto, each answer being distinctly read to him as it is taken down, and
being corrected or added to until it conforms to what he declares is the truth;
except that in cases where the testimony shall be taken down in shorthand,
the answer or answers of the witness need not be read to him;
3. If a question put is objected to on either side and overruled, or the
witness declines answering it, that* fact, with the ground on which the question shall have been overruled or the answer declined, must be stated;
4. The deposition must be signed by the witness, or if he refuses to sign
it, his reason for refusing must be stated in writing as he gives it, except that
in cases where the deposition shall be taken down in shorthand, it need not be
signed by the witness;
5. It must be signed and certified by the magistrate when reduced to
writing by him, or under his direction, and when taken down in shorthand, the
transcript of the stenographer appointed as aforesaid, when written out in
longhand, and certified as being a correct statement of such testimony and
proceedings in the case, shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings. The stenographer shall, if the defendant is held to
answer the charge, within ten days after the close of such examination, transcribe his said shorthand notes into longhand, and certify and file the same
with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the defendant shall
have been examined, and shall in all cases file his original notes with said
clerk. The stenographer's fees shall be paid out of the treasury of the county.

CaL Pen. C, | 869*.
time of the trial, and the transcript of the
Testimony upon preliminary examination
testimony
of an absent witness admitted.
Id
may be used on trial, when, | 8558.
*
Testimony of witness taken In writing, 8
Where a magistrate, who holds a person to
1767.
answer a complaint charging him with a felFsllure of reporter to file transcript does not
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8751. (4671.) Custody and disposition of depositions, eta The magistrate or his clerk must keep the depositions taken, and exhibits admitted as
evidence on the examination, until they shall be returned to the proper court;
and must not permit them to be examined or copied by any person except a
judge of a court having jurisdiction of the offense, or authorized to issue writs
of habeas corpus, the attorney-general, county attorney, or other prosecuting
attorney, and the defendant and his counsel.
Cal. Pen. C, f 870.

8752. (4672.) Id Violation of preceding section a crime. Every violation of the next preceding section is punishable as a misdemeanor.
N. Dak. (1895) 8 7963.

8753. (4673.) Defendant discharged for want of probable cause. If,
after hearing the proofs, it appears that either no public offense has been committed, or that there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of
a public offense, the magistrate must order the defendant to be discharged, *
by an indorsement on the warrant or the complaint, signed by him, to the
following effect: "There being no sufficient cause to believe the within
named A B guilty of the offense within mentioned, I order him discharged/'
Cal. Pen. C, ! 871.

8754. (4674.) Id. When costs taxed against complainant. If the defendant on^a preliminary examination for a public offense is discharged as
provided in the next preceding section, and if the magistrate finds that the
prosecution was malicious or without probable cause, he shall enter such judgment on his docket and tax the costs against the complaining witness, which
shall be enforced as judgments for costs in criminal cases, and execution may
issue therefor.
N. Dak. (1895) 8 7965.

8755. (4675.) When defendant held to answer. Order. If, however, it
appear from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and
that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate must indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him, to the following effect: "It appearing to me that the offense in the within complaint mentioned (or any offense, according to the fact, stating generally the nature
thereof) has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the
within named A B guilty thereof, I order that he be held to answer to the
same."

Cal. Pen. C , | 872*.
Form of commitment, ( 8760.
Magistrate to return papers to district court,
I 8768.
Magistrate to furnish list of witnesses, etc.,
I 8768.
.
Names of witnesses to be indorsed on inforntation, § 8782; and on indictment, | 8820.
Sec. 4886, C. L. 1888, requiring the Justice to
In do r*«e on the deposition an order, etc., Is dlrectory, and it is sufficiently complied with
when the order specifying the offense for which

accused is held is entered upon the magistrate's docket and certified to the court
State v. Crook, 16 IT. 212; 51 P. 1091.
An Information will not be set aside because
of mistakes of magistrate In describing the offense, or even in characterizing it, when It appears that the conduct, acts, and motives described in the information as the offense were
investigated by the magistrate and commitmerit made thereon,
State v. McKee, 17 U. 870; 58 P . 788.

8756. (4676.) Id Order when offense not bailable. If the offense is
not bailable, the following words, or words to the same effect, must be added
to the indorsement: "And that he is hereby committed to the sheriff of the
county of
"
Cal. Pen. C./ f 878.

8757. (4677.) Id Order when bail has been taken. If the offense is
bailable, and bail is taken by the magistrate, the following words must be
added to the aforementioned indorsement: "And I have admitted him to
bail to answer by the undertaking hereto annexed."
8758. (4678.) Id Order when offense bailable. If the offense is bailable, and the defendant is admitted to bail, but bail shall not have been given,
the following words must be added to the order indorsed on th*e complaint:
"And that he is admitted to bail in the sum of
dollars, and is committed
to the sheriff of the county of
until he gives such bail, or is legally discharged,"
Cal. Pen. C , I 876*.
Ball on arrest, f$ 8704, $706.

Bail generally, ffi 9248-9270.
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8759. (4679.) Comfutacnt to be delivered with defendant. If the magistrate orders the defendant to be committed, he must make out a commitment, signed by himself, with his name of office, and deliver it, with the defendant, to the officer to whom he is committed, or, if that officer is not present, to the peace officer, who must immediately deliver the defendant into the
proper custody, together with the commitment.
Cal. Pen! C, I S76.
Indorsement to be made on the complaint toy the magistrate, I S755.

8760. (4680.) Id. Form of. The commitment must be to the following effect:
State of Utah, county of
The state of Utah to the sheriff of the county of
•
An order having been this day made by me that A B be held to answer
upon a charge of (stating briefly the nature of the offense, and giving as near
as may be the time when and the place where the same was committed), you
are commanded to receive him into your custody and detain him until he is
legally discharged.
Dated at
, this
day of
, 19
Cal. Pen. C | 877.

8761. (4681.) Witnesses may be required to give bonds. On holding
the defendant to answer, the magistrate may take from each of the material
witnesses examined before him on the part of the state a written undertaking,
without surety, to the effect that he will appear and testify at the court to
which the complaint and depositions are to be sent, or that he will forfeit the
sum of $200.
Cal. Pen. C., I 878*
Witness may be required to five bond to appear at preliminary examination, | 8766.

8762. (4682.) 1<L Sureties may be required When the magistrate or a
judge of the court in which the action is pending shall be satisfied, by proof on
oath, that there is reason to believe that any such witness will not appear and
testify unless security is required, he may order the witness to enter into a
written undertaking, with sureties, in such sum as he may deem proper, for
his appearance as specified in the next preceding section.
Cal. Pen. C., I 879.

-

" ~ " -^.i^

8763. (4683.) Id. When witness is a minor. When a minor is a material witness, any other person may be allowed to give an undertaknig for
the appearance of such witness; or the magistrate may, in his discretion* take
the undertaking of such minor in a sum not exceeding $50, which shall be valid
and binding in law, notwithstanding the disability of minority.
Mont Pen. C, I 1090*.

8764. (4684.) Id. Commitment for failure to give. If a witness, required to enter into an undertaking to appear and testify, either with or without sureties, refuses compliance with the order for that purpose, the magistrate must commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged.
Cal Pen. C, I 881.

8765. (4685.) Id. Examination of witness unable to give bond. When,
however, it shall satisfactorily appear, by examination on oath of the witness,
or any other person, that the witness is unable to procure sureties, he maybe
forthwith conditionally examined on behalf of the state. Such examination
must be by question and answer, in the presence of the defendant, or after
notice to him, if on bail, and conducted in the same manner as the examination
before a committing magistrate is required by this code to be conducted, and
the witness must thereupon be discharged; but this section shall not apply to
an accomplice in the commission of the offense charged.

Cal. Pen. C.,.f 882.
Magistrate may take depositions of witness*
Use of such testimony, f 8558.
In the first instance, f 8682.
_^
Testimony of witness may be taken in writ- > When testimony reduced to writing on prying in any case; use as evidence, | 8787.
liminary examination, f 8750.

8766. (4685x.) May require witness to give bond to appear at preliminary examination* Whenever a crime has been committed, a magistrate having jurisdiction of the same may, on proof that there is reason to believe that
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any of the material witnesses will not appear at the preliminary examination
unless security is required, or on the recommendation of the county attorney
or other attorney for the state, order said witness to enter into a written undertaking with sureties, in any sum he may deem proper, for their appearance
at said preliminary examination.
*07, p. 196.
8767. (4685x1.) Id* Testimony of witnesses taken in writing; use as
evidence. Upon application from the county attorney or other attorney for
the state, and upon notice to the defendant, the testimony of witnesses may
te taken in writing before the magistrate having jurisdiction of said crime,
and said testimony, when signed by the witness and certified by the magistrate, or a transcript of said testimony, if taken in shorthand, certified by the
stenographer who took the testimony, shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony, and shall be used at the preliminary examination of
said defendant or at the trial of said defendant, or both, with the same force
and effect as though said witnesses were present in court and testifying;
provided, however, that it be satisfactorily shown to the court that the witness is dead or insane, or cannot with due diligence be found within the state.
'07, p. 196.
Magistrate may examine witnesses and take
depositions at time complaint Is made, f 8682.
Testimony of witnesses at preliminary hear*
tog | 8553, and note
Where a deputy sheriff calls at a home of a
witness several times, but does not find him,
and the witness is out of the state at the time
of the trial, the transcript of his evidence is

admissible, even though the defendant does
not have an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness in the presence of the Jury,
State vs HiHstrom, 46 U. 841; 150 P. 885.
Where it is shown that the witness is out
of the state, it is not necessary to show any
special effort to find him in the state
State v. De Prctto, 48 U. 849. 155 P. 886.

8768. (4686.) After preliminary examination, magistrate must make
full return of proceedings to the district court. Penalty for failure. When
the magistrate shall have discharged the defendant or shall have held him
to answer, he must, within fifteen days from the date of his decision, return to the clerk of the court at which the defendant is required to appear,
the warrant, if any; the complaint, the depositions, if any; a list of the names
and the postoffice addresses of all witnesses for the state, if he can ascertain
them; and all undertakings of bail and for the appearance of witnesses taken
by him, together with a certified copy of the record of the proceedings, as
it" appears on his docket. Failure of the magistrate to make such return as
herein provided; and within the time herein stated, shall be deemed a contempt of the court before which the defendant is required to appear, for
which the magistrate shall be fined by said court not less than $10 and not
more than $100.
Am'd '15, p. 200.
Cal Pen C. 8 883*

8769. (4687.) When defendant a convict* Examination in prison.
When the defendant is a convict in the state prison, or a prisoner in a county
jail, the examination may be held in the office of the prison or jail. In such
cases the commitment shall be directed to the warden of the prison or to the
keeper of the jail.

CHAPTER 17.
PROSECUTION BY INFORMATION, INDICTMENT, OR ACCUSATION.
8773. (4688.) Prosecution In dBstrict court to be by information, etc.
All public offenses triable in the district courts, except cases appealed from
justices' courts, must be prosecuted by information or indictment, except as
provided in the next succeeding section.
* i «
~ . - Cal Pen C, | 888*.
Prosecutlon by information «r indictment,
von art l, sec. 18, | 8549.
Indictment defined, | 8675. Information defined, | 8676.
The prosecuUon and conviction of a person
Dy information filed by county attorney in ac-

cordance with the statutes, Con. art 1, sec. 18,
and art 8, aec 21, does not abridge the privileges or immunities of such person as a citizen
of the U. S under the fourteenth amendment
In re Maxwell, 18 U. 495, 57 P. 412; affirmed
176 U. 8. 181
State v. Imlay, 22 U. 156; 61 P. 557.
A person charged with having committed an
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informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and
is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign counsel to defend him.
Cal. Pen. C, I 987.
Rights of accused persons, Con. art 1, sees,
T-18; | 8553.
(The transcript of the proceedings before an
examining magistrate, affirmatively showing
that the defendant "waived the service of an
attorney," shows that defendant was apprised
of his right to such services, and in absence

of showing to contrary it will be presumed thti
the examining magistrate informed accusedaf
his right to-an attorney.
State v. Mewhinney, 43 TJ. 185; 134 P. ttt
An attorney appointed under this section
la not entitled to compensation from the coonty.
Pardee v. 8. L*. County, 39 U. 482; 118 P. ltt.

8872. (4768.) Id. Information or indictment to be read. Plea. The
arraignment must be made by the court, or by the clerk or county attorney
under its direction, and shall, consist in reading the information or indictment
to the defendant and delivering to him a copy thereof, including the list of
witnesses, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty to the information or indictment.
Gal. Pen. C, f 988*.

8871 (4769.) Defendant to declare hit true name. When the defendant
is arraigned, he must be informed that, if the name by which he is prosecuted
is not his true name, he must then declare his true name, or be proceeded
against by the nam^ in the information or indictment. If he gives no other
name, the court may proceed accordingly; but if he alleges that another name
is his true name, the court must direct an entry thereof in the minutes of the
arraignment, and the subsequent proceedings on the information or indictment may be had against him by that name, referring also to the name by
which he is informed against or indicted.
*Cal. Pen. C, f 989*.
Defendant charged in wrong name, correction, I S888.

8874. (4770.) Time allowed for answer. Motion to set aside. Demurrer. Plea. Proviso. If, on the arraignment, the defendant requires it,
he must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one day, to answer the
information or indictment. He may, in answer to the arraignment, move
to set aside, demur, or plead to the information or indictment; provided,
'that the defendant must be required to answer within ten days from the
date of arraignment if court be then in session in such county, otherwise
on the first day of next succeeding session of court.
Am'd '15, p. 200.
CaL Pen. C f 900.

CHAPTER 24.
SETTING ASIDE INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT.
8878. (4771.) When information must be set aside. The information
must be set aside by the court in which defendant is arraigned, upon his motion, in any of the following cases:
1. When it fails to recite that the defendant had theretofore been duly
committed by a magistrate;
- 2. When the names of the witnesses testifying on the part of the state
in such examination are not indorsed thereon;
3. When it is not signed by the district attorney or by the attorney pro
tern, for the state,
Am'd *01, p. 27.
Cal. Pen. C I 995*.
mm
Information, rules Of pleading, form, ate, II
•779-8782, 8828-8855.
Granting or refusing of motion deemed excepted to, i 9183.
A
Waiver of preliminary examination* | 8549,
and note.
. . . . . .
Time of filing and necessity of preliminary
hearing, I 8779.
Names of witnesses, etc., to be placed on information, | 8782.
When indictment or information sufficient f
M<1. - -

Indictment and Information tested by ssms
rules of pleading.
State v. Crook, 16 U. 212; 51 P. 1091.
A variation of the date of an adulterouf
act is not ground for motion to quash.
State v. Sheffield, 45 U. 426; 146 P. 806.
** objection that accused has not had a
preliminary examination may be raised by a
motion to quash the information, and sues
motion cannot be considered as a demurrer inder | 8898.
State v. Springer, 40 TJ. 471; 121 P. 976.

8879. (4772.) When the indictment must be set aside. The indictment
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must be set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned, upon his
motion, in any of the following cases:
1. Where it is not found, indorsed, and presented as prescribed in this
code;
*
*
2. When the names of the witnesses examined before the grand jury, or
whose depositions may have been read before them, are not inserted at Hit
foot of the indictment, or indorsed thereon;
3. When a person has been permitted to be present during the session
of the grand jury while the charge embraced in the indictment has been under
consideration, except as provided in § 8814;
4. When the defendant had not been held to answer before the finding
of the indictment, on any ground which would have been good for challenge
4
cither to the panel or to any individual grand juror.
*
Cal Fen C, I 995*.
Indictment, rules of pleading, form, e t c , If
1820*8855
Granting or refusing of mouon deemed ex#*n£d to 8 9189
*
«*«"«« «c**«*u **
cepiea u>, 5 » A «
Names of witnesses to be placed on indictment. J 8829.
„
Fact that indictment was found solely on

testimony of Incompetent witness Is BO ground
for setting aside
<>r
U. S v Cutler, 5 TJ. 608, 19 P. 145
Indictment returned by grand Jury not sum*
moned and Impaneled as required by law, or
consisting of an illegal number, should Jfc>e set
aside
U. S v. Reynolds, 1 U. 226.
Brannigan v. People, 8 U. 488, 24 P. 767.' '

8880. (4773.) Motion to set aside. Form. When to be made. Motion
to set aside the information or indictment, must be in writing, subscribed by
the defendant or his attorney, and it must specify clearly the ground of objection to the information or indictment, and such motion must be made and
filed contemporaneously with the filing of a demurrer and plea, or the de*
fendant will be deemed to have waived any objection which could be raisefl
by such motion.
Am'd '15, p. 201.
Mont Pen. C , 8 1911; K. Dak. (1895) | 8083.

8881. (4774.) Id. Hearing. Procedure. Postponement The motion
must be heard at the time it is made, unless for cause the court postpones the
hearing to another time. If the motion is denied, the defendant must im;
mediately answer the information or indictment, either by demurring ox
pleading thereto. If the motion is granted, the court must order that t,he
defendant, if in custody, be discharged therefrom; or, if admitted to bail, that
his bail be exonerated; or, if he has deposited money instead of bail, that the
same be refunded to him, unless it directs that an information be filed or that
the case be submitted to the same or to another grand jury. But the court
shall not postpone the hearing for any longer time than may be imperative.
Am'd '15, p. 201.
Cal Pen C . | 997*.

8882. (4775.) Id. When new information or resubmission ordered.
If the court directs that an information be filed, or that the case be resubmitted, the defendant, if already in custody, must so remain unless he shall
be admitted to bail; or, if already admitted to bail, or money has been deposited instead thereof, the bail or money shall be answerable for the appearance of the defendant to answer a new information or indictment; and, unless a new information is filed or a new indictment is found at the same or
the next term of court, the court must make the order prescribed by the next
preceding section.

Cal Pen C , f 9984.
Amendment of information, | 8781.
Proceedings on sustaining demurrer to Infornation or indictment, §§ 8898-8*95.
Nolle Prosequi, fiS 8780, 9848.

Dismissal for failure to brine action to trial,
IS 9845-9847.
Resubmission to grand jury, I 8881.
Mistake in charging tbe offense, discharge or
new prosecution, | 8998.

8883. (4776.) Order setting aside not a bar. An order to set aside an
information or indictment, as provided in this chapter, shall be no bar to a future prosecution for the same offense.
Cal Pen. C, | 999.
Bar on judgment of acquittal, | 8908.
Decisions on once in jeopardy, etc., note to
I 8905.

Whether such an order bars a future proeecution is a question of law for the court
State T. Springer, 40 U. 471; 121 P. 976.
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CHAPTER 25.
DEMURRER.

8887. (4777.) Defendant's pleading, a dcimmci or a plea. The only
pleading on the part of the defendant shall be either a demurrer or a plea.
OaL Pen. Cx 1 1002.

8888. (4778.) Demurrer, when made. Plea. Both theydemurrer and
plea must be put in open court at the time of the arraignment/
Am'd '15, p. 201.
CaL Pen. a . | 1003.

8889. (4779.) Grounds of demurrer. The defendant may demur to the
information or indictment when it appears upon the face thereof:
1. That the grand jury by which it was found had no legal authority
to inquire into the offense charged, by reason of its not being within the legal
jurisdiction of the county, if an indictment, or, if an information, that the
court has no jurisdiction of the offense charged therein; or,
2. That it does not substantially conform to the requirements of §§ 88308832;
3. That more than one offense is charged, except as provided in I
8834; or,
4. That the facts stated do not constitute a public offense; or,
5. That it contains matter which, if true, would constitute a legal justification or excuse of the offense charged, or other legal bar to the prosecution.
Cal. Ben. C, I 1004*.
Order sustaining or overruling demurrer
<d*emed excepted to, f 9189.
Demurrer that the indictment "does not sub•tantially conform to the requirements of | |

150, 151, of the code of procedure in criminal
cases as to the offense charged and the par*
tlcular circumstances" sufficiently specifies tot
grounds -of objection hereunder.
People v. Hill, S U. 834; 8 P. 75.

8890. (4780.) Demurrer to be in writing and to specify grounds. The
demurrer must be in writing, signed either by the defendant or his counsel,
and filed. It must distinctly specify the grounds of objection to the information or indictment, or it must be disregarded.
Cat Pen. C. f 1005.

8891. (4781.) Id. l i m e of bearing argument Postponement The
argurhent upon the objections presented by the demurrer must be heard at
the time it is filed, unless for cause the court postpone the hearing to another
time, but the court shall not postpone the hearing for any longer time than
may be imperative. If the defendant files a motion to set aside the information or indictment, the argument upon such motion and the argument upon
the demurrer must be heard at the same time.
Am'd '15, p. 201.
CaL Pen. C., | 1006.

8892. (4782.) 'Judgment on demurrer. Entry. Upon considering the
demurrer, the court must give judgment, either allowing or disallowing it,
and an order accordingly must be entered upon the minutes.
Cal. Pen, C I 1007.

8893. (4783.) Effect of sustaining demurrer. Further prosecution.
If the demurrer is allowed, the judgment shall be final upon the information
or indictment demurred to, and shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense, unless the court, being of the opinion that the objection cm
which the demurrer is allowed may be avoided in a new information or indictment, directs that a new information be filed, or that the case be resubmitted to the same or to another grand jury.
temlMal
Cal. Pen. C., | 1008*.
ftoR
When Jurisdiction found to be in another
county or state, procedure, |fi 8994-8997.
New information^ or resubmission of charge
when facts charged do not constitute an offense. §8 8994, 89*8.
New information or indictment when motion
to set aside granted, I 8882.
Decisions on once in Jeopardy, etc, note to
| 8905.
filing

toT

**Hure to prosecute. II Mtt9
0350.
"
Amendment «f <T>frtW>o*i^ t em
£m«nament of information, § 8781.
^ 1 5 * tow<t0h1eTd,flr- t? e x t •ucceedlna
flrsnd Jurjr
I? ,,
! ***** J"1? t n a t m e e t i ****
th
£ allowance of the demurrer,
*«>#« v. Hill, 8 U. 834; 8 P. 75.
This section, nor f 8903, does not permit tb#
of a new information on the dismissal
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of an action and the discharge of the accused part of the motion, that accused had not, prior
after plea.
to the filing of the information, had a right
Barnes v. Second Dist Court, 86 17. S96; 104 of a preliminary examination for the offense
P. 282
charged in the information, and prayed that
While an appeal may be taken from a judg- the information be set aside and quashed,
merit sustaining a demurrer, the supreme court held it was not a demurrer to tne informals without authority to reinstate the case and tion, but a motion under § 8878, and, if susremand for further pleading
tained, is not a bar to another prosecution
Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 U. 696, 184 P. for the same offense, and the question whether
558
or not it is a bar is for the court and not
Where accused filed written objections to the Jury, to determine,
the information which recited that it appeared
State v. Springer, 40 U. 471, 121 P. 976.
by the justice's record, which was made a

8894. (4784.) Id. When defendant discharged. If the court does not
permit the information to be amended, nor direct that a new information be
filed, nor direct that the case be resubmitted, the defendant, if in custody,
must be discharged, or if admitted to bail, his bail shall be exonerated, or if
he shall have deposited money instead of bail, the money must be refunded
to him.
Cal Pen C , f 1009*.

Amendment of information, I 8781.

8895. (4785.) Id. If case resubmitted. If the court directs that the
case be resubmitted, the same proceedings must be had thereon as are prescribed in § 8882.
Cal Pen C , I 1010.

8896. (4787.) What objections must be taken by demurrer. What at
any time. When the objections mentioned in § 8889 appear upon the face of
the information or indictment, they shall be taken only by demurrer, except
that the objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the information or indictment, or that the facts stated do not constitute a public offense, may be taken at the trial, under the plea of not guilty, or after the trial,
in arrest of judgment.
. Cal Pen. C , f 1012
(The title and enacting clause of chap. 118,
Laws '15, recite that this section is amended
but the act contains no amendment)
Objections, except the two specified, not
taken by demurrer are waived
U 8 v. West, 7 U. 487; 27 P. 84.

A question of want of jurisdiction in the
trial court in a criminal case may be raised
for the first time in the supreme court
State v. Morrey, 23 U. 273, 64 P. 764.

CHAPTER 26.
PLEA.
8898. (4788.) Pleas of four kinds. There are four kinds of pleas to an
information or indictment. A plea of:
1. Guilty;
2. Not guilty;
3. A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged,
which may be pleaded either with or without the plea of not guilty;
4. Once in jeopardy, which may be pleaded with or without the plea of
not guilty.
Cal Pen C , I 1016*.
When put in, I 8888.
"Not guilty" entered when defendant refuses
to plead, $ 8306.
Decisions on former conviction, acquittal, or
once in jeopardy, note to 8 8205.
Former conviction, or acquittal, or once in
Jeopardy a bar, Con. art 1, sec 12, ft 8904,
8905, 8555, 8652, 8658.
Where an arraignment is had and a plea entered on a holiday, no objection being entered,
the error, if any, is Waived Inasmuch as the

defendant may waive the arraignment and
plea. The case of People v. Heller, 2 U. 188 is
overruled,
State v. Bates, 52 TJ. —; 175 P. —<.
- #^. mA . ~Am,i«»«iAft «*• ~>.*i» u
p|
w-ivirf
former conviction not made Is
tl tS'*r«»«*-~ * rr i««r. #n T> moo
S I! ^ ^ ° i
W ' j f p ^ i r
m
*• Barton, 6 U. 254, 21 F. 8-8.
Where an Issue of former acquittal Is raised,
It must be passed upon by the Jury,
State v. Creechley, 27 U. 142; 75 P. 884.

8899. (4789.) Plea must be oral. Form of entry. Every plea must be
oral, and entered upon the minutes of the court substantially in the following
form:
1. If the defendant pleads guilty: "The defendant pleads that he is
guilty of the offense charged;"
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After two trials of a criminal case, a new
trial for newly discovered evidence to estabUsh an alibi was properly denied for lack of
diligence.
State v. Moore, 41 XJ. *47; 116 P. 122.
ID order to authorize a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must
be so conclusive In its character as to raise
a reasonable presumption that the result of
the second trial would be different from the
first, in granting or refusing a new trial, dlscretion is vested in the trial court
State v. Montgomery, 87 U 515; 109 P. 815.
Where a crime was committed in broad dayligbt and testified to by eight or nine witnesses,
the granting of a motion for new trial is not
justified, on affidavits showing evidence which
merely corroborates the defendant's version
and to some extent contradicts or modifies the
statements of some of the state's witnesses.
State v. tfolitz, 40 U. 443, 122 P. $76.
Where the time in which defendant boarded
a street car was material, evidence alleged
to be newly discovered that the power was off
during the trip of the car defendant claimed

to have boarded, and defendant's affidavit tin
the power was off while he was on the ar
was not ground for a new trial, the defendSt
having omitted to testify as to the stepou* ti
the car at the trial
«*«*«
State v. Sirmay, 40 U. 525; 122 P. 7o
Where the evidence barely sustained s eon*
viction for larceny of horses, the trial coon
abused its discretion in denying a new trial
motion, largely based on cumulative affidavita
showing there was nothing suspicious in accused's connection with the horBes, and that
the man from whom he had Innocently secured
them really existed, which the sheriff had tsttilled was not a fact
State v Williams, 49 U. 886, 144 P. 8SS
Evidence held to establish that accused via
reasonably diligent in preparing for trial alter his release on ball after seven months' cos*
Unement where he was without funds, and im*
portant witnesses lived several hundred mita
distant, and subpoenas were given the sheriff
to serve them* out they did not appear.
Id.

9200. (4953.) Application for new trial, how and when mack Form.
The application for a new trial must be made upon written notice of motion
designating" the grounds upon which it is made, and must be served and filed
within five days after the rendition of the verdict. If based upon any of the
grounds mentioned in subs. 2, 3, 4, and 7, § 9199, the affidavits in support
thereof must be served and filed within thirty days after filing the notice of
motion.
Am'd '03, p. 47; '15, p. 204.
Mont Pen C, f 2198*; Cal. Pen. C, I 1182*.
After a judgment in a criminal case has been
affirmed on appeal and the case remanded, a
were not passed upon by the appellate court or
discovered before the appeal was taken could
be entertained by the trial court, within thirty
days after discovery
8tate v. Morgan, 13 TJ. 112; «4 P. 156.
Where alleged prejudicial statements of a
juror are discovered before an appeal from the
conviction is taken, the motion for new trial,
based on subs 8 or 4 of § 9199, should be made
within thirty days, and the appeal delayed until after the denial of the motion
State v. Mickle, 25 U. 179, 70 P. 856.
Where the record does not show that the mo-

tion was filed and served within the prescribed time after discovery, it is not error to
deny the motion.
In a prosecution for homicide it is not error
for the court to refuse to permit defendant to
introduce oral evidence in support of his motion
for new trial.
State •. Mortensen, 26 U. 812, 73 P. 662, 631
Where a motion for new trial, supported by
affidavits, is overruled, and an appeal is taken,
the transcript filed, and a second motion for
new trial, supported by affidavits isfiled,the
lower court is without jurisdiction to pats on
such motion.
State v. Carter, 62 U. —; 173 P. 459.

9201. (4954.) Motion for new trial for certain causes to be based upon
affidavits. Time of hearing. A motion for a new trial, if made for any of
the causes mentioned in subs, 2, 3, 4, and 7, § 9199, must be based upon affidavits which must be served and filed as provided in the next preceding section. The motion must be heard as soon as practicable, and the hearing
thereof shall not be delayed longer than may be imperative. Am'd '15, p. 204.
Mont Pen. C, I 2194*.

CHAPTER 41.
APPEALS.
9205. (4955.) Either party may appeal. Method prescribed. Either
party in a criminal action may, except in cases appealed from a justice's court,
appeal to the supreme court, as prescribed in this chapter.
Cal. Pen. C.. I 11S5*.
Appeals from district court, Con. art 8, see. 9, mad note.

9206. (4956.) Title of action not changed on tppeaL The party appealing shall be known as the appellant, and the adverse party as the respondent, but the title oi the action shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal.
Cal Pen. C, I 1235.

Title not chanced, civil procedure, I IWS.

9207. (4957.) From what defendant may appeal. An appeal may be
taken by the defendant:
1. From a final judgment .of conviction;
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2. From *an order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights
of the party.
Cal Pen. C., 1 1237*.
Defendant shall have the right to appeal in
all cases, Con. a r t 1, t e c 12
Appeal lies from final judgments, Con. art.
I, tec 8, and note.
Power of supreme court on appeal, |§ €995,
9233, and note
Orders resubmitting a case to grand Jury
after demurrer to indictment sustained, and refusing to discharge defendant pending such resubmission, are not appealable.
People v Hill, Z U. 334, 3 P. 75.
A fugitive from justice has no right to be
Mard upon appeal.
People v Tremayne, 3 TJ. 331; 3 P . 85.
Orders forfeiting a defendant's bail, refusing
to set aside such forfeiture, and directing that
money deposited in lieu of bail be paid into
the territorial treasury, are not appealable.
Id.
Rulings on challenge! for actual bias are conelusive, and not reviewable on appeal.
wple v. Hopt,
fiopt, 4 U. 347; 9 P . 407; 130 U. fi.
People
130
Where a juror is challenged for actual bias,
in issue of fact is raised, and if no exception

la taken to the admission or rejection of evidence upon the voir dire examination, the action of the trial court is final and conclusive,
and cannot be reviewed on appeal.
People v. Thiede, 11 U. 341, 39 P . 337; affirmed 159 U. 6. 510.
See note to i 3958.
Under Con. a r t 34, e e c 3, I 5186, C. I* of
1888 (this section), is still in force and effect,
and not being inconsistent with a r t 1, sec.
12, or art 8, s e e 9, gave defendant the right
to move for new trial upon facts discovered after judgment and to appeal from an order
refusing to set aside the judgment and grant
a new trial.
State v. Morgan, 28 U. 212; 34 P. 256.
Order discharging one accused of crime for
want of jurisdiction is a final judgment
State v. Booth, 21 U. 88, 59 P. 553.
State v. McKenna, 24 U. 317; 67 P. 815.
A judgment of dismissal discharging a prisoner is final, after plea to the jurisdiction,
and, under Oon. a r t 8, s e c 9, an appeal lies
on behalf of the state to the supreme court
State v. Booth, 21 U. 88, 59 P. 553.

9208. (4958.) From what the state may appeal* An appeal may be taken by the state:
1. From a judgment for the defendant on a demurrer to the information
or indictment;
2. From an order arresting judgment;
3. From an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights
of the state;
4. From an order of the court directing the jury to find for the defendant.
N. Dak. (1895) $ 8329*, Cal. Pen. C , 8 1238*.
Appeal by the state does not stay judgment
| 9212
A judgment of dismissal, discharging a prisoner, in a criminal case, and releasing his
bail, entered after hearing arguments on a plea
to the jurisdiction of the court is a final judgment, and under provisions of Con art 8, s e c
I, an appeal lies, on behalf of the state, to the
wpreme court
State v Booth, 21 U. 88, 59 P . 653.
Where the district court erred In holding that
it had no authority to impanel a jury of twelve

men to try defendant for a crime committed
before statehood, and as the state had no right
of appeal, mandamus is a proper remedy.
State ex rel. v. Hart 19 U. 438, 57 P. 415.
Where accused, after plea and entering on
the trial, was discharged on the ground that
no proper preliminary examination had been
entered on appeal by the state, the court can
only reverse the order and judgment and cannot determine its legal effect or direct the district court to reinstate the case and proceed
to try accused.
State v. Gustaldi, 41 U. 63, 123 P . 897.

9209. (4959.) Time for taking appeal All appeals in criminal cases
must be taken within two months after the entry of the judgment appealed
from. Am'd '15, p. 204.
Cal Pen. C, f 1289*.
Appeal be heard within ninety days from ap-

peal, and decided within thirty days from submission, | 9225.

9210. (4960.) Id. Taken by filing and serving notice. An appeal shall
be taken by filing, with the clerk of the court in which the judgment or order
appealed from shall have been entered or filed, a notice stating the appeal
from the same, and serving a copy thereof upon the attorney of the adverse
party.
Dismissal for failure to serve notice of ap*
Cal Pen. C , I 1240.
An appeal in a criminal case is taken by filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the
Kurt, and serving a copy thereof on the adrerse party or his attorney.
People v. Gough, 2 U. 69.
Where the record shows the filing of a notice
)f appeal, but is silent as to its service, affidavits will not be received in the supreme
sourt to show that the notice of appeal was
in fact served upon the adverse party.
People v. Gough, 2 TJ. 69.
People v. Fennel, 4 TJ. 112; 7 P . 525, t48.

peal.
People y. Gough, 2 TJ. €9.
People T. Fennel, 4 U. 112, 7 P . 525, €48.
Dismissal for failure to serve notice of appeal, civil procedure, note, | 6996.
After an appeal is perfected, the case ceases
to be pending in the lower court and thereafter
is deemed pending in the appellate court* until finally disposed of there.
State v. Carter, 52 U. —; 171 P . 459.

9211. (4961.) Id. Service of notice by publication. If personal service
Df the notice cannot be made, the judge of the court in which the action was
tried, upon proof thereof, may make an order for the publication of the notice
in some newspaper for a period not exceeding thirty days. Such publication
shall be equivalent to personal service.
Cat Pen. C , I 1241.

***•
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2. Complaint.
Under this section and 77-11-1, complaint which states name of crime charged,
the time and place of its commission, the
name of the accused, if known, and sets
out in general terms the acts or omissions
constituting public offense or crime
charged, is sufficient as basis of prelimin-

ary examination, even though it is lacking
in other averments which would be necessary in indictment or information. State
T. Anderson, 85 U. 496, 101 P. 385.
Collateral References.
Criminal Law$»209.
22 CJ.B. Criminal Law § 803.

77-10-2. "Indictment" defined.—An indictment is an accusation in
writing presented by a grand jury to the district court, charging a person
with a public offense.
History: R. 8.1898 * 0. L. 1907, { 4605;
0. L. 1917, § 8675; B. 8. 1933 * 0. 1943,
105-10-2.

Code 1950, § 773.1 (includes substantially
same provisions); Hont. Bev. Codes 1947,
§94-4902 (substantially identical).

Oross-Beference.
Indictments generally, 77-20-1 et seq.

Collateral Beferences.
Indictment and Informational 7.
42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations
§7.

Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, (917; Iowa

77-10-3. "Information" defined.—An information is an accusation in
writing in form and substance like an indictment for the same offense,
charging a person with a public offense, presented and signed by the
district attorney, or by the attorney pro tempore for the state, and* filed
in the office of the clerk of the district court.
History: B. 8.1898 It 0. L. 1907, § 4606;
C. L. 1917, § 8676; B. 8. 1933 * C. 1943,
105-10-3.
Comparable Provision.
Montana Bev. Codes 1947, {94-4903
(identical).
Oross-Beference.
Information generally, 77-17-1 et seq.
1. Prosecution by Information.
Prosecution by information for non-

capital felony, committed after statehood,
was not, as to defendant, in violation of
federal Constitution. Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U. S. 581, 44 L. Ed. 597, 20 B. Ct. 448
(Harlan, J., dissenting), aff'g 19 U. 495,
57 P. 412.
Collateral Beferences.
Indictment and Information §35.
42 CJ.B. Indictments and Informations
§11.

77-10-4. "Magistrate" defined.-—A magistrate is an officer having power
to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense.
History: B. 8.1898 ft C. L. 1907, § 4807;
C. L. 1917, § 8877; B. S. 1983 ft 0. 1943,
105-10-4.
Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §807; Idaho
Code 1947, §19-502; Mont. Bev. Codes
1947, § 94-4904 (identical).
1. In general
Formerly the term "magistrate" included

justices of the peace. People v. Spiers, 4
TJ. 885, 391, 10 P. 609, 11 P. 509.
District judge held magistrate entitled
to hold preliminary •examinations in case
of misdemeanor. - Btate v. Mclntyre, 92
TJ, 177, 66 P. 2d 879.
Collateral Beferences.
JudgesG=>l.
48 CJ.S. Judges §8.

77-10-5. Magistrates enumerated.—The following persons are magistrates :
(1) Justices of the Supreme Court.
(2) Judges of the district courts.
582
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(3) Judges of city courts.
(4) Justices of the peace.
History: R. & 1898 * C. L. 1907, § 4608;
0. L. 1917, §8678; B. 8. 1933 ft 0. 1943,
105-1041.
Compiler's Note.
This section differs materially, but was
derived from 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §4836.
Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, § 808 (similar
provisions); Idaho Code 1947, §19-503;
Iowa Code 1950, § 748.1; Mont. Bev. Codes
1947, § 94-4905 (similar).
1. Who are magistrates.
When Utah was a territory, justices
of the peace were magistrates. Marks v.
Sullivan, 9 U. 12, 15, 83 P. 224, applying
2 Comp. Laws 1888, §4836.
A city judge may act merely as a committing magistrate. State v. Hale, 71 TJ.
134, 263 P. 86.

District judge held magistrate entitled
to hold preliminary examinations in case
of misdemeanor. State v. Mclntyre, 92
U. 177, 66 P. 2d 879.
Under this section, a justice of the peace
is a magistrate. State v. Spencer, 101 U.
287, 121 P. 2d 912, denying rehearing 101
U. 274, 117 P. 2d 455.
2. Justices of the peace.
A justice of the peace has power to
issue search warrants. Allen v. Holbrook,
103 U. 319, 135 P. 2d 242, 247, modified
on rehearing and petition denied 103 U.
599, 139 P. 2d 233.
Collateral References.
Judges$»l.
48 C.J.8. Judges § 3.

7740-6. Peace officers enumerated.—A peace officer is a sheriff of a
county or his deputy, or a constable, or a marshal or policeman of any
incorporated city or town.
History: B. S. 1898 * C. L. 1907, § 4609;
C. L. 1917, §8679; E. 8. 1933 * C. 1943,
105-10-6.
Comparable Provisions.
Idaho Code 1947, § 19-510 (substantially
identical); Iowa Code 1950, § 748.3; Mont.
Bev. Codes 1947, §94-4906 (similar).

1. Peace officers.
Formerly a United States marshal was
regarded as a peace officer when acting
under orders of a United States commissioner, functioning as a committing magistrate. Matter of Nelson, 9 U. 365, 36
P. 634.
Collateral References.
Sheriffs and Constables^l.
57 C.J. Sheriffs and Constables § 1.

CHAPTER 11
COMPLAINTS BEFORE MAGISTRATES
Section 77-114.
77-11-2.
77-11-3.
77-11-4.
77-11-5.

Contents.
Person having knowledge must make.
Complainant to be examined.
Arrest without warrant—Procedure.
Complainant to name witnesses—Subpoenas.

77-11-1. Contents.—The complaint must state:
(1) The name of the person accnsed, if known; or if not known and
it is so stated, he may be designated by any other name.
(2) The county in which the offense was committed.
(3) The general name of the crime or public offense.
(4) The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the crime
or public offense named.
688

WARRANT OF ARREST
History: R. 8.1898 It C. L. 1907, § 461S;
0. L. 1917, § 8683; R. 8. 19S3 it 0. 1943,
106-U-4.
/w»«-,.«M* x>~>rr**^
Comparable Provision.
Montana Rev. Codes 1947, §04-5804
(similar).

77-12-1

Collateral References.
Criminal Law€»209.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §306.
Arrest without warrant, 4 Am. Jur. 15,
Arrest 8 22.
*

7741-5. Complainant to name witnesses—Subpoenas.—Every person
making complaint charging the commission of a crime or public offense
must inform the magistrate of all persons whom he believes to have any
knowledge of its commission, and the magistrate at the time of issuing
the warrant may issue subpoenas for such persons, requiring them to
attend at a specified time and place as witnesses.
History: R. 8.1898 * 0. L. 1907, § 4614;
C. L. 1917, § 8684; B. 8. 1933 * 0. 194%
105-11-5.

Orosa-Beference.
Holding witnesses or requiring bonds,
77-15-25 et seq.

Comparable Provision.
Montana Bev. Codes 1947, (94-5805
(similar).

Collateral Beferences.
Criminal Law<S=>206.
22 OJ.fi. Criminal Law § 301.

CHAPTER 12
WARRANT OP ARREST
Section 77-12-1.
77-12-2.
77-12-3.
77-12-4.
77-12-5.
77-12-6.
77-12-7.
77-12-8.
77-12-9.
77-12-10.
77-12-11.
77-12-12.
77-12-13.
77-12-14.
77-12-15.
77-12-16.
77-12-17.
77-12-18.
77-12-19.
77-12-20.
77-12-21.
77-12-22.
77-12-23.

Issuance of warrant.
Form of warrant.
Warrant to name defendant.
Directed to and executed by peace officer.
When warrant issued by supreme or district judge.
When warrant issued by other magistrates.
Pursuing officer may call for aid in any county.
Return of prisoner—When offense charged is felony.
When offense charged is a misdemeanor not triable by magistrate—
Bail.
Procedure when ball taken.
When offense charged is triable by magistrate—Bail.
Procedure when bail taken.
Disposition of defendant when bail not given.
Defendant to be taken before magistrate without delay.
Taken before another magistrate—Procedure.
Proceedings for offenses triable in another county.
Duty of officer.
Preliminary examinations.
Conveyance through other counties not an escape.
Arresting officer not liable to civil arrest—May call for aid.
Misdemeanors other than those indictable—Summons may issue.
Summons—Service.
Failure to appear—Contempt—Warrant of arrest.

77-12-1. Issuance of warrant.—When a verified complaint is made
before a magistrate charging the commission of a crime or public offense,
he must, if satisfied therefrom that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable, ground to believe that the accused
committed it, issue a warrant for his arrest; but when the magistrate
before whom the complaint is made is a justice of the peace, before issuing
the warrant, the complaint, if made by any person other than the county
attorney of the county, and the evidence taken by such magistrate relating
18—UTAH CODE—VOL 8
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to the offense charged, must be submitted to such county attorney, and he
must examine into the charge and enter either his approval or disapproval of the issuance of a warrant upon such complaint. If the county
attorney disapproves, no warrant shall be issued, but if he approves
the issuance of a warrant, such magistrate shall proceed accordingly;
provided, that when it appears from the complaint or evidence submitted
to the magistrate that the accused is likely to escape from the county
before such approval of the county attorney can be had, a warrant may
issue without the approval of the county attorney. No justice of the
peace shall receive any fees or allowances whatever for any act done or
services rendered in a criminal action or proceeding commenced or prosecuted in disregard of the provisions of this section.
History: E. S. 1898 ft 0. L. 1907, §4615;
C. L. 1917, § S688; E. 8. 1938 It C. 1943,
105-12-1.
Compiler's Note.
This chapter was E. S. 1898, Title 76,
ch. 13; Comp. Laws 1907, Title 91, ch. 13;
Comp. Laws 1917, Title 120, ch. 13.
Comparable ProvisionIdaho Code 1947, § 19-506 (includes substantially same provision).
Cross-Eeferences.
Arrest by police officers, 10-6-67:
in game law violations, 23-1-17.
in liquor violations, 82-8-17.
without warrant, 77-13-3.
Civil arrest, Eules of Civil Procedure,
Eule 64A.
Form of complaint, 77-11-1.
"Magistrate" defined, 77-10-4.
Magistrates enumerated, 77-10-5.
Summons instead of warrant in cases of
nonindictable misdemeanors, 77*12-21 to
77-12-23.
Weights and measures, violations, 5-6-14.
1. Affidavits,
In affidavits generally for the arrest of
alleged criminals it is not necessary that
they should show a prima facie case, but
need only set forth facts tending to establish the commission of the offense and
the guilt of the defendant. United States

v. Eldredge, 5 XL 161, 166, 13 P. 673,
applying Laws 1878, § 59, p. 72.
2. Issuance of warrant.
The magistrate would not be justified
in refusing to do so unless the charge is
too indefinitely stated to warrant the belief in the magistrate that an offense had
been committed, or that defendant was
the guilty party. The officer has a limited
discretion as to how far he relies on the
statement of the party. United States v.
Eldredge, 5 U. 161, 167, 13 P. 673, following New York cases.
Objection that county attorney did not
approve the issuance of warrant of arrest
of defendant comes too late when not
urged until after trial in court below; the
irregularity is thereby waived. State v.
Green, 78 U. 580, 604, 6 P. 2d 177.
8. Bemedies.
Failure to comply with this section will
not justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition. State v. Morse, 27 U. 336, 75 P.
739, 1 Ann, Caa. 711.
Collateral References.
Criminal Law<S=>216.
22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 316.
Arrest with warrant, 4 Am. Jur. 8, Arrest S 5 et seq.
Affidavit, who may take, as basis for
warrant of arrest, 16 A. L. B. 923.

77-12-2. Form of warrant.-—A warrant of arrest is an order in writing
in the name of the state, signed by a magistrate, commanding the arrest
of the defendant, and may be substantially in the following form:
State of Utah, County of
The State of Utah to any peace officer of said state (or of the county
of
):
Complaint on oath haying been this day made before me by A B,
that the crime of (designating it) has been committed, and accusing
C D thereof, you are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above
538
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trial depend upon its having been filed.
State v. Morgan, 27 XL 103, 74 P. 526.
The admitting in evidence of transcript
of testimony of witness who testified for
state on preliminary hearing, and was
cross-examined by counsel for defendant
at hearing, did not violate constitutional
right of defendant to be confronted by
witnesses where such witness was absent
from state. State v. Vance, 38 U. 1, 110
P. 434.
Under this section, the evidence before
the magistrate is not required to be and
is not reported and preserved, or certified
up, except in homicide cases or when
ordered on the request of the prosecuting
attorney. In all other cases, proof of what
the evidence before the magistrate was
would have to be made independently of
any record and by the testimony of witnesses who were present at the hearing
and heard the evidence. That defendant
at his own expense and for his own benefit
had proceedings before magistrate stenographically reported and transcribed, does
not help the matter. State v. Sheffield,
45 U. 426, 439, 146 P. 306.

Under this section and 77-15-31, transcript of testimony of witness on preliminary examination may be nsed at trial
for first-degree murder, where he eonld
not, after exercise of due diligence, be
found in the state. State v. fiillstrom,
46 U. 341, 150 P . 935.
6. Effect of waiver of preliminary examination.
Under this section, where accused, with
consent of the state, waived the preliminary examination, lie must be held to
have waived the necessity of the magistrate's hearing any testimony as to the
charge against him, so that there was no
testimony in such case to be heard or
"reduced to writing." State v. Mewhinney, 43 U. 135, 134 P. 632, L. B. A. 1916D,
590, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 537.
Collateral Beferencas.
Criminal Law$»236.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §341.

77-15-15. Custody and disposition of exhibits and depositions.—The
magistrate or his clerk must keep the depositions taken and exhibits
admitted as evidence on the examination until they shall be returned to
the proper court; and must not permit them to be examined or copied
by any person, except a judge of a court having jurisdiction of the offense,
or authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus, the attorney general, county
attorney or other prosecuting attorney, and the defendant and his counsel.
History: B. 8.1898 k 0. L. 1907, § 4671;
0. L. 1917, § 8751; B. 8. 1933 & 0. 1943,
105-15-15.
Compiler's Note.
This section is practically identical with
2 Comp. Laws 1888, §4884.

Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §870 (includes substantially same provision);
Idaho Code 1947, §19-813; Mont. Bev.
Codes 1947, §94-6112 (substantially identical).
Collateral Beferencas.
Criminal Law^»236.
22 OJ.8. Criminal Law §341.

7745-16. Violation a misdemeanor.—Every violation of the next preceding section is a misdemeanor.
History: B. 8.1898 * C. L. 1907, § 4672;
C. L. 1917, §8752; B. 8. 1933 * 0. 1943,
105-1M6.

Collateral Beferencas.
Criminal Law<£»236.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §341.

77-15-17. Defendant when and how discharged.—If after hearing the
proofs it appears that either no public offense has been committed, or that
there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of a public
offense, the magistrate must order the defendant to be discharged, by an
indorsement on the warrant or the complaint, signed by him, to the
following effect: "Tb*re being no sufficient cause to believe the within
566
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named A B guilty of the offense within mentioned, I order him discharged."
History: B. 8. 1898 k 0. L. 1907, § 4673;
C. L. 1917, §8753; E. 8. 1933 & C. 1943,
105-15-17.
Compiler's Note.
This section is practically identical with
2 Conip.'Laws 1888, §4885.
Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §871 (identical); Idaho Code 1947, §19-814; Iowa
Code 1950, § 761.17 (similar); Mont. Bev.
Codes 1947, §94-6113 (substantially identical).
1. Discharge of accused.
If upon the hearing it develops that

the crime charged has not been committed,
but that some other crime probably has
been committed, the magistrate need not
discharge the accused unconditionally, but
he may prepare, or direct the public
prosecutor to prepare a complaint in which
the offense which the magistrate finds was
committed is stated, and rearrest accused
upon that charge and give him an opportunity to either waive or insist upon an
examination, and give him time to procure
counsel if he desires to do so. State v.
Pay, 45 U. 411, 424, 146 P. 300.
Collateral References,
Criminal Law®»239.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §347.

77-15-18. When costs taxed against complainant—If the defendant on
a preliminary examination for a public offense is discharged as provided
in the next preceding section, and if the magistrate finds that the prosecution was malicious or without probable cause, he shall enter such judgment
on his docket and tax the costs against the complaining witness, and
execution may issue therefor.
History: E. 8.1898 & C. L. 1907, § 4674;
C. L. 1917, § 8754; E. 8. 1933 & C. 1943,
105-15-18.

Collateral References.
Criminal Law<&=>239.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 347.

77-16-19. Defendant held to answer—Order.—If it appears from the
examination that a public offense has been committed and that there is
sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate
must indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him, to the following
effect: "It appearing to me that the offense in the within complaint
mentioned (or any offense, according to the fact, stating generally the
nature thereof) has been committed, and that there is sufQcient cause to
believe the within named A B guilty thereof, I order that he be held to
answer to the same."
History: E. 8. 1898 * O. L. 1907, § 4675;
C. L. 1917, § 8755; B. 8. 1933 fc C. 1943,
105-15-19.

Names of witnesses to be indorsed on
information, 77-17-4, and on indictment,
77-20-3.

Compiler's Note.
This section is practically identical with
2 Comp. Laws 1888, §4886.

1. Bight to hold accused.
This section, which was taken from
California Penal Code, does not warrant
holding accused upon any charge except
upon the one contained in the complaint,
or for one that is embraced or included
therein. State v. Pay, 45 U. 411, 146 P.
300; State v. Sheffield, 45 U. 426, 146 P.
806.
Magistrate need not hold defendant
for charge specified in complaint but
may hold him for any offense embraced
therein. State v. Freeman, 93 U. 125.
71 P. 2d 196.

Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §872; Idaho
Code 1947, §19-815; Iowa Code 1950,
§ 761.18 (similar); Mont. Bev. Codes 1947,
§ 94-6114 (substantially identical).
Cross-Beference*.
Form of commitment, 77-15*24.
Magistrate to furnish list of witnesses,
77-15-32.
Magistrate to return papers to district
court, 77-15-32.
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Constitutional or statutory changes affecting grand jury or substituting information for indictment as an ex post facto
law, 53 A. L. E. 716.
Failure or refusal of grand jury upon

77-17-1

investigation to find indictment as affecting right to file information, 120 A. L. E.
713.
Leave of court to file information, 120
A. L. E. 358.

77-16-2. Defects prior to filing information or indictment—Waived
unless objection made before plea.—No defect or irregularity in or want
or absence of any proceeding or statutory requirement, prior to the filing
of an information or indictment, including the preliminary hearing, shall
constitute prejudicial error and the defendant shall be conclusively presumed to have waived any such defect, irregularity, want or absence of
proceeding or statutory requirement, unless he shall before pieading to
the information or indictment specifically and expressly object to the
information or indictment on such ground. Whenever the consent of the
state to any waiver by the defendant is required, such consent shall be
conclusively presumed, unless the state before or at the time the defendant
pleads to the information or indictment expressly objects to such waiver.
History: L. 1935, ch. 123, § 1; 0. 1943,
105-16-2.
Title of Act.
An act relating to waiver of any defect
or irregularity in or want or absence of
any proceeding or statutory requirement
prior to the filing of any information or
indictment, including the preliminary
hearing, unless objection thereto is made
before plea.
Cross-Beferences.
Failure to move to quash indictment or
information as constituting waiver of
objections, 77-23-10.
Objection to defects in or lack of arraignment required before making plea to
save error, 77-22-18.
Objection to information on ground of
lack of subscription or verification, 7721.5.
_
,
A M ^
1. Accused not represented by counsel.
"Any objections based upon the want

of, or irregularities in, a preliminary hearing must be taken before pleading to
the information." This applies to lack of
counsel at the preliminary hearing to
represent defendant charged with homicide. State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 338, 142
P. 2d 178, 181.
2

« Presumption of regularity,
In criminal proceedings charging defendant with offense of carnal knowledge
and unlawful knowing female over 13
ig y e a r 8 o f a g e > h e l d t h a t
a n a un^eT
amendments in complaint which changed
date of alleged offense were presumed to
have been regularly made, where record
was silent as to any objection by defendant before appeal, and that date of alleged offense was not material State v.
Gates, — U. —, 220 P. 2d 115.
„
. _ .
Collateral References.
Indictment and Information@=>5.
42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations
§3.

CHAPTER 17
THE INFORMATION
Section 77-17-1.
77-17-2.
77-17-3.
77-17-4.

Filing after examination and commitment.
When information is not filed—Nolle prosequi.
Amendments—New information ordered filed, when.
Contents.

77-17-1. Piling after examination and commitment.—When a defendant
has been examined and committed as provided in this Code it shall be
the duty of the district attorney, within thirty days thereafter, to file in
the district court of the county in which the offense is triable an inf orma575
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ment or within ten days thereafter, but not less than four days before the
trial of such cause, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney in such
cause, notice in writing of his intention to claim such defense, and in
case of a claimed alibi, such notice shall include specific information as
to the place at which the accused claims to have been at the time of the
alleged offense.
If the defendant fails to file such notice he shall not be entitled to
introduce evidence tending to establish an alibi. The court may, however,
permit such evidence to be introduced where good cause for the failure
to file the notice has been made to appear.
History: L. 1985, dL 120, § 1 ; O. 1943,
105-22-17.
Title of Act
An act requiring defendants in criminal
eases to give notice of a proposed defense
of alibi.
1. Burden of proof.
The section does not operate to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant;
and the state, in all eases where the presence of the accused is necessary to render
him responsible, must prove that he was
there, and if from all the evidence there
exists a reasonable doubt of his presence,

he should be acquitted. State v. Whitely,
100 U. 14, 110 P. 2d 337.
Where court In trying criminal ease
without jury expressed in his findings the
belief that burden was on defendant to
establish defense of alibi, conviction
would be rerersed. State T. Whitely, 100
U. 14, 110 P. 2d 337.
Collateral References.
Criminal Law£=>286.
22 (U.S. Criminal Law § 436.
Instructions disparaging
alibi, 146 A. L. B. 1377.

defense

of

77-22-18. Arraignment—Failure to or irregularity in does not invalidate proceedings.—Neither a failure to arraign nor an irregularity in the
arraignment shall affect the validity of any proceedings in the cause if
the defendant pleads to the indictment or information and/or proceeds to
trial without specifically and expressly objecting to such failure or
irregularity.
History: L. 1035, en. 121, § 1; O. 1043,
105-22-18.
Title of A c t
An act providing for waiver of irregularity in arraignment or failure to arraign
unless objection is made.

Collateral References,
Criminal LawS=>262.
2 2 C# r,8# C r i m i n a l
*
I * w 8 *° 8 -

CHAPTER 23
MOTION TO QUASH
Section 77-23-1.
77-23-2.
77-23-8.
77-23-4.
77-23-5.
77-23-6.
77-23-7.
77-23-8.
77-23-9.
77-23-10.

Time to move to quash or plead.
Demurrers abolished—Motion to quash substituted.
Motion to quash—Grounds.
Form, contents, omissions.
When motion shall be heard.
Hearing on motion to quash.
Order on motion to quash—Entry thereof—Failure to enter.
Effect of sustaining the motion to quash.
Order sustaining not a bar to another prosecution.
Effect of failure to move to quash.

77-33-1. Time to move to quash or plead.—Upon being arraigned the
defendant shall immediately, unless the court grants him farther time,
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77-23-3

either move to quash the information or indictment, or plead thereto, or
do both. If he moves to quash, without also pleading, and the motion is
withdrawn or overruled he shall immediately plead.
History* I* 1035, cb. 118, § 1; 0. 1948,
105-2M.
Compiler's Kote.
LSWB 1935, eh. 118, § 1, repealed chapter
23, Title 105, Bevised Statutes of 1933, the
sections of which were numbered 105-23-1
to 105-23-6, and enacted a new chapter 23.
_
^
1. Time to move to quash.
Under our Code, motions to quash must
eome before plea and trial. State v. Sheffield, 45 U. 426, 439, 146 P. 806.
Generally speaking, matters presenting
questions relating to the examination, or
that the information charged an offense
other than and different from that described in the complaint, or that defendant was not given an examination of the
offense charged, or to defects, other than
substance and sufficiency, in the informa-

tion, mnst be presented before plea and
trial. State v. Sheffield, 45 V. 426, 433,
146 P. 806.
Motion to qnash information or Indictment for misjoinder of offenses must be
timely made, otherwise defendant waives
right to object on that ground, in view of
this section and 77-23-10. Bogerson v.
Harris, 111 U. 330, 178 P. 2d 397.
Collateral Beferences.
Indictment and Information®»139.
42 C.J.8. Indictments and Informations
§199.
Objections to indictments and informations, 27 Am. Jur. 694, Indictments and
Informations {137 et seq.
Bight of accused to attack indictment
or information after reversal or setting
aside of conviction, 145 JL L. B. 493.

77-23-2. Demurrers abolished—Motion to quash substituted.—Demurrers to the information or indictment are hereby abolished. All defenses
heretofore available to the defendant by demurrer, or by a motion to set
aside or quash the information or indictment, and which are available
under this Code, shall hereafter be taken by a motion to quash the
information or indictment or a count thereof.
History: L. 1935, chu 118, §1; O. 1943,
105-23-2.

Collateral Beferences.
Indictment and Informational36.
42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations
§195.

77-23-3. Motion to quash—Grounds.—-A motion to quash the information or indictment shall be available only on one or more of the following
grounds. In the case of:
(1) Either an information or indictment:
(a) That it does not charge the defendant with the commission of an
offense.
(b) That the court has ordered a bill of particulars under the provisions of section 77-21-9 and the prosecuting attorney fails to furnish a
sufficient bill.
(c) That the defendant is misnamed in the information or indictment.
In such case if his true name is inserted, or if he refuses to give his true
name, the motion shall be overruled.
(d) That the information or indictment contains a statement of matter
which constitutes a legal justification of the offense charged, or other legal
bar to the prosecution.
(e) That it appears from a bill of particulars furnished under the
provisions of section 77-21-9 that the particulars stated do not constitute
the offense charged in the information or indictment, or that the defendant
did not commit that offense, or that a prosecution for that offense is
637
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barred by the statute of limitations. If the prosecuting attorney shall
furnish another bill of particulars which so states the particulars as to
make it appear that they constitute the offense charged and that the offense
was committed by the defendant, and that it is not barred by the statute
of limitations, the motion shall be overruled.
(f) That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction TDf offense
charged or of the person of the defendant.
<g) That there is more than one offense charged except as provided
in section 77-21-31 of this Code.
(2) An information:
(a) That an information was filed without the defendant first having
had or waived a preliminary examination.
(b) That the provisions of section 77-17-4 or of section 77-21-5 were
not complied with. If, on the hearing of the motion, the prosecuting
attorney complies with the provisions of such section or sections the
motion shall be overruled.
(c) That the prosecuting attorney had no authority to file the information.
(3) An indictment:
(a) That there was irregularity in the drawing, summoning, examining, or impaneling of the grand jury which returned the indictment,
provided it is made to appear that actual and substantial injustice and
prejudice has resulted or will result to the accused in consequence of
such irregularity.
(b) That a person, other than a grand juror, was present while the
grand jurors were deliberating or voting and there is reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant was in fact prejudiced thereby.
(c) That the requisite number of grand jurors did not concur in
finding the indictment.
(d) That the grand jury had no authority to inquire into the offense
charged.
If a motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the information
or indictment which can be cured by amendment the court shall order
the amendment to be made and shall overrule the motion.
History: L. 1935, clt 118, § 1 ; 0. 1943,
105-23-3; L. 1947, ch. 14, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1947 amendment rewrote subdivision 3 (a) pertaining to irregularity of
grand jnry.
The references in this section to sections 77-21-9, 77-21-31, 77-17-4 and 77-215 appeared in Code 1943 as sections 10521-9, 105-21-31, 105-17-4 and 105-21-5.
Oross-Eeferences,
Amendments, 77-17-3, 77-21-45.
Harmless or prejudicial nature of errors,
defects or omissions in indictment or information, 77-21-43, 77-21-44, 77-53-2.
Name of defendant, 77-21-1L

Penal statutes not strictly construed.
76-1-2.
Procedure upon misjoinder of counts,
77-21-44.
Quashal for variance between bill of
particulars and indictment or information,
77-21-10.
Bequiring giving of true name upon arraignment, 77-22-14.
Requisites of indictment or information,
77-21-1 et seq.
1. Grounds for quashal.
The language of this section is exclusive, and there is no authority for allowing other grounds for quashing an indictment than such as are specified therein. United States v. Cutler. 5 U. 608, 19
P. 145.
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It shall specify distinctly the ground of objection relied on and the court
shall hear no objection other than that stated in the motion. It shall be
entered of record but a failure to so enter it shall not affect the validity
of any proceeding in the cause.
History: L. 1935, eh, 118, f l ; 0. 1943,
105-23-4.
Compiler's Koto.
This section is similar to B. 8. 1933,
105-23-3. It was derived from the Callfornia Penal Code and is much the same
in its provisions. Deering's Cal. Penal
e>
'
1. Objections to jurisdiction.
Defendant has constitutional right to
have his case tried by court having ju«
risdiction, and his mere failure! during

trial, to object to jurisdiction, assumed
by court, does not constitute waiver of
that right nor prevent him from raising
question of jurisdiction in 8upreme Court
on appeal. State v. Morrey, 23 U. 273,
64 P. 764, applying section since repealed,
But see State v. Durfee, 77 U. 1, 290 P.
962.
Collateral References.
Indictment and Information*»138.
42 CJ.8. Indictments and Informations
§200.

77-23-5. When motion shall be heard.—The motion to quash shall be
heard immediately on its being made unless, for good cause, the court
postpones the hearing. The court shall not postpone the hearing for any
longer time than may be necessary.
History: 7* 1935, eh. 118, § 1; O. 194% guage thereof. Deering's Cal. Penal Code,
105-23-5.
§ 998.
Compiler's Note.
Collateral Beferences.
This section is similar to B. 8. 1933,
Indictment and InformationS»140(l).
105-23-4. It was derived %om California
42 C.J.8. Indictments and Informations
Penal Code and closely follows the Ian- {214.

77-23-6. Hearing on motion to quash.—All issues which arise upon a
motion to quash shall be tried by the court.
History: L. 1985, oh. 118, 11; 0. 194S,
105-234.

Collateral References,
Indictment and Information«»140(l).
42 CJ.B. Indictments and Informations
{214.

77-23-7. Order on motion to quash—Entry thereof—Failure to enter.—
The order of the court quashing an information or indictment or overruling the motion to quash the information or indictment shall be entered
of record, but a failure to make said entry shall not affect the validity
of any proceeding in the cause.
History: X* 1935, eh. 118, §1; O. 1943,
105-23-7.

Collateral Beferences.
Indictment and Inf ormation£»141.
42 CJ.8. Indictments and Informations
{215.

77-23-8. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash.—If the motion to
quash is sustained the court may order that a preliminary hearing be
had or that another information be filed or that the matter be again
submitted to a grand jury. If one of the aforementioned orders is made,
the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he is admitted to
bail If none of such orders is made or if another information is not
filed within such time as is specified in the order or within such other or
further time as the court may allow for good cause shown or if the matter has been ordered to be submitted to a grand jury and a new indictment
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is not found by the aame or the next succeeding grand jury having authority to inquire into the offense, the defendant, if in custody, shall be
discharged therefrom unless he is in custody on some t>ther charge; or if
he has been released on bail, he and his sureties shall be exonerated, or
if he has deposited money instead of bail the same shall be refunded to him.
History: L. 1935, ch. 118, § 1; C. 194%
105-23-8.
Gross-Reference.
Dismissal of prosecutions, 77-51-1 et
•eq.
1, Effect of sustaining motion.
If motion to quash information is sustained and defects are not amendable,
defendant must be discharged. State v.
Potello, 42 V. 396, 401, 132 P. 14, following State T. Topham, 41 U. 89, 123
P. 888.

Information charging defendant with
unlawful cohabitation on a certain day,
which failed to name the cohabitees of
the opposite sex, should have been
quashed, and where the preliminary
hearing was waived by defending, the
court should have directed the filing of a
new information. State v. Jeasup, 98 IT.
482, 100 P. 2d 969.
Collateral References.
Indictment and Information$s>141.
42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations
1215.

77-23-9. Order sustaining not a bar to another prosecution.—An order
sustaining the motion to quash, is not a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense.
History: L. 1935, dL 118, § 1 ; 0. 1948,
105-23-9.
Compiler's Note.
This section is similar to B. 8. 1933,
105-23-6.
Oross-Reference.
Dismissal without judgment as not barring further prosecution, 77-24-11.
1. Effect of sustaining motion.
In prosecution for adultery under
former statutes, where defendant bad
filed certain objections in writing to information reciting that it appeared by
record in justice's court that defendant
was not, prior to filing of information,
given statutory right of preliminary
examination for offense charged in in*
formation, and prayed that information
be set aside and quashed, held that such
motion could not be treated as demurrer
to information, but as motion tinder
former statute, and if sustained, would
not bar another prosecution for same offense. State v. Springer, 40 IT. 471, 121
P. 976.

2. Effect of sustaining demurrer.
Under former statute, sustaining of
demurrer to information, charging acts
allegedly intended to procure miscarriage of pregnant woman, and discharging
of defendant, ^without direction that another inf ormanon be filed or that ease be
submitted to grand jury, held bar to defendant's prosecution on subsequent information for identical alleged offense on
same woman. State v. Crook, 16 U. 212,
51 P. 1091, followed in Tooele City • .
Hoffman, 42 U. 596, 602, 134 P. 558, Applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 4976.
This section also takes the place of
former 105-24-8, now repealed, under
which it was held that a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a complaint under
the former practice was final and a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense. Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 XT. 696,
602, 134 P. 558, following State T. Crook,
16 U. 212, 219, 51 P. 1091, which latter
ease applied California law.
Collateral References.
Indictment and Inf ormation$=>142.
42 C.J.8. Indictments and Informations
{215.

77-23-10. Effect of failure to move to quash.—If the defendant does
not move to quash the information or indictment before or at the time
he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which
are grounds for a motion to quash except those which are also grounds
for a motion in arrest of judgment.
History: L. 1935, clu 118, $ 1 ; C. 1043,
105-23-10.

Oross-Eefereacefl.
Defects prior to indictment or information waived unless objection made before plea, 77-16-2. •
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tions. State v. Rosenberg, 84 U. 402, 35
P. 2d 1004.
Collateral Beferences.
Criminal Law<S=>949(l).
23 C J . 8 . Criminal Law §1468.

77-39-1

Acceptance of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence as waiver of error or
right to appeal or to move for new trial,
117 A. L. B. 929.

CHAPTER 39
APPEALS
8ection 77-39-1.
77-39-2.
77-39-3.
77-39-4.
77-39-5.
77-39-6.
77-39-7.
77-39-8.
77-39-9.
77-39-10.
77-39-11.
77-39-12.
77-39-13.

Who may appeal.
Parties, how designated.
By defendant, in what eases.
Appeal by state, in what eases.
Time for taking.
Taken by filing and serving notice.
Service by publication.
Effect of appeal by state.
Effect of appeal by defendant.
Stay of execution.
Restoring custody to original officer on stay.
Clerk to transmit record on appeal—Filing.
Appeal by one or more defendants tried jointly—Effect.

77-39-1. Who may appeal.—-Either party in a criminal action may,
except in cases appealed from a justices' court, appeal to the Supreme
Court as prescribed in this chapter
History: B. 8.1898 6 0. L. 1907, § 4955
0. L. 1917, §9205; B. 8. 1933 * C. 1943,
105-40-L
Compiler's Note.
This section was derived from 2 Comp.
Laws 1888, S 5134, and is practically identical therewith.
Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, § 1235; Idaho
Code 1947, §19-2801; Mont. Bev. Codes
1947, §94-8101 (similar).
Orose-Beferences.
Appeal from city court criminal eases,
77-35-18, 78-4-14.
Appeal from eity justice's conrt, 78-5-14.
Appeals by state in eases arising under
Liquor Control Act, 32-8-50.
Appeals from district court, Const. Art.

vnf, §9.
Appeals from justice's court, 77-57-38
to 77-57-52, 78-5-14.
Appeals from order of sterilization, 6410-10.
Appeals to district court from inferior
courts, 10-7-75, 78-3-5.
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court,
78-2-2.
1. Appealable judgments, orders and decrees.
Under this section, no appeal lies to
Supreme Court from an order of district

court discharging a person from arrest
upon a writ of habeas corpus. Mead v.
Metcalf, 7 U. 103, 25 P. 729.
This section and 77-39-3 do not authorize an appeal from a judgment of conviction in a contempt proceeding. Ex parte
Whitmore, 9 U. 441, 448, 35 P. 524, applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§ 5134, 5136, both
of which are similar to present section.
2. Appeals of cases originating in city
and justices' courts.
In criminal case originating in justice's
court and appealed to district court, Supreme Court, under provisions of Constitution, could not review errors except those
which related to or assailed validity or
fact under which defendant was convicted.
State v. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563, 200 P.
894, 26 A. L. B 696.
This section does not authorize an appeal by a city or town from a judgment
of district court, on appeal from city
court, discharging defendant from custody, even though constitutionality of
ordinance under which defendant was
prosecuted was in issue. Town of Scipio
v. Olsen, 71 U. 328, 265 P. 1117. following
Castle Dale City v. Woolley, 61 U. 291,
212 P. 1111.
Collateral Beferencee,
Criminal LawG=>1023%.
24 CJ . 8 . Criminal Law § 1658.
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Criminal prosecutions, 2 Am. Jur. 984,
Appeal and Error § 226 et seq.

Acceptance of probation, parole, or tuspension of sentence as waiver of error or
right to appeal or to move for new trial,
117 A. L. R. 929.

77-39-2. Parties, how designated.—The party appealing shall be known
as the appellant, and the adverse party as the respondent, but the title
of the action shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal
History: R. 8.1898 s O . L 1907, §4956;
C. L. 1917, § 9206; R. 8. 1933 ft C. 1943,
105-40-2.
Compiler's Note.
This section is practically identical with
2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 5135.

Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, § 1236; Idaho
Code 1947, §19-2802; Mont. Bev. Codes
1947, §94-8102 (substantially identical).
Collateral References.
Criminal Law§»1004.
24 C.J.6. Criminal Law § 1623.

77-39-3. By defendant, in what cases.—An appeal may be taken by
the defendant:
(1) From a final judgment of conviction.
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial
rights of the party.
History: B. 8. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 4957;
C. L. 1917, § 9207; B. 8. 1933 It C. 1943,
105-40-3.
Compiler's Note.
This section was 2 Comp. Laws 1888,
§ 5136.
Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, § 1237; Idaho
Code 1947, §19-2803 (includes substantially same provisions); Mont. Bev. Codes
1947, § 94-8103 (similar).
Cross-References.
See 77-39-1.
Appeal lies from final judgments, Const.
Art. VIII, § 9.
Defendant shall have the right to appeal in all criminal cases, Const. Art. I,
§12.
Power of Supreme Court on appeal, 7742-3.
1. Validity.
Subdivision (2) is not inconsistent with
Const. Art. I, § 12. State v. Morgan, 23
U. 212, 230, 64 P. 356.
2. Appealable Judgments, orders and decrees.
This subdivision applies only to orders
made after final judgment, which, of
course, could not be reviewed on an appeal from the judgment. People v. Hill,
3 U. 334, 359, 3 P. 75.

Neither an order of resubmission after
demurrer to indictment sustained, nor an
order refusing to discharge a defendant
pending investigation by the grand jury
to which charge is thus resubmitted, is
appealable. People v. Hill, 3 IT. 334. 359.
3 P. 75.
An appeal does not lie to Supreme Court
from the judgment and conviction for contempt. Elliot v. Whitmore, 10 U. 246, 253,
37 P. 461, following People v. Owens. 8
U. 20, 28 P. 871.
Order refusing to grant new trial is
appealable. State v. Morgan, 23 U. 212,
64 P. 356.
Orders made in capital eases under
chapter 36 of this title are not appealable.
State v. Gardner, 62 U. 156, 217 P. 1111.
This section gives defendant no right
of appeal from order of trial court refusing to order a sanity inquisition under
the provisions of 77-48-2 to 77-48-6, unless
such orders or rulings of the court denied
or affected some substantial right of defendant. State v. Green, 88 U. 491, 499,
55 P. 2d 1324, following State v. Gardner, 62 U. 156, 217 P. 1111.
Collateral References,
Criminal Law$=>1023(l).
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1656.
Buling against defendant's attack upon
indictment or information as subject to
review by higher court, before triaL 133
A. L. B. 934.

77-39-1 Appeal b~ state, in what oases.—-An appeal may be taken
by the state:
(1) From a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant upon
a motion to quash the information or indictment.
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(2) From an order arresting judgment.
(3) From an order made after judgment affecting the substantial
rights of the state.
(4) From an order of the court directing the jury to find for the
defendant.
History: B. 8. 1898 * C. L. 1907, $ 4958;
0. I*. 1917, §9208; B. 8. 1933, 105-40-4;
L. 1935, clL 132, § 1 ; 0. 1943, 105-40-4.
Compiler's Note.
The 1935 amendment rewrote subdivision (1).
Comparable Provisions.
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §1238; Idaho
Code 1947, § 19-2804 (includes substantially same provisions); Mont. Bev. Codes
1947, §94*8104 (similar).
Cross-Beferences.
Appeal by state in eases arising under
Liquor Control Act, 32-8-50.
Appeal by the state does not stay judgment, 77-39-8.
1. Judgments and orders appealable by
the state.
This section does not give defendant
named in writ of habeas corpus, nor
people, right of appeal from order discharging a person upon hearing of writ.
In re Clasby, 3 U. 183, 1 P. 852, applying Comp. Laws 1876, § 1553.
State held to have had no right of
appeal from ruling of district court that
it had no jurisdiction or authority to
impanel twelve-person jury to try defendant, indicted for noncapital felony
prior to, but not brought to trial until
after, statehood. State v. Hart, 19 U. 438,
57 P. 415.
District court's judgment, discharging
defendant in criminal prosecution and
releasing his bail, entered on plea to
court's jurisdiction, held final judgment
from which state might appeal to Supreme Court. State v. Booth, 21 TJ. 88,
59 P. 553.
State has right of appeal from judgment discharging defendant, in prosecution for felony, on ground that information does not state facts sufficient to
constitute public offense. State v. McKenna, 24 TJ. 317, 67 P. 815.

In prosecution for unlawful possession
of intoxicating liquors, state could appeal from dismissal of defendant on
ground information was insufficient to
charge an offense, where appeal was
taken in time. 8tate v. Bickenberg, 58
TJ. 270, 198 P. 767.
Under former statute held, this section did not allow appeal by city from
judgment of city justice's court directing verdict for defendant in action for
violation of ordinance. Castle Dale City
v. WooUey, 61 TJ. 291, 212 P. 1111.
State may not appeal under Const. Art.
V m , §9, and this section, from order
quashing and setting aside information
because no preliminary examination nor
order of commitment had been made by
magistrate, since only final judgments are
appealable. State v. Thompson. 69 17. 282,
254 P. 147.
2. Judgment on appeal.
Under this section, on appeal from
judgment and order discharging accused
from custody after he has pleaded and
trial begun, on ground that no proper
preliminary examination was had, Supreme Court can only reverse, and cannot make order requiring district court
to reinstate case, and proceed to try
defendant upon information filed against
him. State v. Gustaldi, 41 U. 63, 72, 123
P. 897, applying Comp. Laws 1907, § 4958,
which is much like present section. See
77-42-1.
Collateral Beferencee.
Criminal LawG=»1023(l).
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1656.
Constitutionality of statute permitting
appeal by state in criminal case, 113 A. L.
B. 636, 157 A. L. B. 1065.
Decision quashing or dismissing indictment or sustaining demurrer thereto, right
of prosecution to review, 92 A. L. B. 1137.
Bight of state to writ of certiorari in
criminal case, 109 A. L. B. 793.

77-39-5. Time for taking.—All appeals in criminal cases must be taken
within two months after the entry of the judgment appealed from, or,
if a motion for a new trial is made, within two months after notice of
the denial of the motion.
History: B. 8.1898 ft C. L. 1907, § 4959;
J" ^ i 6 ' ^ J ^ J H ^ i ^ J ^ Z ' J S S ?
L. 1925, ch. 113, § 1; B. 8. 1933 * 0.1948,
105-40-5.

Compiler's Note.
T h i s 8 ction w
*
*s 2 Comp. Laws 1888,
r
* sigg.
' *
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CHAPTER 1
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Section
77-M.
77-1-2.
77-1-3.
77-1-4.
77-1-5.
77-1-6.

Short title.
Criminal procedure prescribed.
Definitions—Peace officer classifications.
Conviction to precede punishment.
Prosecuting party.
Rights of defendant.

77-1-1. Short title.—This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Utah Code of Criminal Procedure."
History: C. 1953, 77-1-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, i 2.
Title of Act
An act relating to criminal procedure; enacting the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure with
chapters relating to: preliminary provisions;
prosecution, screening and diversion; security
to keep the peace; suppression of resistance to
service of process; impeachment; removal by
judicial proceedings; arrest; lineups;freshpursuit; grand juries; indictments; pleas;
affirmative defenses; mental examinations;
trials; judgment; execution; bail; attendance of
witnesses outside the state; subpoena power
and immunity; search and administrative warrants; interception of communications; disposal
of property received by peace officer; justice's
courts; criminal identification; pardons and

paroles; Western Interstate Corrections Compact; disposition of detainers against prisoners;
extradition; reciprocal enforcement of support;
counsel for indigent defendants; defense costs;
rendition of prisoners as witnesses; and interstate furlough; and providing an effective date.
This act repeals Title 77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and enacts chapters 1 through 34 of
Title 77, Utah Code Annotated 1953.—Laws
1980, ch. 15.
Repealing Clause.
Section 1 of Laws 1980, ch. 15 provided:
Title 77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is repealed."

77-1-2. Criminal procedure prescribed.—The procedure in criminal
cases shall be as prescribed in this title, the rules of criminal procedure, and
such further rules as may be adopted by the supreme court of Utah.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15,12.

77-1-3. Definitions—Peace officer classifications.—For the purpose of
this act:
(1) "(Mminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is charged,
accused and brought to trial for a public offense;
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation, in writing, presented by a grand
jury to the district court, charging a person with a public offense;
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person with a
22
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public offense which is presented and signed by a prosecuting attorney and
filed in the office of the clerk where the prosecution is commenced or subscribed and sworn to by a complaining witness before a magistrate if the
offense is a class B misdemeanor or a lesser offense not requiring approval of
the prosecuting attorney;
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice of the supreme court, a judge of the district courts, a judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the circuit courts and a
justice of the peace or a judge of any court created by law; and
(5) All peace officers shall be classified as peace officers—category I, peace
officers—category II, or federal officers.
(a) Category I:
Any sheriff or deputy sheriff, police officer or marshal of any county, city
or town, investigators of the motor vehicle business administration, the
commissioner of public safety and any sworn member of the department of
public safety, all persons specified in section 23-20-1.5, or any police officer
employed by any college or university; provided, howeVter, any police force
established by a private college or university shall, prior to exercising its
police power, make application to the commissioner of public safety and be
certified by the commissioner as meeting rules and regulations promulgated
by the department of public safety.
(i) Category I peace officers shall have statewide peace officer authority;
provided, however, such authority shall extend to other counties, cities, or
towns only when the officer acts in accordance with chapter 9 of title 77;
provided, however, such limitation shall not apply to any peace officer employed by the state.
(ii) Category I peace officers shall satisfactorily complete the peace officer
training academy and such annual certified training as the director of the
division of peace officer standards and training, with the advice and consent
of the council on peace officer standards and training, shall direct; provided,
however, in no event shall such training consist of less than 40 hours per
year. Any category I peace officer not previously satisfactorily completing
such academy or having failed to satisfactorily complete such academy within
18 months from the date of his appointment, or who fails to satisfactorily
complete the annual training shall automatically be prohibited from exercising
any peace officer powers.
(b) Category II:
State capitol security officers, reserve or auxiliary police of the state and
any county, city, or town, correctional employees of the division of corrections, constables and deputy constables, school district security officers, special agents or investigators for the attorney general and county attorneys,
jailors, railroad special agents deputized by a county sheriff pursuant to section 17-22-2, and all other persons designated by statute as having peace
officer status.
(i) Category II peace officers shall have total peace officer authority when
on duty and when acting in relation to the responsibilities of the peace
officer's agency; provided, however, category II peace officers shall have the
powers of a category I peace officer over felonies or misdemeanors committed
within their presence.
(ii) Category II peace officers shall successfully complete a training pro-
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not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except
upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel.
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural
person.
History: C. 1953, 774*4, enmcted by L.
1980, eh. 14,11.

77*35-5. Rule 5—Information and indictment—(a) Unless otherwise
provided, all criminal prosecutions whether for felony, misdemeanor or infraction shall be commenced by thefilingof an information or the return of an
indictment. Prosecution by information shall be commenced before a magistrate having jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have been committed unless
otherwise provided by law.
(b) Unless otherwise provided, no information shall befiledbefore a magistrate charging the commission of a felony or class A misdemeanor unless the
prosecuting attorney shall first authorize the filing of such information. This
restriction shall not apply in cases where the magistrate has reasonable cause
to believe that the person to be charged may avoid apprehension or escape
before approval can be obtained.
History: C. 1953, 77-35-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 14,11.

77-35*6. Rule 6—Warrant of arrest or summons.—(a) Upon the return
of an indictment the magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the
arrest or a summons for the appearance of the accused.
Upon the filing of an information, if it appears from the information, or
from any affidavit filed with the information, that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused has committed it, the magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a
summons for the appearance of the accused.
(b) If it appears to the magistrate that the accused will appear on a summons and there is no substantial danger of a breach of the peace, or injury to
persons or property, or danger to the community, a summons may issue in
lieu of a warrant of arrest to require the appearance of the accused. If the
defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue. A warrant of arrest may
issue in cases where the defendant has failed to appear in response to a summons or citation or thereafter when required by the court. When a warrant of
arrest is issued, the amount of bail shall be fixed by the magistrate and stated
on the warrant.
(c) (I) The warrant shall be executed by a peace officer. The summons may
be served by a peace officer or any person authorized to serve a summons in a
civil action.
(2) The warrant may be executed or the summons may be served at any
place within the state.
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(3) The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendants. The
officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest,
but upon request shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon as practicable. If the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at the time of
the arrest, he shall then inform the defendant of the ofifense charged and of
the fact that the warrant has been issued. The summons shall be served as in
civil actions, or by mailing it to the defendant's last known address.
(4) The person executing a warrant or serving a summons shall make return thereof to the magistrate as soon as practicable. At the request of the
prosecuting attorney, any unexecuted warrant shall be returned to the
magistrate for cancellation.
History: C. 1953, 77-35-6, enacted by L.
1980, eh. 14, S 1.

77-35-7. Rule 7—Proceedings before magistrate.—(a) (1) When a
summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant shall appear
before the court as directed in the summons.
(2) When any peace officer or other person shall make an arrest with or
without a warrant the person arrested shall be taken to a magistrate pursuant^ to section 77-7-19. If a magistrate is not available in such circuit or
precinct, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. If an information has not beenfiledone shall be filed
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(3) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
committed he shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county
wherein the crime was committed and shall be taken before the proper magistrate as provided in these rules. If, for any reason, the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to such county, he shall, without unnecessary
delay, be taken before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail and released thereon or other appropriate disposition.
Bail, if taken, shall be returned forthwith to the proper magistrate having
jurisdiction over the offense together with the record made of the proceedings before such magistrate.
(4) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon
the defendant's first appearance before him, inform the defendant:
(i) Of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy
thereof to him;
(ii) Of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how he may obtain the same;
(iii) Of his right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense to him if he is unable to obtain his own counsel;
(iv) Of his rights concerning bail or other circumstances under which he
may obtain pre-trial release; and
(v) That he is not required to make any statement and that the statements
he does make may be used against him in a court of law.
The magistrate shall thereupon allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel before proceeding further and shall allow him
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to contact any attorney by any reasonable means without delay and without
fee.
(b) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate
shall call upon the defendant to plead. If the defendant enters a plea of guilty,
he shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided by law. If the defendant
enters a plea of not guilty, a trial date shall be set and it may not be extended
except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held in accordance with these
rules and law applicable to criminal cases.
(c) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he shall not be called on to plead
before the committing magistrate. During the initial appearance before the
magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination, and
the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall forthwith order the
defendant bound over to answer in the district court. If the defendant does
not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. Such examination shall be held within a reasonable
time, but in any event not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody
for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if he is not in custody;
provided, however, that these time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination shall not be held if the
defendant is indicted.
(d) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held in accordance with the
rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state
shall have the burden of proof and be required to proceed first with its case.
At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath,
call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine
the witnesses against him. If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable
cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith order, in writing,
that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings
of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to
evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination. If the magistrate does not find
probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed or that
the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and
discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge shall not
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.
(2) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party the magistrate may order all spectators to be excluded from the courtroom.
(3) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court,
the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall forthwith
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of
the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings and the
typewritten transcript, if made, in the magistrate's court.
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(e) Whenever a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the
sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order.
(f) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness
in a case pending before him will not appear and testify unless bond is required, he may fix a bond, with or without sureties and in such sum as he may
deem proper, for the appearance of the witness. If the witness fails or refuses
to post the bond with the clerk of the court, the magistrate may commit him
to jail until he complies or is otherwise legally discharged. If the witness does
provide bond when so required, he may be examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the defendant and his testimony shall
be recorded, whereupon he shall be discharged. If the witness thereafter is
unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent hearing or trial when ordered
to do so, the recorded testimony may thereafter be used at the hearing or
trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness.
History: C. 1953, 77-35-7, enacted by L.
1980, eh. 14,11.

77-35-8. Rule 8—Appointment of counsel.—A defendant charged with a
public offense, other than an infraction, who is indigent and unable to obtain
counsel shall have the right to have counsel appointed for him or to represent
himself.
History: C. 1953, 77-85-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 14, S 1.

77-35-9. Rule 9—Joinder of offenses and of defendants.—(a) Two or
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged arise out of a criminal
episode as defined in section 76-1-401. A felony offense and a misdemeanor
offense may be charged in the same indictment or information if:
(1) They arise out of a criminal episode; and
(2) The defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to the
misdemeanor along with the felony offense.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct
or in the same criminal episode.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise,
orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to
be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than
one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information, or by a
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the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to
any other prosecution for the offense charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party.
The iiyured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or
in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in
the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the
performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony.
History: C. 1953, 77*35-25, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 14, S 1.

77-35-26. Rule 26—Appeals.—(a) An appeal is taken by filing with the
clerk of the courtfromwhich the appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the
order or judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof of service of such copy shall be
filed with the court.
(b) An appeal may be taken by the defendant:
(1) From the final judgment of conviction;
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(3) From an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the supreme court decides that such an appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(4) From any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental disease or defect, incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(c) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution:
(1) From afinaljudgment of dismissal;
(2) From an order arresting judgment;
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution because of afindingof double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(4) From a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part thereof
invalid; or
(5) From an order of the court granting a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence when, upon a petition for review, the supreme court decides that such
an appeal would be in the interest of justice.
(d) (1) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or arrest
of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the motion is
given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving such notice shall be filed
with the court.
(2) No appeal shall be dismissed except for a material defect in the taking
thereof, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant.
The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another appeal can
be, and is, timely taken.
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(e) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(f) Appeals may be submitted on briefs and if an appellant's brief is filed
the appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon due notice of the hearing, shall fail to appear for oral argument.
(g) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals shall govern criminal
appeals to the supreme court except as otherwise provided.
(h) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, the case
shall be automatically reviewed by the supreme court within 60 days after
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless the time is
extended by the supreme court for good cause. A case involving the sentence
of death shall have priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in
disposition by the supreme court.
(i) The rules of practice for district and circuit courts promulgated by the
judicial council and approved by the supreme court relating to appeals from
circuit courts shall govern criminal as well as civil appeals.
(j) An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from all final orders and
judgments rendered in a district court or juvenile court in accordance with
the provisions of this rule.
(k) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered
in the justice court in accordance with the provision of this rule, except as
follows:
(1) The case shall be tried anew in the district court and the decision of the
district court shall be final except in cases where the validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court;
(2) Within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court
shall transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the original
pleadings, all notices, motions and other papers filed in the case and the
notice and undertaking on appeal;
(3) Stay of execution and relief pending appeal shall be in accordance with
Rule 30; and
(4) All further proceedings shall be in the district court, including any process required to enforce judgment.
History: C. 1953, 77-35-26, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 14,11.

77-35-27. Rule 27—Stays pending appeal.—(a) (1) A sentence of death
shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for other relief is pending.
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be stayed if an
appeal is taken and a certificate of probable cause is issued.
(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order or judgment
in favor of the defendant may be granted by the court upon good cause pending disposition of the appeal.
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be issued if the court hearing the
application determines that there are meritorious issues that should be decided by the appellate court. A certificate of probable cause may be issued by
the trial court or, if denied by the trial court, by the court to whom an appeal
is taken. The application for a certificate of probable cause shall be in writing,
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78-5-102. Offices of justice court judges.
(1) Justice court judges holding office in:
(a) county precincts are county justice court judges; and
(b) cities or towns are municipal justice court judges.
(2) With the concurrence of the governing bodies of both the county and
municipality, a justice court judge may hold both the offices of county and
municipal justice court judge.
History: C. 1953, 76-M02, enacted by L.
1889, ch. 157, t 11.

Effective Dates. — Lews 1989, ch. 157,
i 51 makes the act effective on July 1,1989.

78-5-103. Territorial jurisdiction.
(1) The territorial jurisdiction of county justice courts extends to the limits
of the precinct for which the justice court is created and includes all cities or
towns within the precinct, except cities where a municipal justice court or
municipal department or primary location of the circuit court exists.
(2) The territorial jurisdiction of municipal justice courts extends to the
corporate limits of the municipality in which the justice court is created.
History: C. 1953, 78-5-103, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 157, § 12.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157,
i 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.

78-5-104. Criminal jurisdiction — Concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction — Preliminary examinations —
Small claims.
(1) Justice courts have criminal jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors and infractions and have civil jurisdiction over small claims cases
and related proceedings.
(2) (a) Municipal justice courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the
following offenses committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court:
(i) all city or town ordinances; and
(ii) offenses charged under Title 41 except driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a blood alcohol content of .08%
or higher, and reckless driving.
(b) Municipal justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court over the following offenses committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court:
(i) class B and C misdemeanors;
(ii) driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a
blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, and reckless driving; and
(iii) infractions.
(c) Municipal justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of small claims cases under Chapter 6, Title 78, if the defendant
resides in or the debt arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice
court.
(3) (a) County justice courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses charged under Title 41 when committed within the territorial ju67
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risdiction of the court, except driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, and reckless
driving.
(b) County justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit
court over the following public offenses committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court:
(i) class B and C misdemeanors;
(ii) driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a
blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, and reckless driving;
(iii) city or town ordinances of municipalities within the precinct,
except those in which a municipal justice court, or a primary location
or municipal department of the circuit court exists; and
(iv) infractions.
(c) County justice courts in counties which do not have a primary location of the circuit court have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary examinations to determine probable cause of felony informations, except those
charging capital offenses or first degree felonies, if the justice court proceedings are made a matter of record.
(d) County justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit
court of small claims cases under Chapter 6, Title 78, if the defendant
resides in or the debt arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice
court.
History: C. 1953, 78-5-104, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 157, i 13.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 157,
t 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989
Cross-References. — Criminal jurisdiction
of justice courts, Chapter 25 of Title 77.

Informations and indictments, Rule 5, Rules
of Criminal Procedure
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

78-5-105. Jurisdiction of justice court and juvenile court
(1) Justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court over
traffic misdemeanors and infractions committed by persons 16 or 17 years of
age and that occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, except those
offenses exclusive to the juvenile court under Subsection 78-3a-16(l)(a). The
justice courts do not have jurisdiction of offenses committed by persons 16 or
17 years of age that are alcohol or drug related traffic offenses, reckless driving, fleeing an officer, leaving the scene of an accident, and driving on a
suspended license.
(2) If the traffic offense involves the conviction of a person 16 years of age or
older but younger than 18 years of age for an offense under Section
78-3a-39.5, the justice of the peace shall notify the juvenile court of the conviction.
(3) The justice court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and
return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for
suspension under Section 41-2-128.
(4) Justice court judges may transfer matters within the court's jurisdiction
under this section to the juvenile court for postjudgment proceedings according to rules of the Judicial Council.
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Art. I, § 13

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prose-*
cuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the
State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment.
The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.
"Grand jury" defined, § 78-46-4.

History: Const 1896; L. 1947, S.J.R. 5.
Cross-References. — Formation, powers,
and duties of grand jury, § 77-10a-l et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Examination.
Grand jury.
Information.
Juveniles.
Cited.
Examination.
Under territorial laws, preliminary examination was not indispensable to finding of indictment or trial thereon, and thus neither
would indispensability attach to any steps connected with conduct of such examination.
Thiede v. People, 159 U.S. 510,16 S. Ct. 62,40
L. Ed. 237 (1895).
When defendant is called on to plead and
interposes no objection that he has been unlawfully committed or has not waived examination
before magistrate, and goes to trial without objection, examination will be presumed to have
been waived. State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457,52
P. 986 (1898).
Where defendant was charged by information with fornication and bound over by committing magistrate, but information was
quashed on ground that offense was barred by
limitations, court could not authorize district
attorney to file new information and place defendant on trial for offense separate and distinct from one charged in first information
without again taking defendant before committing magistrate for preliminary examination.
State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085
(1908).
The examination may be waived by the accused in every case. If the entire proceeding
may be waived, any part thereof may likewise
be waived, and such a waiver may be deemed
to have taken place, unless accused at the
proper time and in a proper manner indicates
that he does not waive anything. State v.
Gustaldi, 41 Utah 63, 123 P. 897 (1912).
If accused waives a preliminary examina-

tion, he waives the necessity of the magistrate's hearing testimony, and, therefore, there
is no testimony to be reduced to writing. State
v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135,134 P. 632,1916D
L.R.A. 590, 1916C Ann. Cas. 537 (1913).
The right of a preliminary examination is a
substantial one. State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411,146
P. 300, 1917E Ann. Cas. 173 (1915).
If accused waives examination before magistrate, and state consents thereto, all that magistrate has authority to do is to require accused
to appear before district court to answer charge
contained in complaint and no other. State v.
Pay, 45 Utah 411,146 P. 300,1917E Ann. Cas.
173 (1915).
The provisions of this section were not complied with in prosecution for having carnal
knowledge of a female, where defendant was
subjected to preliminary examination for act
committed on one date specifically stated in
information and tried for another act alleged to
have been committed on a later date. State v.
Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860 (1918).
Right to preliminary examination hereunder
may be waived by failure to move to quash
information. Where information charged both
rape and adultry but preliminary examination
related only to rape, defendant's failure to
move to quash or to demur specially to the information as duplicitous, or to object thereto
until after plea of not guilty, waived those defenses. State v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 252 P.
280 (1926).
Preliminary hearing conducted by district
judge in prosecution for indictable misdemeanor of conspiracy to extort money satisfied
requirements of this section. State v. Mclntyre,
92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879 (1937).
Right of district court to try person for felony
rests upon filing of proper indictment by grand
jury, or filing of proper information by district
attorney or other proper counsel for state, and
such information can be filed properly only af-
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77-1-2. Criminal procedure prescribed.
The procedure in criminal cases shall be as prescribed in this title, the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and such further rules as may be adopted by the
Supreme Court of Utah.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, i 2.
Cross-References. — Annexation of county
as affecting prosecutions and prisoners,
§§ 17-2-5, 17-2-12.

Effect of creation of new county on pending
prosecutions and prior offenses, §§ 17-3-7,
17-3-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Common law.
As the state is bound by the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is unnecessary to inquire
what was the rule at common law when the
statute speaks. United States v. Cannon, 4
Utah 122, 7 P. 369, affd, 116 U.S. 55, 6 S. Ct.
278, 29 L. Ed. 561 (1885).
This section excludes all common-law prac-

tice. United States v. Cutler, 5 Utah 608,19 P.
145 (1888).
The rules for testing an indictment in this
state are those prescribed by Code of Criminal
Procedure, and not the rules of the common
law. People v. Kerm, 8 Utah 268, 30 P. 988
(1892).

77-1-3. Definitions.
For the purpose of this act:
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is
charged, accused and brought to trial for a public offense;
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation, in writing, presented by a grand
jury to the district court, charging a person with a public offense;
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person
with a public offense which is presented and signed by a prosecuting
attorney and filed in the office of the clerk where the prosecution is commenced or subscribed and sworn to by a complaining witness before a
magistrate if the offense is a class B misdemeanor or a lesser offense not
requiring approval of the prosecuting attorney;
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice of the Supreme Court, a judge of the
district courts, a judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the circuit courts
and a justice of the peace or a judge of any court created by law.
History: C. 1953, 77-1-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 68, § 1; 1983, ch.
212, § 1; 1985, ch.174, § 2; 1985, ch. 212,
§ 16.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment by ch. 174 deleted Subsection (5), which
related to classification of peace officers.
The 1985 amendment by ch. 212 would have
deleted "and regulations'* after "rules" in two
places in Subsection (5); and substituted "Department" for "division" in three places in Sub-

section (5); however, pursuant to the directive
of the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, the repeal of Subsection (5) by
Laws 1985, ch. 174 has been given effect.
Meaning of "this act" — See note under
same catchline following § 77-1-1.
Cross-References. — Indictments generally, § 77-12-1 et seq.
Prosecutions of public offenses, Rule 4,
U.R.Cr.P.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Effect of pardon and expungement
—Professional licensing hearing.
Those persons who have access to the sealed
record, who testified at the previous criminal
hearings, or whose testimony is bolstered by

reference to the sealed record cannot be al"recreate" the record in proceedings
*&** &e record has been expunged. Ambus v.
State Bd. of Educ, 800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990).

l o w e d to

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Expunction of federal arrest § 241(a)(4), (11) of Immigration and Nationalrecords in absence of conviction, 97 A.L.R. Fed. ity Act of 1952 (8 USCS § 1251(a)(4), (11)),
652.
making aliens deportable for crimes involving
Effect of expungement of conviction on moral turpitude or drugs, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 750.

CHAPTER 18a
THE APPEAL
Section
77-18a-l.
77-18a-2.

Appeals — When proper.
Capital cases.

77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper.
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 7, i 10.
Compiler's Notes. —- This chapter
recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former
Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure. For notes to cases
construing that rule, see the Court Rules volume.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 7, § 12
makes the act effective on July 1, 1990.
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78-5-104. Jurisdiction.
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction, except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) County justice courts may not conduct preliminary examinations to determine probable cause of felony informations, except under rules of the Judicial Council.
(3) Justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of
small claims cases under Title 78, Chapter 6, if the defendant resides in or the
debt arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice court. Prior to accepting small claims affidavits, a justice court shall be certified as competent
to determine small claims pursuant to Section 78-5-139.
History: C. 1953, 78-5-104, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 157, § 13; 1991, ch. 268, S 39.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective January 1,1992, deleted former
Subsections (2), (3)(a), and (3)(b); redesignated
former Subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d) as present
Subsections (2) and (3); rewrote Subsection (1),
which read "Justice courts have criminal jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors and
infractions and have civil jurisdiction over
small claims cases and related proceedings,"
and Subsection (2) which read "County justice
courts in counties which do not have a primary
location of the circuit court have jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary examinations to determine probable cause of felony informations, except those charging capital offenses or first de-

gree felonies, if the justice court proceedings
are made a matter of record"; and substituted
"Justice" for "County justice" in the first sentence and added the second sentence in Subsection (3).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157,
§ 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.
Cross-References. — Criminal jurisdiction
of justice courts, Chapter 25 of Title 77.
Informations and indictments, Rule 5, Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Transfer to district court of counter, cross or
third-party claims in excess of jurisdiction,
Rule 13(k), U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
tices' courts and was inconsistent with other
statutory provisions. Dillard v. District Court,
69 Utah 10, 251 P. 1070 (1926).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Amount in controversy.
—Interest.
—Waiver of excess.
Failure to pay fine.
Personal jurisdiction.
—Waiver of objections.
Preliminary hearing.
—Felony.
Representation of state.
Violation of game laws.
Violation of Sunday laws.
Venue.
Presumptions.

Amount in controversy.

Constitutionality.
Laws 1925, ch. 62, amending former
§ 20-5-4 (Code 1943) and limiting jurisdiction
ofjustices' courts to offenses committed in their
respective precincts, was valid against claim
that it might produce confusion and derangement in criminal practice and procedure in jus-

—Interest
In action on promissory notes, brought in
justices' court, held that, notwithstanding
judgment prayed for was within justices' jurisdiction, justice could not properly award plaintiff judgment in excess of $300 (the former jurisdiction limit), although excess over that
amount consisted of interest that had
accumulated on notes after action was begun.
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v.
Marchant, 11 Utah 68, 39 P. 483 (1895).
In determining amount in controversy, interest was to be deemed part of "sum claimed"
whether claimed in complaint or not, at least
where it was legal consequence of an obligation
or demand without stipulation. Wheatley v.
Oregon Short Line R.R., 49 Utah 105,162 P. 86
(1916).
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GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES 78-7-17.5
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges § 21
gt geq

C.J.S. — 48A C.J.S. Judges § 53 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Judges •=> 23.

78-7-17. Powers of every judicial officer.
Every judicial officer has power:
(1) to preserve and enforce order in his immediate presence, and in
proceedings before him, when he is engaged in the performance of official
duty.
(2) to compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided by law.
(3) to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a proceeding before
him in the cases and manner provided by law.
(4) to administer oaths to persons in a proceeding pending before him,
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of his
powers and duties.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-7-17.

Cross-References. — Oaths and affirmations, power to administer, § 78-24-16.
Subpoenas, §§ 78-24-4 to 78-24-6.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal
Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 223.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges § 21
et
*&lC.J.S. — 48A C.J.S. Judges § 53 et seq.
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of state

court's order precluding publicity or comment
about pending civil case by counsel, parties, or
witnesses, 56 A.L.R.4th 1214.
Propriety of trial court order limiting time
for opening or closing argument in civil case —
g t a t e u^^
7 1 A.L.R.4th 130.

78-7-17.5. Authority of magistrate.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a magistrate as defined in Section
77-1-3 shall have the authority to:
(a) commit a person to incarceration prior to trial;
(b) set bail and release upon the payment of bail and satisfaction of any
other conditions of release;
(c) issue warrants of search and arrest;
(d) conduct an initial appearance in a felony;
(e) conduct arraignments;
(f) conduct a preliminary examination to determine probable cause;
and
(g) issue temporary orders as provided by rule of the Judicial Council.
(2) In a first degree or capital felony, only a judge of a court of record may
set or deny bail or commit a person to imprisonment prior to trial. Except as
provided in Subsection 78-5-104(2), in felony cases only a judge or commissioner of a court of record may conduct an initial appearance, preliminary
examination, or arraignment.
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Rule 7

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest §§ 4,7 Bail it 23, 54; 22 CJJS. Criminal Law § 334
to 17; 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and Recognizance et seq.
§ 23.
Key Number*. —Arrest«» 65 to 68; Bail«»
C.J.S. — 6A CJJS. Arrest $1 4 to 9; 8 CJ.S. 42, 49; Criminal Law *» 215 to 220.

Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate.
(1) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(2) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to a magistrate under Section
77-7-19. If a magistrate is not available in the circuit or precinct, the person
arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail.
If an information has not been filed, one shall befiledwithout delay before the
magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(3) (a) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
committed he shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county
where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the proper
magistrate under these rules.
(b) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under
Subsection 77-7-21(1), he may state in writing that he desires to forfeit
bail, waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and
consent to disposition of the case in the county in which he was arrested,
held, or present.
(c) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which
the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue
in that county.
(d) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the
warrant.
(e) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a
conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), he shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section 77-20-1.
(f) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate.
(4) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon
the defendant's first appearance before him, inform the defendant:
(a) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy to
him;
(b) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how to obtain them;
(c) of his right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense to him if he is unable to obtain his own counsel;
(d) of his rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and
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(e) that he is not required to make any statement, and that the statements he does make may be used against him in a court of law.
(5) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under Subsection
(4) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow him to contact any attorney by
any reasonable means, without delay and without fee.
(6) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea.
(a) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided by law.
(b) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not
be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these
rules and law applicable to criminal cases.
(7) (a) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he may not be called on to
enter a plea before the committing magistrate. During the initial appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a
preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate
shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court.
(b) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the
defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days
if he is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if
the defendant is indicted.
(8) (a) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden
of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine the witnesses
against him.
(b) Iffromthe evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be
bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly
raised at the preliminary examination.
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it,
the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
(9) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either
party, may exclude witnessesfromthe courtroom and may require witnesses
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators
to be excluded from the courtroom.
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(10) (a) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records
made of the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any typewritten transcript.
(b) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order.
(11) (a) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material
witness in a case pending before him will not appear and testify unless
bond is required, he mayfixa bond with or without sureties, and in a sum
he considers adequate, for the appearance of the witness.
(b) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the
court, the magistrate may commit him to jail until he complies or is
otherwise legally discharged.
(c) If the witness does provide bond when required, he may be examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the
defendant and his testimony shall be recorded. He shall then be discharged.
(d) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, deleted the subsection designation (a) at the beginning of the
section; rewrote present Subsection (3), which
read I f a person is arrested in a county other
than where the offense was committed he shall
without necessary delay be returned to the
county wherein the crime was committed and
shall be taken before the proper magistrate as
provided in these rules. If, for any reason, the
person arrested cannot be promptly returned to
such county, he shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken before a magistrate within the
county of arrest for the determination of bail
and released thereon or other appropriate disposition. Bail, if taken, shall be returned forthwith to the proper magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense together with the record
made of the proceedings before such magistrate"; redesignated former Subsections
(a)(4)(i) to (a)(4)(v) as present Subsections
(4)(a) to (4)(e); substituted "pretrial release, including bail" for "bail or other circumstances
under which he may obtain pretrial release" in
Subsection (4)(d); inserted subsection designation (5) and substituted "after providing the
information under Subsection (4)" for "thereupon"; redesignated former Subsection (b) as
present Subsection (6) and inserted the designations (a) and (b) therein; redesignated former Subsection (c) as present Subsection (7);
redesignated former Subsections (dXD to (d)(3)
as present Subsections (8) to (10); deleted "if
made, in the magistrate's court" at the end of

the introductory paragraph of present Subsection (10); redesignated former Subsections (e)
and (f) as present Subsections (10)(a> and
(10)(b); and made minor stylistic changes
throughout.
The 1988 (2nd S.S.) amendment divided former Subsection (3)(e) into present Subsections
(3)(e) and (3)(f); substituted '"under Section
77-20-1 and released on bail or held without
bail under Section 77-20-1" for "and released
on bail or by other appropriate disposition" and
made a punctuation change in present Subsection (3)(e); made a phraseology change in Subsection (5); substituted "enter a plea" for
"plead" in Subsection (6); divided Subsection
(7) into Subsections (7)(a) and (7)(b); substituted "enter a plea" for "plead" in the first sentence of Subsection (7)(a); added the (a) designation to the beginning of Subsection (10); redesignated former Subsection (10)(a) as Subsection (10)(b) and former Subsection (10)(b) as
present Subsections (ll)(a) to (ll)(d); and
made minor stylistic changes.
Laws 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, i 5 provides:
"This act takes effect on January 1,1989, if the
BAIL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT is
approved by the voters during the next general
election." The bail constitutional amendment,
amending Utah Const., Art. I, i 8, was proposed by Laws 1988 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint
Resolution No. 1, and approved in November
1988.
Cross-References. — Court reporters,
§ 78-56-1.1 et seq.
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ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial, 60
A.L.R.4th 1063.
Prosecutor's appeal in criminal case to rarial, national, or religious prejudice as ground
for_mistrial, new trial, reversal, or vacation of
sentence-modern
cais,
70 A.L.R.4th
664.
in state criminal case
on basis
of recanted
tesStandard for granting
or A.L.R.4th
denying new
trial
timony—modern
cases, 77
1031.
Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial

in federal criminal case during its progress as
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 85
A.L.R Fed 13.
'Recantation 'of testimony of witness as
_
.
_ i a *» Fed.
_ „_60.
^ a l fi^^«i «^«„„«i «««
94MA.L.R.
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«">**&
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Rule 25. Dismissal without trial.
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the
court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party,
order an information or indictment dismissed.
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial;
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any
bill of particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed;
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the
impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury;
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and
entered in the minutes.
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the
offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with respect
to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged
and bail exonerated.
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to
any other prosecution for the offense charged.
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party.
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or
in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in
the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the
performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony.
Cross-References. — Detainers against
prisoners, dismissal of action for failure to
bring to trial, § 77-29-1.
Dismissal not a bar to further proceedings,
§ 77-1-7.

Dismissal where evidence not sufficient to
establish offense charged, Rule 17.
Right to speedy trial, Utah Const., Art. I,
Sec 12' § 77-1-6
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 512 to 519; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 859 to 875.
C.J.S. — 22A C J.S. Criminal Law § 610 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of statute
authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon
settlement of civil liability growing out of act
charged, 42 A.L.R.3d 315.
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or

prosecution because of failure of jury to agree
after successive trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274.
What constitutes "manifest necessity" for
state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing
subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having attached, 14 A.L.R.4th 1014.
When does delay in imposing sentence violate speedy trial provision, 86 A.L.R.4th 340.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 574,
576.

Rule 26. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the courtfromwhich the
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record.
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of afindingof double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or
arrest ofjudgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice
shall be filed with the court.
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another
appeal may be, and is, timely taken.
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails
to appear for oral argument.
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(4) Upon receipt of the Offense Tracking Numberfrombooking personnel,
the prosecutor shall forward the number immediately to the court.
(5) If the defendant appears at court and does not have the summons form
with the date and time of booking and the Offense Tracking Number, court
personnel shall instruct the defendant to go immediately to the jail or other
designated place for booking and release. If possible, court personnel shall
postpone the arraignment in order to allow sufficient time for the booking to
be accomplished prior to arraignment.
(Added effective March 31, 1992.)

Rule 4-610. Appointment of justice court judges to preside
at preliminary hearings.
Intent*
To establish the criteria for the appointment of justice court judges to preside at preliminary hearings.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district courts, the circuit courts and the justice
courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) The presiding district court judge may, on a case by case basis, appoint a
justice court judge to preside at a preliminary hearing if:
(A) the justice court judge consents to the appointment;
(B) the justice court judge has either completed a course in the conducting of preliminary hearings or has presided over at least five preliminary
hearings prior to the effective date of this rule; and
(C) either:
(i) no judge or commissioner of a trial court of record within the
district is reasonably able to conduct the preliminary hearing within
the time period specified by law and the parties are unwilling to
stipulate to an extension of the time period; or
(ii) the parties, on the record or in writing, stipulate to the appointment.
(2) The Justice Court Administrator shall maintain a list of those justice
court judges who meet the qualifications set forth in paragraph (1)(B) above.
(3) The administrative office shall offer courses in the conducting of preliminary hearings, and shall pay the expenses of justice court judges attending
such courses not offered in conjunction with the annual justice court judges
conference.
(4) Preliminary hearings conducted pursuant to this rule shall be conducted on the record.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)

Rule 4-611. Probable cause determinations for purposes of
detention.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for conducting probable cause determinations for the purpose of determining whether a person arrested without a
warrant is to be detained.
984

